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Abstract
The rights literature is full of accounts of rights, and each captures important aspects of
the nature and function of rights. But none of the leading theories offers a comprehensive
account of the nature and function of rights that both stands up under the pressure of
counterexamples and can buck accusations of internal inconsistency.
In this paper I embrace much of Nicholas Wolterstorff's work on justice and the relation
of human rights to worth, and I propose changes to his account in order to strengthen it. I evoke
the works of Johan Galtung, Richard Rubenstein, and Elizabeth Anderson in order to equip my
"Wolterstorffian" account with the ability to address structural injustice, structural violence, and
concentrated disadvantage. I offer that human rights (morally legitimate claims) supervene on
human worth and facts of the matter about that which is good for things like us, and I argue that
this supervenience of rights on worth is best understood as indexed to particular socio-moral
contexts. Human worth is inalienable, and from socio-moral context to socio-moral context our
morally legitimate claims may vary based on the details of the socio-moral context we find
ourselves in. All of the preceding will be controversial--far more controversial than the claims
"humans have value," "humans are morally considerable," or "humans have rights."
Toward the latter part of my paper, I take an applied turn. I offer that if consensus cannot
be reached on why, exactly, humans are valuable or what, exactly, rights are, then what is
needed is a "Rawlsian maneuver" with which we can lean forward into territory that enjoys
relative consensus: that humans have rights (whatever those are and for whatever reason they
are had). From that place of relative consensus (humans have rights) I apply my
"Wolterstorffian" account of rights and justice to the area of anti-Black racism in the American
context. The application of my account to sins like slavery, various Jim Crow policies, and
contemporary structural racism or direct racial violence demonstrates the moral legitimacy of
two different (in kind) sets of claims to race reparations. The first set of morally legitimate claims
to race reparations will include claims to compensation for past wrongs, in the sense of

corrections for damages, back-pay for stolen labor, or compensation for stolen life. The second
set of morally legitimate claims to race reparations will include claims to structural reform and
the disruption of protracted anti-Black structural violence, in the sense of affirmative action
policies, police and education reform, and the disruption of inequitable distributions of power.
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Introduction
In the latter half of the 20th century, most of the world’s nations committed themselves to
the United Nations’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.1 These global commitments
ushered in progress in international child labor laws and child soldiering laws, they elevated the
recognized status and social situation of women, and they provided a moral framework for
multilateral condemnations of genocide, Apartheid, war crimes, etc. The Declaration was a
momentous event of global political significance. In the last quarter-century, however, global
powers have lessened their commitments to the Declaration of Human Rights. The Trump
Administration, in particular, recently went so far as to announce that the United States would
no longer be a member of the global human rights council.2 This back-pedaling is an alarming
change in how the nations of the world formally conceive of their political and moral obligations
toward vulnerable people, and it is already accompanied by weakening assurances that
individuals’ rights will be maintained and championed by nation-states in a human rightssensitive global order.3
In the context of this shifting international moral framework, I will offer an understanding
of justice that is anchored to a robust inherent human rights framework. I will offer a notion of a
normatively forceful human right that is ultimately reducible to talk of proper respect for human
worth, and my concept of justice will sit atop that understanding of human rights. In the
American public sphere, reasonable and passionate dialogue is taking place regarding progress
and regression in American race relations—engaging conversations about history,
considerations of our political duties to one another and to the State, considerations of the
State’s duties to the historically wronged, policy conversations about affirmative action and

United Nations, “Universal Declaration.”
Lee and Lederman, “Trump Administration Pulls.”
3
See the Syrian refugee crisis (Reid, “Refugee Crisis”), the migrant crisis at the US-Mexico border (Jervis
et al., “The Migrants”), crises of ethnic cleansing in Myanmar among the Rohingya Muslims (Albert and
Maizland, “Rohingya Crisis”), and the lack of international political will to reassert the conditions of peace
in these various situations.
1
2
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reparations, etc. I want to contribute to that interdisciplinary conversation an understanding of
justice according to which justice is grounded in proper respect for the tremendous worth of
human beings and I will present the implications my model of justice will have in those other
applied domains: that Black Americans have morally legitimate claims to race reparations of two
different varieties, one a claim to direct compensation for past wrongs and the other a claim to
structural reform. I call mine a rights-first theory of justice.
My work will pursue answers to, and will be guided by, two primary questions:
Q1.

What is justice?

and, as an application of (1),
Q2.

What are the requirements of justice with regard to Black Americans
today, in light of historical wrongs?

I will explore some of the implications of my rights-first framework of justice in the domain of
American anti-Black racism, answering the question: What are the requirements of justice?
within that particular context in order to illuminate the kinds of demands that my model of justice
places on contemporary moral agents in the light of the kinds of injustices that there have been
and currently are in our world. I will explore the relation of the immense worth of rights-holders
to the systems, structures, and institutions in which rights-holders are located.
I will make the case that justice is ultimately conceivable in terms of proper respect for
human worth, by which I will just mean:
•

a rights-holder’s worth is properly respected if and only if both the rights-holder is
treated in those ways of being treated to which she has morally legitimate claim
and the rights-holder is granted those goods to which she has morally legitimate
claim.

The core claim of my theory of justice is:
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•

a state of affairs is ‘just’ in which every rights-holder gets that to which they have
morally legitimate claim, and in which no rights-holder is treated in ways that
demean them.

Defined as such, I will think of justice as an ideal state of affairs to which we ought to aspire,
with the understanding that justice cannot be instantiated in our world at scale. No global state
of affairs in the real world will actualize justice, because
i.

In no global state of affairs in the real world will it be the case that each rightsholder gets all of that to which she has morally legitimate claim, and because

ii. In all global states of affairs in the real world there will, of course, be at least one
rights-holder who is treated in a way that demeans them (that is, in a way that
fails to respect their worth).
A conjunction of my definition of justice, certain facts about human nature, and facts about the
limited availability of resources that are crucial to human well-being will make it clear that under
this definition of justice we should not expect the ideal justice to be actualizable at the scale of
nation or society.
However, I do believe that particular relationships can be accurately characterized as
just. That is, while I do not believe justice is actualizable in this world on a broad scale, I do
believe that a relationship between two particular moral agents, or a relationship between a
particular rights-holder and the State or some other institution, can be properly characterized as
just. Each such particular relationship will be characterized as just in virtue of the particular
rights-holders receiving that to which they have morally legitimate claim and in virtue of the fact
that the person or institution to which they are socially situated is not treating them in a way that
disrespects them or their worth. So while my theory of justice will not allow me to characterize
global states of affairs as actually just, it will allow me to characterize local relationships and
states of affairs as actually just, and it will provide an ideal to which we as political creatures—
members of global systems and institutions—may aspire. The ideal justice should be taken to
3

elucidate what, exactly, has gone wrong in a given instance of injustice, and it will follow from a
conception of justice that is ultimately grounded in human worth and inherent human rights that
any correction of injustice will take as its aim a proper respect for the worth of those affected
moral patients.
Because we cannot reasonably expect to attain to the just society, in which all human
worth is respected, we must move the goalposts and make our aspiration the justly structured
society, in which some human worth is inevitably disrespected but with guardrails in place to
right existing wrongs. Pursuit of the ideal will be inevitably frustrated, but the ideal justice should
inform us as we ask, for instance, “What are the requirements of justice with regard to Black
Americans today, in light of historical wrongs?” We should deal with the world and with our own
moral and societal limitations as they present themselves to us. We may certainly think about
and discuss the ideal justice in meaningful ways in theoretical spaces and, as I have said, at
some levels of social interaction in the real world justice is instantiated (as when one person
appropriately respects the worth of another person); but as we think about the whole world and
of entire societies, I join the pragmatic theorist in theorizing about the world as it is—perpetually
riddled through with some disrespect or another for human worth. So my project makes its goal
the justly structured society.
We can evaluate states of affairs in terms of justice and injustice at an even more
granular level than that of the relationship between two particular moral agents—we can
evaluate a state of affairs in terms of justice and injustice at the level of the particular rights and
duties that obtain between a moral patient and moral agent. Indeed, this is the context in which
talk of rights is most familiar, in the context of the particular moral entities (particular rights) that
obtain between a moral agent and patient (whether we are speaking of individuals, groups, or
the State). After all, the moral relationship between a moral agent and patient is a complex of
rights and duties, and there is a manifold of ways in which one could treat a single person both
justly and unjustly at any given time. We could conceive of, for instance, a parent meeting his or
4

her obligation to his or her child with regard to the provision of food and shelter, yet the parent
failing in some other respect, as in with regard to emotional support or in-home education. Such
a relation of a parent to his or her child could be evaluated to be just along some dimensions
(i.e., in accord with the requirements of certain rights) but unjust along others (i.e., not in accord
with the requirements of other rights). That the justice or injustice of states of affairs can be
evaluated along a spectrum of fine-grained analysis to coarse-grained analysis complicates
things, but everyday experience indicates that the domains of justice and the moral relations we
stand in to others are in fact deeply complicated.
I set my account of justice atop a robust and realist take on human worth and rights.
Without having yet argued for anything, here is a preview of my account of rights: broadly
endorsing Nicholas Wolterstorff’s work,4 I will conceive of human rights as the morally legitimate
claims that human beings make on one another (and on the State, organizations, institutions,
etc.), the moral legitimacy of which is established by their having the requisite kind of worth. In
much of the rights literature, rights and claims are separate entities (see Hohfeld’s framework,
which I cover in Chapter 1). But here, I have just identified rights with morally legitimate claims
in a way that may give pause. I insist on that identity and not for merely semantic reasons. It is
my view that our rights just are the morally legitimate claims that we have against one another;
in the case of animals, the unconscious, the very young, and potentially other sorts of beings
that cannot exercise a claim, the claims are to be made and enforced by guardians or
governments on the claimant’s behalf. There are distinctions to be made here between
i.

rights themselves (or claims themselves),

ii. the act of claiming, and
iii. that which is claimed,

4

Wolterstorff, “Rights and Wrongs.”
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but, in my view, that to which we have a right and that to which we have legitimate claim are
identical. And of course, the verbal “to claim” has no equivalent in “rights” locutions. (“To right”
is nonsensical.)
So, I hold to the identity of rights as claims and what I mean when I say “I have the right
to perform activity X or the right to good or treatment Y” is just that “I have the morally legitimate
claim against another to their treating me in ways consistent with my performing activity X or
attaining good or treatment Y.” It is in that sense that I mean that our rights just are our morally
legitimate claims. There is nothing morally substantive to rights above and beyond the claims
themselves. Later, I will offer that rights are “normatively binding social relations” à la
Wolterstorff and perhaps one will insist that, surely, claims and normatively binding social
relations are not the same thing! So here I will grant a potential caveat: if “rights” refers to
anything that “claims” obviously does not, it is the social relation that obtains between two
rights-holders. Under that view, which I am happy to entertain for the sake of getting on with
things, a right would be a conjunction of two elements: the social relation that obtains between
two rights-holders and the morally legitimate claim of one rights-holder against the other. Thus,
rights as social-relation-plus-claim (which echoes Wolterstorff’s rights as normatively binding
social relations). That is not my preferred way of carving up this space conceptually, though,
because another of my commitments is that every rights-holder is necessarily socially situated,
so the claims made by rights-holders always occur in social situations and in tandem with
particular social relations. Claims are intrinsically social things—they are a claim of one against
another. So, while I do not think it is nonsense to insist on some conceptual space between the
notion of a right and the notion of a claim (rights as social-relation-plus-claim, for instance), I
hold that it is the case that every instance of a human right is an instance of an intrinsically
social claim (or set of claims). When we point to (intrinsically social) morally legitimate claims,
we also point to rights; when we point to rights, we also point to (intrinsically social) morally
legitimate claims.
6

All of that to say: while I understand the desire for a rigid distinction between the notion
of a claim and the notion of a right, and while I am willing to entertain such a distinction, my
notion of claims as being intrinsically social shows this more complicated notion of a right (right
as social relation plus claim) to be redundant. Under my view, rights are social-relations-plusclaims, but they are such because claims are intrinsically social things (because rights-holders
and those who bear corollary duties are necessarily socially situated), not because we need to
add something to the picture to distinguish between rights and claims. Were one not socially
situated in any sense (that is, were one in no relation whatsoever to any other moral agent,
state, institution, etc.), the necessary preconditions for having rights and making claims would
fail to obtain; but as I have indicated and will indicate, nobody is “not socially situated in any
sense.” Moral agents are necessarily socially situated; claims are intrinsically social. My
preferred locution is rights are claims, and I am happy to grant all the Hohfeldian incidents
entailed by the Hohfeldian notion of a “claim,” as he characterized claims.
These morally legitimate claims have normative force in virtue of the objective worth of
human beings and it is their worth that makes rights-holders morally and normatively salient. It
is our worth that makes our morally legitimate claims against others normatively forceful;
respect for that worth just is a moral agent’s granting to the rights-holder those behaviors and
goods to which the rights-holder has legitimate claim. Our rights are socio-moral properties that
we have in particular social contexts as a function of both the kind of thing we are (human) and
the life-goods that objectively safeguard our well-being; rights supervene on worth in
individuated socio-moral contexts, and human worth supervenes on the fact of rights-holders’
humanity.5 And justice or injustice sit atop all of it.

In Chapter 3, I clarify that “the fact of a rights-holder’s humanity” is just whatever non-value essential
property or set of non-value essential properties or status it is on which human worth supervenes and is
universal to every human. Human worth sits in a modal relation atop this fundamental and essential
property of humans: humanity. I conceive of human worth as supervening on humanity, but one is free to
adopt their own view regarding whether human worth inheres in humanity, or is grounded in humanity, or
somehow reduces to humanity. I will offer that human worth supervenes atop the essential property
5
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The justly structured society can be described in these general terms: when society is
justly structured, there are mechanisms in place for the correction of injustices and wrongs,
though even justly structured societies should not be expected to fully actualize justice. To be
finer-grained, the justly structured society will be conceived of as that society which is
structured:
i.

in such a way that it is possible to render to persons all of that to which they have
morally legitimate claim by other members in the moral community,

ii. in such a way that the State and other public institutions render to persons all
that they owe to them, and
iii. in such a way that persons are protected by enforceable laws from actions of
others who would demean them or withhold from them their right.
Even in those justly structured societies, there will be wrongs that need to be addressed,
and there will be avoidable deficits of mental and somatic realizations that needs to be
resolved.6 Condition (i) is a necessary condition of the justly structured society because
in order for a society to be justly structured it is necessary that the systems, institutions,
distributions of resources, and founding documents of that society are not such that they
actively preclude the fulfillment of the morally legitimate claims that obtain between
rights-holders. I include (ii) as a necessary condition of the justly structured society
because a society in which the State itself does not fulfill its morally legitimate duties to
the rights-holders over which it is sovereign could hardly be conceived of as justly
structured. And (iii) is a necessary condition of the justly structured society because
there are at least some cases in which a rights-holder’s rights are violated in which the
State should step in to right the wrong (as in a case of murder, or child abuse), alleviate
the suffering caused, and bring the wrongdoer to justice.
humanity and is a non-natural property such that beings that are human have human worth and such that
beings that are not human lack human worth.
6
The distinction between avoidable and unavoidable deficits is one subject of Chapter Four.
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Needed, too, will be some talk of the kind of deficits of realizations that are
acceptable in a given justly structured society, so as to adjudge (in a given justly
structured society) what quantity of violence or injustice meets an accepted threshold for
state intervention to which the justly structured state must adhere. My intuition here is
that we want neither a nanny State nor an absentee parent State, and in my discussion
of the justly structured society I will owe the reader principles for state intervention in
instances of injustice that establish that sweet spot of morally legitimate state
intervention. And in an application of my broadly Wolterstorffian account of justice to our
particular social context, I will show that my accounts of the nature of human rights,
justice, structural justice, and structural violence jointly entail the payment of race
reparations to African Americans in two forms.7
For now, I talk of rights and justice simpliciter, but toward the end of my work I will take
an applied turn and talk of justice and its demands in terms of the structural anti-Black racism
that persists today in the modern American socio-moral context. In the following, I endorse
much of Nicholas Wolterstorff’s work on justice and rights, which appeals to human rights and
worth at the bottom. I challenge Wolterstorff’s account where necessary, shore it up where
necessary, and provide alternative ways forward within his work where necessary. In the first
chapter, I offer a survey of the broader rights terrain, so as to
i.

demonstrate that a Wolterstorffian presentation of inherent human rights as being
morally legitimate claims is a viable take on rights, and

ii. demonstrate that “rights” serve as a suitable foundation for a broadly
Wolterstorffian account of justice.

7

Of course, my view, when applied to other historically marginalized groups, will entail much the same as
regards those groups.
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Getting rights right is foundational to my rights-first theory of justice and it will help me to answer
questions later in this work about that which is owed (and why) to those who are wronged or
those who are descendants of those who were wronged.
In the second chapter, I will present and critique Wolterstorff’s conception of justice,
which is grounded on rights and human worth. I will show how the foundation of his account, in
which he ultimately appeals to claims about our relatedness to God, is internally inconsistent
with other claims of his. In the third chapter, I will offer alternatives to the foundation of
Wolterstorff’s account, some theistic and some secular; I like the framework of Wolterstorff’s
take on rights as normatively binding social relations and his appeals to human worth and in
Chapter 3 I do my best to save it. In the fourth chapter, I incorporate the work of peace theorists
Richard Rubenstein and Johan Galtung in order to develop sensible notions of structural justice
and the justly structured society, and in order to establish reasonable grounds for when the
State should and should not intervene in the private affairs of citizens in the justly structured
society—both in cases where a rights-holder’s rights have been violated and cases where
rights-holders are simply subject to unacceptable suffering. And, finally, in Chapter 5 I will
explore the question of what, exactly, is owed to individuals or groups whose status is currently
and historically that of wronged; with an eye to race relations I will present two different
categories of morally legitimate claims to race reparations, and show how they follow from the
accounts of human worth, normatively binding social relations, justice, and the justly structured
society that were developed in preceding chapters.

10

Chapter 1: Surveying Rights
A. Hohfeld and the Structure of Rights
Let’s begin with an exploration of the nature of all of those normative entities that have
been called “rights.” In my account of justice, I will give special attention to our moral relations to
other individuals, systems, and institutions, and in the Introduction I stipulated that those moral
relations just are our human rights.8 The various rights-theories presented in this chapter are
attempts at capturing the nature of all different sorts of rights, but my focus will be inherent
human rights. The following accounts, some of them descriptive and some of them functionalist,
present rights differently: from rights as controls over another’s freedom, to rights as securing
one’s interests and life-goods, to rights as sovereignty over another’s duties with regard to one,
to rights as performing several functions (not merely as securing one’s interests and not merely
as controlling another’s duties with regard to one), to rights as reasonable demands derived
from law or contract or moral principles, and to rights as being fundamentally claims. My
account, which will be presented in detail in Chapter 2, takes rights to be highly socially
contextualized, normatively binding claims, and I take rights to be moral entities that supervene
on our human worth. I am open to accounts of human worth that either account for human worth
by appeal to natural properties or capacities or that take rights and human worth to be moral
properties that are irreducible to natural properties—but both of these types of accounts will run
into problems9. (More on human worth later, following this chapter’s survey of the high points of
the rights literature.)

8

I do not deny the more standard Hohfeldian view (to be covered in this chapter) that rights are
sometimes complex moral entities that include claims, liberties, powers, and immunities jointly and in
different combinations. I accept that claims (at least sometimes) logically entail other entities like liberties,
powers, and immunities, and vice versa, I insist that every liberty, power, and immunity entails a claim or
set of claims. But I speak of rights in terms of claims and prioritize this claim-language more generally
because claims best account for notions like normativity, indebtedness, reparations, etc. I do not intend
to eliminate the notions “liberty,” “power,” or “immunity.” But it is claims and rights-as-claims that are best
suited for accounting for the relations between humanity, human worth, human rights, and justice that I
will lay out in coming chapters.
9
The former runs aground on the problem of counterexamples—for every grounding property/capacity
offered, we can imagine a rights-holder lacking that property or capacity. And the latter runs aground on
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Wesley Hohfeld’s descriptive analysis of rights has become a standard presentation of
the various forms that rights take.10 Within the Hohfeldian system, there are four different (what
he calls) “incidents”—privileges, powers, claims, and immunities—each of which independently
from the others is a form that some rights take, each of which conceptually entails its
complements, and which can jointly form what Leif Wenar calls “complex molecular rights.”11
The idea is supposed to be that some rights are singularly claims or singularly immunities, but at
least some of our rights are a combination of multiple such “incidents.” Wenar places the four
Hohfeldian incidents on a quadrant (Figure 1 below), with the incidents on the top of the
quadrant (powers and immunities) considered representative of a second-order of moral
entities, and the incidents on the bottom of the quadrant (privileges and claims) considered
representative of a first-order of moral entities. The first- and second-order incidents on the left
of the quadrant (privileges and powers) are to be conceived of as “active” moral entities and the
first- and second-order incidents to the right of the quadrant (claims and immunities) are to be
conceived of as “passive” moral entities, à la Lyons.12 The active “incidents” are discretionary—
by an act of will one may choose whether or not to exercise these sorts of rights, and one may
alter one’s rights. The passive “incidents” are nondiscretionary—claims and immunities stand
prior to an act of will by the rights-holder to activate them (unless the rights-holder has waived
his or her rightful claim against another).

the general problem facing non-naturalism—what are moral properties if they are not reducible to talk of
natural properties? Legitimate counterexamples damn any account that appeals to alienable natural
properties. And I am not bothered by the weirdness of saying that moral properties like human worth are
irreducible to natural (physical) properties.
10
Hohfeld, Legal Conceptions.
11
Wenar, “Nature of Rights.”
12
Lyons, “Correlativity.”
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FIGURE 1: Wenar’s figure for “A Complex Molecular Right.”13
Hohfeld’s quadripartite analysis of rights is important in the literature of rights-talk,
because it is taken to be a comprehensive inventory of the constitutive parts of the moral
relations we stand in to others. Hohfeld’s analysis of the forms that rights take is purportedly
comprehensive, but it is important to note that it stops short of the work that must be done to
account for rights; Hohfeld gets at how rights and their constitutive incidents are structured, but
13

Wenar, “Nature,” 233.
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he does not get any deeper than that. He does not tell us what rights are, why they are
normatively forceful, what grounds them or serves as their base, what makes their violation
actually wrong, etc. This talk of Hohfeldian “incidents” needs to be set atop a more fundamental
analysis of the nature of rights, beyond just the various forms they may take. I hope to
contribute to that latter effort.
As you can see in Figure 1, Hohfeld calls first-order discretionary rights “privileges.” A
paradigm example offered is the privilege-right to freely move your body (or not), or one’s
privilege-right to walk across the park. Hohfeld calls first-order passive rights “claims.” A
paradigm example offered is the claim-right against others touching or harming your body, or
the claim-right to food and water. Hohfeld calls second-order discretionary rights “powers.” A
paradigm example offered is the power-right to waive (or not) your claim-right against others not
to touch or abuse your body, or a military officer’s power-right to confer on a subordinate some
new duty. Hohfeld calls second-order passive rights “immunities.” A paradigm example offered
is one’s immunity-right against another to their waiving one’s claim-right against them not to
touch or abuse one’s body, or one’s immunity-rights against the State to alter one’s right to free
expression. The second-order incidents (powers and immunities) are understood to be rules
governing the first-order incidents, and the first-order incidents (privileges and claims) are
understood to be rules directly governing the behavior of moral agents. In the figure, you see
that powers are thought to be “over” our claims—we have the power to waive (or not) our
claims. Similarly, our immunities are “against” others to their waiving our claims.
Hart recasts Hohfeld’s taxonomy of rights into “primary” and “secondary” rules—the
primary rules being the privileges and claims that directly govern our behavior and the
secondary rules being superseding principles that lay out how rights-holders can alter their
privileges and claims.14 One can use one’s power-rights to waive one’s claim-rights against
another to certain treatment, but otherwise one’s claim-right against another to certain treatment
14

Hart, Concept of Law.
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is immutable. One’s power-rights are one’s alone, as one’s immunity-rights protect one from
somebody else waiving or altering one’s claim-rights in a morally legitimate way. And, barring a
case in which one’s privilege-rights are legitimately revoked (as in when one breaks the law and
must face imprisonment), one’s privilege-rights to act or move however one wishes are one’s to
exercise at one’s discretion. Wenar summarizes the Hohfeldian analysis and its distinctions:
The first- and second-order distinction corresponds to Hart's division between
primary and secondary rules. First-order rights specify how agents may, must, or
must not conduct themselves. A citizen's right to march in protest, or a citizen's
right that the police protect her while she marches, are first-order rights. Secondorder rights define authority: these rights specify who can, and who cannot,
change facts about how agents may, must, or must not conduct themselves...
The other distinction is between active and passive rights. Active rights are rights
to do (or not do) some thing. So you have an active right to walk the highlands of
Scotland, and an active right to bequeath your estate to your children. Passive
rights are rights that others do (or not do) some thing. You have a passive right
that your university pay you your wages and a passive right that the state not
require you to tithe to a church. Your active rights concern your own permissions
and powers. Your passive rights concern the permissions and powers of others.15
Hohfeld’s model of how rights are structured is widely accepted, and I accept the
conceptual and logical entailment relations between claims, liberties, powers, and immunities
that he and Wenar endorse. In my account of rights, though, I present a simpler conceptual
space—I hold that we can conceive of rights as being, simply, claims. I accept Hohfeld’s
framework that paints rights as “complex molecules,” some of which might be jointly claim and
immunity and others of which might be jointly privilege and claim, and I accept that claims stand
in logical entailment relations to liberties, powers, and immunities; vice versa I hold that each
liberty, power, and immunity entails a claim or set of claims. Granting all of that, I give the
“claim” aspect of rights priority. Put simply, it is claims that are doing all the moral work. My
broader account of justice takes rights-holders to be intrinsically socially situated and sets
rights-holders into normatively binding social relations, the key ingredient of which is the various
claims (and their correlative duties) we have against our moral interlocutors to particular life-
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goods or treatment.16 My account is not an attempt to eliminate the other moral incidents—I
accept Hohfeld’s account of the structure and relatedness of the four moral incidents, and I
accept that each of the rights to which I refer (morally legitimate claims, as I call them) is either
a Hohfeldian claim simpliciter or a complex molecule of a Hohfeldian claim and the other moral
incidents Hohfeld takes claims to entail. I embrace conceiving of our human rights in terms of
claims, because each socio-moral relation includes a morally legitimate claim or set of morally
legitimate claims to certain life-goods (literal goods, or ways of being treated). Those claims and
their corollary duties just are the normative relations that hold between two rights-holders. So:
every human right is, at least in part, a morally legitimate claim to a particular life-good (a literal
good like food or medical treatment, or a way of being treated)—whether that right is a claim,
simpliciter, or a complex molecular right a constituent part of which is a claim. In my use of the
word “claim,” which will be how that term is used throughout this paper, each of the Hohfeldian
categories is a moral incident that, in practice, is claimed; it is the claim and claiming that give
real-world moral salience to the privileges, powers, and immunities that constitute the rest of
Hohfeld’s theoretical space.
In my Wolterstorffian view of rights,17 we are set in deeply complicated webs of
normatively binding social relations to others, and our human rights just are these normatively
binding relations—the socially contextualized claims we make on others (and the claims of
others against us) to certain life-goods according to our ineradicable worth. Conceiving of rights
as claims is a good way to make sense of our moral intuitions pertaining to that which is due to
rights-holders, and it is a good way to make sense of notions like a moral agent’s being
wronged, their being owed in light of that wrong, their being unjustly withheld goods, and the

Put another way: my giving the “claim” aspect of rights priority isn’t a metaphysically or ontologically
significant move—claims and their complementary incidents are, à la Hohfeld, at the same “level” of
ontological significance.
17
“Wolterstorffian,” in the sense that my view is in the spirit and style of Wolterstorff. You will see that I
break from Wolterstorff in sometimes trivial ways and in sometimes significant ways. But I maintain,
throughout, that the general structure of his account should be held intact.
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injustices committed against them as being instances of disrespect for their worth and the lifegoods that are their due in virtue of that worth. A theory of human rights that conceives of rights
as being essentially claims to certain goods and treatments and that conceives of those rights
as being normatively forceful in virtue of human worth enables us to explain that what it means
that one has been wronged is that one’s worth has been disrespected and that the goods and
treatment to which one has legitimate claim have been withheld.18
I am not alone in emphasizing the conceptual link between rights and claims. Later, I
endorse Wolterstorff’s account of rights as being claims.19 But Joel Feinberg and Glanville
Williams emphasize the relation between right and claim, and between right and “that which can
be insisted on”:
To have a right is to have a claim against someone whose recognition as valid is
called for by some set of governing rules or moral principles. To have a claim in
turn, is to have a case meriting consideration, that is, to have reasons or grounds
that put one in a position to engage in performative and propositional claiming.
The activity of claiming, finally, as much as any other thing, makes for selfrespect and respect for others, gives a sense to the notion of personal dignity.20
A right is something a man can stand on, something that can be demanded or
insisted upon without embarrassment or shame.21
"Right" conjures up the idea of something that can be insisted on, whereas a
liberty is purely a negative expression. A right exists where there is a positive law
on the subject; a liberty where there is no law against it. A right is correlative to a
duty in another, while a liberty is not.22
Neither Williams nor Feinberg, here, explicitly identifies rights with claims, but Feinberg, at least,
reduces rights to talk of claims. Feinberg takes having a claim to be having reasons or grounds
appropriate for making a claim, and he equates one’s status as a rights-holder with one’s having
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reasonable demands to make of others. Within his theory of rights as things to be insisted on or
demanded, Feinberg includes “manifesto rights,” rights that should be conferred but are not yet
(like the right to healthcare).23 Feinberg’s core position is that rights are claims that are validated
by governing rules or principles. Williams does not explicitly talk of claims, but he rejects the
identification of rights with liberties, and he rejects that liberties have correlative duties. I take
Williams’s “something that can be insisted on” to be referring to claims (that have correlative
duties), and like Feinberg, Williams insists on a relation between rights and positive laws or
principles. I will not ultimately agree with Williams that rights are derived from positive laws (at
least, not in cases of inherent human rights), but I agree with his take on rights as “something
that can be insisted on.” This language of “insistence” evinces notions of morally legitimate
claim.24
Beyond Hohfeld’s descriptive analysis of rights, the rights terrain is a complicated
patchwork of schools of thought. Mill, Raz, Kramer, and MacCormick are all exemplars of the
interest theory of rights.25 Kant and Hart are exemplars of the will theory of rights.26 Feinberg,
Skorupski, and Darwall are all exemplars of demand theories of rights, a third way alternative to
the traditional interest theory of rights vs. will theory of rights debate.27 Others offer accounts
that attempt to merge traditional interest theories with traditional will theories.28
Still others, like Rawls and Scanlon, offer rights from within their unique varieties of
contractualism—rights as deriving from principles that moral agents agree to, and rights as
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manifesting as constraints on the discretion of individuals or institutions to act.29 Wolterstorff
dismisses extensive interaction with Rawls’s work as directly relevant to his project of explaining
what rights are:
A few paragraphs back I mentioned John Rawls. Such is the fame of John
Rawls’s Theory of Justice that almost everyone who picks up this book will want
to know what I have to say about Rawls. Apart from incidental comments, I do
not have anything to say about Rawls. The reason for my silence is
straightforward. Though Rawls’s theory of justice is an inherent natural rights
theory, he does nothing at all to develop an account of such rights. He simply
assumes their existence. My interlocutors will be those who do not just appeal to
such rights but have something to say about them.30
B. Functionalist Accounts of Rights
In his functionalist analysis of rights, Leif Wenar highlights the traditional divide in the
rights literature, that of the debate between will theorists of rights and interest theorists of
rights.31 Wenar argues that each school of thought illuminates different but incomprehensive
aspects of a truly comprehensive and unified theory of rights, and that neither by itself provides
an adequate accounting for all of our intuitions about rights. Each school of thought takes rights
to perform a singular function. Interest theorists take rights to perform the function of securing
and guaranteeing the interests or the good of rights-holders, while will theorists take our rights
to be tied closely to our capacities for autonomy and to carve out spheres in which we exercise
morally legitimate authority over others’ duties regarding us. In interest theories rights secure
our interests, while in will theories rights make us sovereigns over another’s duty.
Wenar provides this short summary of the core difference between the two traditional
schools of thought:
There are two traditional analyses of rights. For Will theories, the function of
rights is to give right-holders choices. According to the Will Theory, a promise
creates a right because the promisee can then waive, or demand, the
performance of the promissory duty. Interest theories hold that rights further the
29
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right-holders’ interests. According to the Interest Theory, property is a right
because ownership makes people’s lives go better.32
Wenar uses a promissory’s duty as an example of how will theories work, and he uses property
rights as an example of how interest theories work; neither example is meant to demonstrate
the full scope of its respective theory of rights. Wenar’s own position, ultimately, is that neither a
will theory nor an interest theory by itself gives us a list of rights that is exhaustive of all the
normative relations we consider to be rights—will theories, for instance, fail to account for such
rights as those of infants or the incapacitated (who lack necessary autonomy- or rationalityrelated capacities), and interest theories fail to account for the rights one may have that are not
necessarily related to one’s own interests (as in, a judge’s right to commute a sentence).
This inability of either camp by itself to account for at least some rights that are
prominent in our moral reasoning positions Wenar to offer an account of rights that includes
both camps. In Wenar’s words:
The long and unresolved historical contest between these two single-function
theories stretches back through Bentham (an interest theorist) and Kant (a will
theorist) into the Dark Ages. In the twentieth century the scholarly contest
between advocates of the two theories ended in stalemate. I believe that, as is
often the case with unresolved historical debates, this situation is explained by
each side giving a partial account of a larger terrain.33
The will theory captures rights that give discretion to the rightholder without
conferring benefits, but fails to capture rights that confer benefits without giving
discretion. The interest theory accepts rights that confer benefits, but rejects
rights whose holders do not benefit from holding them.34
Wenar calls his fusion the “several functions” theory of rights because he thinks rights should be
conceived of as jointly serving several different functions rather than just one. A simple
disjunction of will theory and interest theory may at first glance seem too convenient by half, but
it seems true that some rights secure the rights-holder’s interests while other rights give to the
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rights-holder morally legitimate sovereignty in some domain over another’s duties.35 That rights
at different times do both implies some disjunction of will theory and interest theory;
Sreenivasan joins Wenar in this broader reconciliation project, arguing for a hybrid analysis of
claim-rights that mashes will and interest theories together.36 Rights, under Sreenivasan’s fusion
view, give to the rights-holder the amount of control over others’ duties necessary for securing
the rights-holder’s interests or good.
For reasons that should be obvious to the reader, a will theory of rights (as presented in
Hart’s “sovereignty” account) 37 alone cannot stand as an account of rights. According to Hart,
that you have a right means that you have morally legitimate control over another’s freedom and
duties with regard to you. But some rights-holders, such as infants or the incapacitated, have no
such cognitive control or agency. The will theorist’s failure to account for such rights is
untenable, and with its reliance on contingent capacities will theory fails to account for
inalienable rights. Wenar describes another problem for will theory, that of accounting for certain
instances of “unwaivable claims”:
Many important rights, such as the complex bodily right…do include a paired
power to alter a claim. But many do not. For example, you have no legal power to
waive or annul your claim against being enslaved, or your claim against being
tortured to death. The will theory therefore does not recognize that you have a
legal right against being enslaved, or against being tortured to death. Yet most
would regard these unwaivable claims as rights, indeed as among the more
important rights that individuals have.38
But Wenar is more openly optimistic about the ability of an interest theorist of rights to account
for inalienable rights:
Yet where the will theory falters, the interest theory flourishes. The interest theory
holds that the single function of rights is to further their holders’ interests. More
specifically, rights are those incidents whose purpose is to promote the wellbeing of the rightholder. As MacCormick puts it, “The essential feature of rules
35
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which confer rights is that they have as a specific aim the protection or
advancement of individual interests or good.”39
Leading interest theorist Joseph Raz presents his variety of interest theory, laying out a
definition for “having a right” and the conditions necessary for possessing rights:
Definition: 'x has a right' if and only if x can have rights, and other things being
equal, an aspect of x's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding
some other person(s) to be under a duty.40
The Principle of Capacity to have Rights: An individual is capable of having rights
if and only if either his well-being is of ultimate value or he is an 'artificial person'
(e.g. a corporation).41
Being of ultimate, i.e. non-derivative' value is being intrinsically valuable, i.e.
being valuable independently of one's instrumental value. Something is
instrumentally valuable to the extent that it derives its value from the value of its
consequences, or from the value of the consequences it is likely to have, or from
the value of the consequences it can be used to produce. Being of ultimate value
is being valuable even apart from one's instrumental value.42
Rights are grounds of duties in others.43
Immediately, Raz’s interest theory dispatches an objection to interest theories of rights, more
generally—that, surely, there are certain things that are “good” for a person to which a rightsholder cannot be thought to have a right, and that therefore rights cannot serve to secure goods
simpliciter. For example, one does not have the right to unlimited funds from the federal
government, although such funds would be expedient for the rights-holder. The difference
between “goods” that are legitimately interests and those that are not is contained in Raz’s
definition above. The aspect of one’s well-being in question has to be sufficient reason for
holding some other person to be under a duty; not just any “good” will do. So, Raz’s distinction
here between morally legitimate interests and, simply, goods is to serve as the distinction
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between those goods-for-us to which we have a right and those things which are merely good
for us.44
Interest theorists Neil MacCormick and Matthew Kramer contribute their own varieties of
interest theories of rights:
To ascribe to all members of a class C a right to treatment T is to presuppose
that T is, in all normal circumstances, a good for every member of C.45
The essential feature of rules which confer rights is that they have as a specific
aim the protection or advancement of individual interests or goods.46
(1) Necessary but insufficient for the actual holding of a right by X is that the
right, when actual, protects one or more of X's interests.
(2) The mere fact that X is competent and authorized to demand or waive the
enforcement of a right will be neither sufficient nor necessary for X's holding of
that right…
For the Interest Theory, then, the essence of a right consists in the normative
protection of some aspect(s) of the right-holder's wellbeing.47
So, Raz is joined by MacCormick and Kramer in holding that rights serve to protect the rightsholder’s interests. Interest theories of rights reject the claim of will theorists that what accounts
for a rights-holder’s rights is his or her choices, or discretion, or ability to exercise a bit of
morally legitimate dominion over another’s duties. In normal circumstances one’s interests are
not waivable, so there is no problem from within interest theories with accounting for one’s rights

Raz’s work is not featured in my work, but one might wonder: in talking of interests, goods, and rights,
what accounts for the difference between mere goods for us and goods to which we have claim. Raz’s
notion of an interest being a “sufficient reason” for holding some other to be under some duty
distinguishes between those goods to which we have no right and those to which we do have a right. And
the difference between the two types of goods is whether or not the good is an interest, an aspect of wellbeing, for us.
Presumably, then, in Raz’s view there are goods-for-us that are not aspects of our well-being and
therefore do not serve as sufficient reasons for holding another to be under some duty regarding us; and
there are goods-for-us that are aspects of our well-being and therefore do serve as sufficient reasons for
holding another to be under some duty. This distinction between goods-for-us that are interests and
goods-for-us that are not interests is a general problem for any utilitarianism that takes rights seriously;
because utilitarian views that take rights seriously have to answer the question Which goods do we and
don’t we have morally legitimate claim to, and why? Raz would say: We have claim to the ones that are
aspects of our well-being. Later, I address this problem in my Wolterstorffian account with appeal to:
i. objective facts of the matter about which goods are life-goods that safeguard our well-being, and
ii. the notions of avoidable and unavoidable deficits of realizations.
45
MacCormick, “Children’s Rights,” 311.
46
MacCormick, “Rights in Legislation,” 192.
47
Kramer, “Getting Rights Right,” 28.
44

23

that are normally conceived of as inalienable. So, too, can interest theories account for the
rights of those beings who lack the capacity to exercise dominion in a “sphere of sovereignty”—
like the small child, or the comatose patient. Surely, after all, the small child and the comatose
have interests. But Wenar highlights that weakness of interest theories that was mentioned
earlier: surely, there are rights one has that are not had in virtue of their serving the function to
secure one’s own interests, like the rights we have that are associated with certain roles. Such
rights include: the right of a judge to sentence a criminal, the right of a traffic cop to issue
tickets, the right of a general to send troops into battle.48 These rights associated with roles are
different in kind from the inalienable human rights that are most relevant to my work. But they
are still rights, and the violation of them or their corollary duties is morally condemnable and
evaluable in terms of justice. Their violation is still a wrong because their violation is still a
disrespect for human worth. The rights and duties associated with roles, I will argue, are
grounded in someone’s interests or in a shared or collective interest, just as any other right is
grounded in someone’s interests.
Wenar offers that when faced with the counterexample of role-specific rights, the interest
theorist could do one of two things:
1. the interest theorist could reinterpret the judge’s right to pass sentence, for
example, to be a right grounded not in its function to secure the judge’s own
interests exclusively but rather to secure his own and others’ interests
collectively, or
2. the interest theorist could simply deny that these role-conferred rights are rights in
the first place, in virtue of their being irreducible to a single rights-holder’s
interests.
Wenar takes (1) and (2) to be unacceptable, with (1) simply demonstrating that the judge’s (for
example) interests singularly are insufficient to ground her judge-rights and with (2) being an
48
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unacceptable rejection of the common use of our rights concepts and the strong moral intuitions
that come along with that common use.49 A judge, so these intuitions tell us, inarguably has
rights qua judge.
Regarding (1): what would it mean for a judge to have a right, exclusively and in her
capacity as judge, in virtue of some collective interest?; why is it the case that the judge has that
right in virtue of the collective interest, so the line of questioning would go, but no other who
shares that collective interest does, and what makes the judge the sole holder of judge-rights if
what grounds the judge’s rights are interests that are shared in common with others? Interest
theory is committed to rights being definitionally linked to interests (and functioning to protect
those interests), but not to interests plus some special role or other.50 Wenar observed that an
interest theorist, in response to the difficulty an interest theorist of rights would have in
accounting for rights that are conferred by roles, could simply say of such role-associated rights
that they protect interests that are the rights-holder’s own and others’ interests. But Wenar
rejected this course of action, because in his view it serves only to emphasize that the interests
alone of the rights-holder who occupies a given role are insufficient to account for the rights
conferred by that role to that individual, presumably an undesirable consequence for any
interest theorist who wants a clean account of why a rights-holder who has role-specific rights
has those rights in the first place.
But this is too dismissive on Wenar’s part—the interest theorist should simply accept
what Wenar finds to be unacceptable. The interest theorist should conceive of a judge’s rights
(for instance) as securing the judge’s personal interests and the interests of others in virtue of a
property shared in common by the judge and the others, or in virtue of some shared interest (in
Wenar, “Nature of Rights,” 242.
It seems true that a judge has the judge-rights he has in virtue of his role judge and it seems true that a
judge has those rights independent of any interests he has that are exclusively his. But interest theory, as
presented by Wenar, is committed to the judge’s judge-rights as being a product of the judge’s own
interests. Thus, the prima facie inability of interest theories of rights to explain at least some rights. I will
simply reject that interest theories can only account for an individual’s rights by appeal to that individual’s
exclusive interests.
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the impartial interpretation of sovereign laws, for instance) that obtains. In that way, the interest
theorist could conceive of a role-specific right as acting to secure collective interests, interests
shared in common, or universally held interests. And if a necessary condition of an interest
theory is that an individual’s rights serve to secure interests, then it should be clear how roleassociated rights could be incorporated into interest theories of rights. I have simply added
collective interests, or interests shared in common, into the domain of that which an individual’s
rights could legitimately secure. In the case of the judge, the shared property or shared interest
would be a shared membership in society, or a shared interest in the common good, from which
the judge benefits individually and from which many others also benefit individually. In rejecting
this course of action on the grounds that it just highlights that an individual’s (the judge’s)
singular interests are insufficient to ground all the rights that individual may have (including the
rights conferred by unique roles like “judge”), Wenar is simply ignoring that surely there are
shared group interests (or universally held interests, or a shared interest in a common good),
and shared properties that account for those interests. And we should want our theory of rights,
if it is to be an interest theory of rights, to be sensitive to all the interests that there are, whether
they be singular interests or collective interests. Raz endorses a similar view regarding the
objection from role-associated rights—that many rights-holders (like the judge) do not, in fact,
hold individual interests that are sufficient for having reasons to hold another to be under a duty
(to either the judge, to another, or to a society at large). 51 According to Raz, it is the interest of
the general public which grounds such role-associated rights. I find clarifying that “the interest of
the general public” are just interests that are shared in common by individuals to be helpful—
after all, what exactly is the general public and how could that have interests? But if we think of
the “general public” in terms of a collective of individuals, each of which has the relevant
interests sufficient for accounting for the judge’s judge-rights, it becomes clearer how the
judge’s role-associated rights could be accounted for by appeal to interests. Somebody (a
51
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judge), or some entity, has to be responsible for securing the interests shared in common by
very many, if in fact there are such interests.
My Wolterstorffian view of rights is not a merely functionalist take. But in it, there is little,
if any, conceptual space between the notion of an interest and the notion of a life-good, so I am
happy for my framework to fall into the interest theoretical school of thought when it comes to
giving a functionalist account of what rights do. And I take the rights that are prioritized by the
will theorist—those rights that function in the exercise of one’s sovereignty over another’s
duties—to be simply a subset of all the rights there are that secure interests. When one
legitimately exercises one’s power to waive or enforce another’s duty, one does so in
furtherance of one’s own interests (or in furtherance of some collective good) or to secure some
life-good. This is akin to Sreenivasan’s account that fuses will and interest theories by saying
that one’s powers over another’s duties are only those powers necessary for the security of
one’s interests.52
Skorupski, Darwall, and Feinberg present an alternative to that traditional interest vs. will
schism in the rights literature.53 Their views fall loosely together into a family called demand
theories of rights. On Skorupski’s view, rights delineate what a rights-holder may demand of
another, in the sense of delineating what a rights-holder may compel or exact from another.54
Demand theories are like will theories in that they feature the agency of rights-holders and
members of the moral community, but in demand theories rights are not derived from the
capacity to exercise any such morally legitimate sovereignty over another’s duties. Here is
Darwall’s variety of demand theory:
Suppose, for example, that you claim something as your right, say, that someone
not step on your foot or, after his having done so, that he removes his foot,
answer for having stepped on yours, apologize, and so on. In so doing, you
presuppose an authority to demand certain conduct of him and to hold him
Sreenivasan, “Hybrid Theory” and “Duties.”
See Skorupski, Domain of Reasons; Darwall, “Precis”; and Feinberg, “Nature and Value” and Social
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accountable for complying with your demand…In having a right to others’ not
stepping unbidden on your feet, you have the authority to demand that they not
do so and to hold them answerable if they do…You having this right creates a
distinctive kind of reason for others to avoid your feet. Second-person reasons,
as I call them, depend conceptually on the authority to make (and so address)
claims and demands…55
… any moral agent has [authority to address moral demand] as, as we might put
it, an equal member of the moral community. It is sufficient to be a moral agent in
this sense that a being have the psychic capacities necessary to enter into
relations of mutual accountability, that is, to take a second-person perspective on
himself and others and regulate his conduct from this point of view. (Call this
second-personal competence.) On this view we are morally accountable to one
another; second-personal competence thus grounds a shared second-personal
authority to hold ourselves and each other accountable and address moral
demands.56
The sense in which moral obligations are inescapable is that the reasons they
provide are inescapable, that is, that these reasons hold and apply to us
irrespectively of our interests, aims, or other idiosyncratic features. What follows
from a second-personal analysis is that moral obligations and the secondpersonal reasons for acting that flow from them are rooted in our secondpersonal competence. And these are features we cannot give up without
removing our very moral agency itself. It is hard to see how moral obligations
could be any more inescapable than that.57
And Darwall adds that to have a claim-right:
… includes a second-personal authority to resist, complain, remonstrate, and
perhaps use coercive measures of other kinds, including, perhaps, to gain
compensation if the right is violated.58
So Darwall offers a view of rights according to which rights are objective “second-personal
reasons” to act in some ways but not others regarding the rights-holder, and these reasons to
Darwall, “Precis,” 216. Here Darwall talks of the “authority to make (and so address) claims and
demands.” This sounds a lot like the will theorist’s language, but in Darwall’s view what gives the rightsholder rights to demand certain conduct is not the rights-holder’s capacity of sovereignty or capacity of
will or the exercise of said capacities, but rather the authority to make such demands; and the right serves
as an “inescapable” second-personal reason to act (or not) regarding the rights-holder. So, that these
inescapable reasons obtain survives certain counterexamples levered at the will theorist—regardless of a
rights-holder’s lacking some morally relevant capacity (as with the counterexamples that make will
theories incapable of attributing rights to infants or the comatose), these inescapable second-personal
reasons (rights) obtain. In this demand theory, the authority to make a demand takes theoretical priority
over the capacity to make a demand or the actual demand itself. One’s having the authority to make a
demand (one’s having the right) generates “a distinctive kind of” second-personal reason to act or not act
in particular ways regarding one. And these second-personal reasons are recognizable by any member of
the moral community. More shortly.
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act presuppose the authority of the rights-holder to make the demand. Those with secondpersonal competence regulate their conduct according to these reasons. Darwall insists it
should be clear that the moral obligations characterized as rights are inescapable, because the
second-personal reasons are inescapable by those (agents) who are capable of taking on the
relevant second-personal perspective. The authoritative reasons for acting are not proscribed
from the outside; they are recognized as objective by second-person competent agents.
In much the same way, Joel Feinberg (1970, 1973) presents his own view:
To have a right is to have a claim against someone whose recognition as valid is
called for by some set of governing rules or moral principles. To have a claim in
turn, is to have a case meriting consideration, that is, to have reasons or grounds
that put one in a position to engage in performative and propositional
claiming. The activity of claiming, finally, as much as any other thing, makes for
self-respect and respect for others, gives a sense to the notion of personal
dignity.59
A right is something a man can stand on, something that can be demanded or
insisted upon without embarrassment or shame.60
Feinberg’s noteworthy “Nowheresville” thought experiment entertains what a society would be
missing were it devoid of rights; he asks us to imagine a society with moral values, duties, and
laws, but no rights.61 He insists that the crucial agent-dimension of our social relations to others
would be missing—that dimension of our moral relations to others in which our own human
dignity is salient, and according to which we can place demands on others to certain goods or
treatment. Simply, claims and the act of claiming would be missing. In Feinberg, we find rights
to be authoritative moral entities in virtue of their being validated by governing rules or moral
principles; in his theory of rights we see no appeal to capacities or sovereignty over another’s
relevant duties, but rather the presence of “cases meriting consideration” (reasons and grounds
for claiming), the merit of which is determined by governing rules or principles that recognize the
claim to be valid. Feinberg’s view differs from Darwall’s view, in part because Darwall’s does not
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make fundamental appeals to governing rules and principles; Darwall’s second-personal
reasons for action do not govern and validate claims, so much as they are recognized by every
member of the moral community. In Feinberg, the case meriting consideration justifies the claim,
and the claim is verified by some governing rule; in Darwall, second-personal reasons to act are
generated by the authority of a rights-holder to make claims and demands.
Demand theories necessitate the recognition of reasons to act or principles for acting,
but they skirt the appeals of the will theorist to the exercise of autonomy and thus avoid that
crippling weakness of will theories—that, surely, there are rights-holders who cannot practice
their moral sovereignty. Under demand theories these “counterexample” rights-holders (the
infant, the incapacitated) would still have “cases meriting consideration” and “authority to make
demands”—and there would still be inescapable reasons to treat them (the infant, the
incapacitated) in thus-and-such a way, regardless of the incapacitated rights-holder’s inability to
exercise certain capacities required by the will theorist, or their inability to practice Darwall’s
second-personal competence. In Darwall’s case, especially, the distinction is important—he
relies not on the capacity to exercise claims, but rather on the authority to exercise claims.
Similarly, the authority of Feinberg’s claims relies not on some active exercise or capacity of
sovereignty, but rather on the existence of a case that merits consideration and a subsequent
verification of that case meriting consideration by governing rules or principles.
Demand theories can survive the counterexamples levered at the will theories—that
beings that lack certain capacities, like infants or the comatose, lack certain human rights—
because demand theories can account for the moral patient-regarding nature of secondpersonal reasons to act (or not). Darwall’s view is that possessing the capacities necessary to
enter into relations of mutual accountability and practicing second-personal competence is
sufficient for being a moral agent; but those same capacities are not necessarily necessary for
being a moral agent or patient. Whether or not a baby or the comatose enjoys second-personal
competence, the adult whom most would say has duties to the baby or the comatose enjoys
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second-personal competence. And the rights of the infant or the comatose can be accounted for
in the second-personal competent adult’s recognition of inescapable reasons to treat infants and
the comatose in some ways but not others, reasons derived from the authority of the infant or
the comatose to make the relevant demand. Surely, one would not need another rights-holder’s
cooperation or active mutuality in order to take oneself to be duty-bound to that rights-holder.
The infant and the comatose would be, strictly speaking, incapable of exercising any sort of
demand, but someone who is second-personally competent could recognize inescapable
reasons for acting in some ways but not others toward an infant or the comatose, and thus
recognize their obligations to the infant or the comatose, regardless.
One could posit that these duties do have correlative rights, and thus demand theories
could account for the rights of infants and the comatose.62 Darwall holds that “second-personal
competence thus grounds a shared second-personal authority to hold ourselves and each other
accountable and address moral demands,” and that might be some reason to think that secondpersonal competence is required for having the authority to make a demand—but the claim that
“second personal competence grounds shared second-personal authority to hold ourselves and
each other accountable and address moral demands” is not identical to the claim that “secondpersonal competence grounds an infant’s or comatose authority to make morally legitimate
demands.” I think it’s important, here, to distinguish between a community effort to address
rights characterized by mutual accountability to second-personal reasons (which Darwall takes
is grounded by second-personal competence) and an infant’s authority, simpliciter, to make a
demand or claim. The infant’s authority to make a demand, for instance, could obtain prior to or
independent from any shared authority within the moral community to hold the members of the
moral community mutually accountable, or any intentional process of addressing moral
demands. One has to be second-personally competent in order for one to recognize
inescapable reasons for one to act regarding others; but a person (or animal, or infant) would
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not necessarily have to be second-personally competent in order for another to recognize
inescapable reasons for acting (or not) in certain ways regarding them. In this way, a baby or a
comatose patient could have a “case meriting consideration,” and could have “authority” to
place a demand”—all the while lacking the capacity to place the demand or the capacity for
second-personal competence.
Ultimately, I accept that my Wolterstorffian theory of rights is most at home in the interest
theory of rights—rights as serving to secure some interest. But here it is also worth noting my
theory’s consonance with Darwall’s and Feinberg’s demand theories. Interest theories answer
the question of what rights do by pointing to the interests or goods that rights secure, but these
demand theories are not strictly functionalist accounts of rights. Both Darwall and Feinberg are
more interested in offering accounts of what it means to have a right, and they offer that to have
a right is to have a case worth considering, or for there to be objective second-personal reasons
for treating rights-holders in some ways but not others. There is no prima facie inconsistency
between interest theories of rights and demand theories of rights—these different analyses
simply ask and answer different questions. Indeed, we could conceive of many of the cases that
merit consideration as being claims to certain interests.
In my Wolterstorffian account, our human rights are socio-moral entities that supervene
on human worth; our human worth is a fact about us that gives normative force to claim-rights to
certain life-goods in particular socio-moral contexts. Human worth is either respected or
disrespected, by which I will just mean that morally legitimate claims are either answered or
ignored or violated. This talk of objective worth is consonant with Darwall’s talk of objective
second-personal reasons for respecting a rights-holder; it is also consonant with Feinberg’s talk
of rights-holders having cases meriting consideration. It is consistent with my view to say that in
different social contexts our human worth is an objective reason to answer the claims made by a
rights-holder (I am thinking of normativity, here); it is consistent with my view to say that in our
highly contextualized social relations our human worth just is a case meriting consideration. I do
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not necessarily offer my account of human worth and human rights as against Darwall’s or
Feinberg’s model; rather, I seek to emphasize the intrinsically social nature of rights, the
location of their normative force in their supervenience base (human worth), and their operation
in real time as normatively binding claims against others and the systems, institutions, and
society in which we find ourselves. I am in agreement with Darwall that there are inescapable
reasons for acting toward rights-holders in some ways but not others. And I am in agreement
with Feinberg that rights-holders have cases meriting consideration. All of that talk is consistent
with conceiving of our rights as being our morally legitimate claims to certain life-goods, claims
that are the function of our being the sorts of things we are and our depending on certain lifegoods for our well-being. But of course, my view would place human worth at the center either
of those frames; the claims are given moral significance by that moral property, worth.
Before moving on, I will quickly mention John Hospers’ account of rights, an exemplar of
a libertarian account of rights:
When I claim a right, I carve out a niche, as it were, in my life, saying in effect,
“This activity I must be able to perform without interference from others. For you
and everyone else, this is off limits.” And so I put up a “no trespassing” sign,
which marks off the area of my right. Each individual’s right is his “no
trespassing” sign in relation to me and others. I may not encroach upon his
domain any more than he upon mine, without my consent. Every right entails a
duty, true—but the duty is only that of forbearance—that is, of refraining from
violating the other person’s right. If you have a right to life, I have no right to take
that life; if you have a right to the products of your labor (property), I have no right
to take it from you without your consent. The non-violation of these rights will not
guarantee your protection against natural catastrophes such as floods or
earthquakes, but it will protect you against the aggressive activities of other men.
And rights, after all, have to do with one’s relations to other human beings, not
with one’s relations to physical nature.63
Hospers is representative of the view that the primary human rights are rights to life, liberty, and
property. From human nature, we can derive that certain activities of rights-holders ought to be
morally and legally protected. For libertarianism, rights are constraints on another’s actions with
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regard to the rights-holders, not claims against another or against a State to certain goods or
services (termed welfare rights).
C. Rights in Mill
John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism is a paradigm example of an interest theory of rights.64
Though paradigmatic of interest theories of rights, there is a prima facie incompatibility between
a utilitarian ethic that takes as its maxim “maximize utility” and talk of rights. Any utilitarian ethic,
for instance, faces the objection: strictly means-to-end moral analyses have the troubling
implication that were some morally abhorrent act (like that of torturing an innocent child) actually
somehow to maximize the collective good, then that act would, in the case where it actually
serves to maximize the good, be the right thing to do. In an unexamined utilitarian framework,
there either is no place for rights, or things are such that the rights that a child (for instance) has
not to be tortured do not trump considerations of collective utility.
In an 1872 letter to John Venn, Mill explicates his utilitarianism:
I should not fear to defend Kant’s maxim against your criticisms: He could not
mean, nor could Paley mean, that we should so act that the whole human race
could with general benefit do exactly what we are doing; they meant that our
conduct ought to be capable of being brought under a rule to which it would be
for the general benefit that all should conform. This rule, in your example of
taking orders, would not be that all mankind might with public advantage take
orders, but that the choice of a profession should depend (under limitations which
could be stated) on the aptitudes and convenience of the individual.
One more remark. I agree with you that the right way of testing actions by
their consequences, is to test them by the natural consequences of the particular
action, and not by those which would follow if every one did the same. But, for
the most part, the consideration of what would happen if every one did the same,
is the only means we have of discovering the tendency of the act in the particular
case.65
Here Mill is an act utilitarian in theory, but in practicality acknowledges that the only way to
consider the consequences of a particular action is by asking what the consequences would be,
generally, if everyone did the same under some general rule. Presumably he thinks this
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because the only way to judge or predict what the consequences of my action will be, and thus
to judge or predict its morality, is with reference to the general tendency.
Mill conceives of rights as our claims against society to its protection of our access to
certain goods. Mill writes:
Justice implies something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but
which some individual person can claim from us as his moral right…When we
call anything a person's right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to
protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of
education and opinion...To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something
which society ought to defend me in the possession of. 66
And Mill is cognizant of that prima facia tension between talk of rights and an unanalyzed
utilitarianism that gives its consideration only to the maximization of the collective good. Mill
accepts the moral intuitions we have regarding justice—that there are ways we ought to treat
others and ought not to treat others—and he accepts the intuitions about wrongness that
accompany violations of those rules about how to treat others. Mill calls our moral judgements
regarding rights “cases of justice,” and he calls our moral judgments regarding utility “cases of
expediency.” In handling apparent tensions between the two kinds of cases, Mill writes:
It has always been evident that all cases of justice are also cases of expediency:
the difference is in the peculiar sentiment which attaches to the former, as
contradistinguished from the latter. If this characteristic sentiment has been
sufficiently accounted for; if there is no necessity to assume for it any peculiarity
of origin; if it is simply the natural feeling of resentment, moralised by being made
coextensive with the demands of social good; and if this feeling not only does but
ought to exist in all the classes of cases to which the idea of justice corresponds;
that idea no longer presents itself as a stumbling-block to the utilitarian ethics.67
In this passage, Mill attempts to dissolve the conflict between a utilitarian model that exclusively
weighs social utility in its moral calculus and the sense of justice, a sense of rights and wrongs,
that is universal in its various manifestations in human moral cognition. And he is exploring the
conflict in light of the fact that we have moral intuitions of both varieties regarding the very same
state of affairs.
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Mill is aware of objections to his utilitarianism that take rights (conceived of as moral
trumps) and his utilitarianism to be incompatible, so he seeks to establish notions of justice and
utility such that the just act and the expedient act in any one case should be conceived of as the
very same act. As long as the sentiment of justice is “sufficiently accounted for,” as long as the
origin of the intuition of justice is sufficiently “non-peculiar,” as long as these intuitions of justice
are considered in light of the social good, and as long as the intuition of justice arises in all such
cases, Mill accepts that justice and expedience are co-extensive terms, at least in cases where
consideration of both justice and expedience are required. That is, acting according to the
maxim “maximize utility” will not sometimes violate or countermand our accurate intuitions about
justice and rights. And actions that are in accord with the sentiments of justice will also be
actions that maximize utility; to repeat Mill, “it has always been evident that all cases of justice
are also cases of expediency.” This is the Millian answer to the rights theorist’s objections that
an individual’s rights ought not to be forsaken in considerations of the collective good, and they
ought not to be considered mere means to collective happiness. If Mill is right about the
coextension of actions that are motivated by considerations of justice with actions that are
dictated by the maxim “maximize utility,” then the objections of the rights theorist against the
utilitarian can be met.
The way Mill handles our intuitions about justice, our intuitions about utility, and those
cases in which our utility calculations and rights might be in conflict is helpful:
…particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so important, as
to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice. Thus, to save a life, it may
not only be allowable, but a duty, to steal, or take by force, the necessary food or
medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate, the only qualified medical
practitioner. In such cases, as we do not call anything justice which is not a
virtue, we usually say, not that justice must give way to some other moral
principle, but that what is just in ordinary cases is, by reason of that other
principle, not just in the particular case.68
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Rather than conceiving of rights as trumps full stop, as holding regardless of utilitarian
considerations or when in conflict with some other principle of right action, Mill conceives of
rights (“what is just”) as being contextualized.69
In normal cases, for example, one has the duty not to steal food; in cases of emergency
(as when someone’s life is at stake and could be saved with a loaf of bread), one is perhaps
permitted or even has a duty to coerce bread from someone with an abundance. The conditions
and demands of justice in one situation are not necessarily the conditions and demands of
justice in another situation; social considerations themselves play into our judgements about
justice, and for Mill justice is socially contextualized. So, typically a baker has a claim against his
fellow townspeople, such that they ought not to steal his bread, and presumably Mill would
argue that such claims when respected contribute to the maximization of utility. But in some
emergency, as when a desperate father’s son would be saved with a loaf of bread, a baker
would have no such morally legitimate claim against the father such that the demands of justice
decree that the child go breadless (assuming the baker has enough bread and is not willing to
be charitable). It is not that utilitarian considerations of the starving boy trumped the baker’s
right; rather it is that, in this particular context, the baker has no such right against the desperate
father and boy, and instead the starving boy should be conceived of as making a morally
legitimate claim against the baker. So, there was no baker’s right for the utilitarian’s
considerations of the starving boy’s interests to trump. When the father steals the loaf, he is,
then, doing both that which is required by justice (his duty to the boy, who has a right not to die
of starvation in most contexts) and that which is required by the maxim “maximize utility”
(alleviating the boy’s horrible suffering).
This talk of rights as being contextualized—our claim-rights against others as either
obtaining or not obtaining in the context under examination—is insightful. It seems right that we
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should index particular rights to particular contexts, and it remains for the utilitarian to answer
whether or not some rights will obtain in all contexts—that is, are there truly inalienable rights,
rights for which there is no context in which they do not obtain? In the real world, our moral
contexts shift, and our account of rights needs to be able to handle moral dilemmas and the
shifting moral contexts and extreme cases that come with them. Alternatively, we could
conceive of rights as being a complex web of overlapping and competing moral entities, and we
could lay out the conditions in which one right trumps another right for all of those moral entities.
But it is simpler to conceive of rights as being highly contextualized—the world populated by a
plethora of moral contexts in which it is clear that one right obtains and another does not, rather
than by a fixed plethora of competing and countermanding rights.
The broader project of defining in which contexts rights do and do not obtain is otherwise
known as specificationism.70 Steiner endorses a form of specificationism according to which all
morally legitimate rights are delineable as compossible,71 but rights-theorists like Feinberg reject
the project on grounds that we simply are not in the required epistemic position for providing a
full accounting of rights as such.72 But as for the general claim that we should conceive of rights
as being contextualized, and never over-lapping, I think this epistemic worry need not bother us.
I will borrow this notion of a contextualized right for my own Wolterstorffian account, and we can
proceed with the epistemological humility required for knowing that it will be a difficult task to
provide a list of one’s rights in any given number of moral contexts. But that there is the broader
epistemological worry that it is difficult to provide an exhaustive list of the rights one has in any
given situation should not be a mark against this claim: There are different moral contexts, and
the rights you have are to be understood as being indexed to the particular moral context you
find yourself in; and perhaps, there are rights that obtain in every moral context.
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So, the Millian is committed to saying that the perceived conflict between commitment to
social utility and commitment to justice and rights can be dissolved with correct understanding.
In the debate about rights, it is typically understood to be a weakness of utilitarianism that in
some situations a subject’s rights could, in principle, be violated due to utilitarian considerations.
But according to Mill, there would be no such violation. When one perceives that one’s right is
being trumped by some utilitarian calculation, one is misperceiving; one merely harbors a
misconception of justice in the moral context they find themselves in. Thus, Mill offers a
framework for understanding the role rights might play in a utilitarian, interest-theoretical ethic.
D. Beitz and Human Rights
In his book The Idea of Human Rights, Charles Beitz characterizes the human rights
terrain (in particular, the terrain canvassed by international human rights theorists) as carved
into two camps that both come up short: naturalistic theories of human rights and agreement
theories of human rights. The core difference between the two, according to Beitz, is where the
moral authority of human rights comes from:
Naturalistic theories appeal to what is taken to be an order of moral values
whose claim on us does not depend on their acceptance in any particular culture
or society, or a fortiori in international society. The human rights of international
doctrine are interpreted as an attempt to embody in international legal and
political practice the values of this independent normative order, which is the
source of their (moral) authority. By contrast, according to agreement
conceptions, the fact that human rights are in some way common to the moral
codes of the world’s societies is itself the source of their authority. It is possible,
of course, that the normative requirements of the best-justified naturalistic theory
and the best-justified agreement theory might coincide. But any such
coincidence would be a contingent matter requiring an explanation.73
In Beitz’s carving up of the terrain, my account will fit squarely into the naturalistic camp. Beitz
terms some accounts as “naturalistic” following John Simmons’s usage of that term terminology,
and Simmons writes:
Natural rights…are those rights that can be possessed by persons in a “state of
nature” (i.e., independent of any legal or political institution, recognition, or
enforcement)…
73
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Human rights are those natural rights that are innate and that cannot be
lost (i.e., that cannot be given away, forfeited, or taken away). Human rights,
then, will have the properties of universality, independence (from social or legal
recognition), naturalness, inalienability, non-forfeitability, and imprescriptibility.
Only so understood will an account of human rights capture the central idea of
rights that can always be claimed by any human being.74 (185)
Beitz characterizes naturalistic theories of rights as splitting further into sub-camps.
James Griffin is an exemplar of the “personhood” camp, according to which human rights are
protections of interests and goods, one of which includes human personhood. Personhood, to
Griffin, just is our normative agency, the various interests of which include autonomy, minimum
provision, and liberty.75 Personhood is an entity that is morally privileged and protected.
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum are exemplars of the “human capabilities” variety of
naturalistic theories.76 In these views, human well-being and advantage turn on the attainment
of certain actions and states of being (doings and beings):
Instead of asking “How satisfied is a person A,” or “How much in the way of
resources does A command,” we ask the question: “What is A actually able to do
and to be?” In other words, about a variety of functions that would seem to be of
central importance to a human life, we ask: Is the person capable of this, or not?
This focus on capabilities, unlike the focus on GNP, or aggregate utility, looks at
people one by one, insisting on locating empowerment in this life and in that life,
rather than in the nation as a whole. Unlike the utilitarian focus on satisfactions,
it looks not at what people feel about what they do, but about what they are
actually able to do…Finally, unlike the focus on resources, it is concerned with
what is actually going on in the life in question: not how many resources are
sitting around, but how they are actually going to work in enabling people to
function in fully human ways.77
These “functionings” are the primitives of theories of capability. A persons’s
“capability set” consists of the alternative combinations of functionings the person
is in a position to achieve. Capability is to be distinguished, on the one hand,
from value achieved (that is, actual functionings) and, on the other, from merely
formal opportunity (the absence of restriction by force or law). Capability is a kind
of freedom, not achievement….If we think of functionings as “valuable doings
and beings,” then it is clear that the idea of capability is not normatively neutral.
Some “doings and beings” will not count as functionings if they are not valuable,
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and the capability to achieve these doings and beings will not count as a part of a
person’s well-being or advantage.78
So, based on the sort of thing we are, our capabilities make different doings and beings
valuable, and it is those valuable doings and beings that ought to be protected. Nussbaum
(1997) defines a human right:
…an especially urgent and morally justified claim that a person has, simply by
virtue of being a human adult, and independently of membership in a particular
nation, or class, or sex, or ethnic or religious or sexual group.79
So, in Nussbaum, human rights protect the capabilities of humans to exercise certain morally
significant capabilities and “functionings.”
In his discussion of agreement theories of human rights, Beitz splits that camp further
into three subcamps that each has its own organizing principle: the idea of a common core, the
idea of overlapping consensus, and the idea of progressive convergence. R. J. Vincent
describes the common core view as understanding our human rights to be a “core of basic
rights that is common to all cultures despite their apparently divergent theories.” 80 According to
Beitz:
The metaphor of a “common core” is usually presented as an account of the
nature of human rights, but it has obvious implications for the normative
questions of their content and scope. For example, rights requiring democratic
political forms, religious toleration, legal equality for women, and free choice of a
marriage partner would be excluded because, as an empirical matter, these
protections are not found in all of the world’s main moral systems. Other rights
might be excluded if they were understood to generate certain kinds of duties; if,
for example, the right to a high standard of physical and mental health were
thought imply that every society has an obligation to ensure the accessibility of
health care for all, then the existence of disagreement about the extent of
distributive responsibilities outside of families or local communities might exclude
this as well.81
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Rex Martin and Charles Taylor produce the ideas central to the “overlapping consensus”
view.82 Beitz characterizes the view, merely borrowing John Rawls’s language for its title:
… one might shift to a more elaborate conception which sees human rights as
falling within an “overlapping consensus” of political moralities. Such a view
would have two essential elements. The first is a distinction between human
rights, conceived as a set of common global norms adopted for certain political
purposes, and the diverse array of moral, philosophical, and religious doctrines
or outlooks found among the world’s cultures. The second is the hypothesis that,
given an understanding of the purposes of the global norms, it would be
reasonable for adherents of any culture to accept these norms on the basis of
their own moral, philosophical, and religious doctrines. On such a view, we need
not conceive of “universal” human rights as part of a common core in the sense
of being actually recognized by or contained in all conventional moralities; we
think of them, instead, as norms for global political life reachable from a variety of
possibly incompatible foundational positions.83
Beitz characterizes agreement theories as potentially dead on arrival, given that they are to
provide members of every culture with reasons to act, and given that the notion of a human right
is hardly accepted and shared among the world’s main cultures (much less, agreed upon). So,
given those obvious difficulties, he proposes a third variety of agreement theory:
One response to this dilemma is to envision an intercultural agreement as
arising, not from the actual contents of existing moral cultures, but instead from
the contents of these cultures as they might develop or evolve under pressure for
adaptive reinterpretation…Human rights would still be conceived as falling within
an “overlapping consensus” but the boundaries of the consensus would not be
set by the philosophical and moral beliefs that actually prevail in the world’s
major cultures…but rather by the best available elaboration of the basic
normative materials of these cultures for the circumstances of modern life…I
shall refer to it as “progressive convergence.”84
For this formulation of an agreement theory of human rights Beitz draws on Taylor
(1999), Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, and Joshua Cohen.85 I will not say much here about
“progressive convergence,” aside from observing that, firstly, it seems to be a clearly post hoc
attempt to salvage agreement theories and, secondly, the entire notion of moral progress seems
to undermine the legitimacy of the agreement theoretical project. If, after all, our rights and
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moral significance are just the sum of our agreements on those things, what is there to progress
toward and according to what standard are we urging our neighboring states to make progress?
This view seems to entail some objective standard that obtains, whether or not there is
agreement to be found on the standard.
Beitz recounts Rawls’s departure in The Law of Peoples from the debate between
naturalists and agreement theorists.86 In The Law of Peoples, Rawls characterizes the
international scene as a collection of liberal democracies and “decent” states that are not
democratic. Each state is individually committed to reasonable conceptions of justice and of a
common good. The members of this “Society of Peoples” offer to one another public reasons
and shared principles and norms regarding one another’s actions, just one category of which is
human rights. Rawls’s human rights include the right to life and means of subsistence, personal
liberty, personal property, and equal treatment under the law—and though some “outlaw states”
may refuse to abide by the norms and principles shared by the Society of Peoples, Rawls holds
human rights to be universally applicable to and binding on every contemporary society. And
finally, in his pragmatic view, human rights have immense political significance: adherence to
the corpus of rights available to the Society of Peoples constitutes a society’s good standing as
reasonably just.
Beitz does not accept any of the above views as his own on grounds that they each fail
in different respects. The naturalist views, he says, fail the original project of international
human rights theorizing:
It was intended from the outset to afford common grounds for political action to
persons situated in cultures with differing moral traditions and political values. It
was explicitly agreed by the framers, as a general matter, that international
doctrine should not embrace its own justification, and in particular that it should
not presuppose that human rights are “natural.” It is a mistake to identify the
objects of interest with objects that originate in one or another theoretical project
whose conception and motivation differ from those of the contemporary
practice.87
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So naturalistic theories fail to be appropriately worldview-neutral. Agreement theories fail,
according to Beitz, in large part due to the instability of the agreements made by societies with
internally inconsistent values and commitments. And they fail for another reason (and though
Rawls’s is not strictly speaking an agreement theory, it is subject to the same accusation):
whether discussing the common core view, the overlapping consensus view, or Rawls’s
reasonable justice view, the rights and norms agreed to are simply too narrow to account for the
full suite of human rights ensconced by the real-world international human rights theorizing that
has taken place over the last half-century. Beitz advocates for a “practical conception” of rights:
…we might frame our understanding of the idea of a human right by identifying
the roles this idea plays within a discursive practice. We attend to the practical
inferences that would be drawn by competent participants in the practice from
what they regard as valid claims of human rights. An inventory of these
inferences generates a view of the discursive functions of human rights and this
informs an account of the meaning of the concept.
I shall call a conception of human rights arrived at by this route a
“practical” conception. Such a conception differs from both naturalistic and
agreement views in the following way. A practical conception takes the doctrine
and practice of human rights as we find them in international political life as the
source materials for constructing a conception of human rights. It understands
questions about the nature and content of human rights to refer to objects of the
sort called “human rights” in international practice. There is no assumption of a
prior or independent layer of fundamental rights whose nature and content can
be discovered independently of a consideration of the place of human rights in
the international realm and its normative discourse and then used to interpret and
criticize international doctrine…Instead, we take the functional role of human
rights in international discourse and practice as basic: it constrains our
conception of a human right from the start.88
With that, Beitz offers a functionalist approach to human rights, turning the debate about the
nature of human rights on its head and insisting that human rights just are the role they play in
international human rights deliberation and policy.
The sort of praxis-first theorizing is interesting but problematic, to say the least. Take
the obvious objection: if what human rights are is simply what the international human rights
discourse is up to, then we can imagine a time in human history when there were no human
rights: namely, any time prior to the 20 th century. After all, Beitz himself points out that broad
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international commitments to the existence of human rights is a modern phenomenon. If what
Beitz means is that whatever corpus of human rights that exists is merely that corpus of rights
listed in contemporary international human rights theorizing, and that no other human rights
exist, then I reject Beitz’s project wholesale. I opt, instead, for the view that there are human
rights, that we can reason about them (albeit imperfectly), and that the task of the contemporary
international human rights theorist should be to provide an accounting of the human rights that
exist pre-theoretically, prior to societal agreement, and so on.
Beitz’s praxis-first functionalism is inconsistent with my Wolterstorffian account of human
rights as normatively binding claims that supervene on human worth in highly individuated
socio-moral contexts. I would prefer it if the project of international human rights deliberation
and agreement were informed by careful theorizing about human worth, the respect that is due
to each human, and the life-goods to which humans have legitimate claim in various socio-moral
contexts. But I do not set out to undermine Beitz’s project—we are merely engaged in two
separate projects. Beitz’s is a political project; mine, at its core, is philosophical and defies the
international human rights project’s goal of each party coming to the table without a firm
commitment to any political, religious, or philosophical account of why there are human rights in
the first place. I have stated my preference, but I grant that they come to the table without such
commitments for a reason: there will never be agreement, and such fundamental disagreements
can only frustrate an international order committed to the entities (rights) over which there is at
least some broad agreement. Later, in making my case for human worth, human rights, and
claims to such things as race reparations, I lean into what I call a “Rawlsian maneuver”—but it
could just as easily be called a “Beitzian maneuver.” At some point, barring a miraculous
breakthrough in the disagreement surrounding why, exactly, humans enjoy moral significance
and have the rights we have, we have to get on with the conversation about the human rights
that are widely accepted and what they mean for us today in our deliberations about justice and
everyday life. So while in my account, in an effort to provide a moral theory of rights I start with a
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more fundamental discussion of where rights come from and why they are normatively forceful, I
grant here that much of the discussion to be had is a strictly political discussion—a matter of
radically different societies and people needing to get along with one another. And I grant that
the more fundamental moral account I offer can be anathema to that political discussion.
Consider this paper an attempt to fuse the two projects—I do wish to provide a sensible
account of what human rights are and where they come from, but by doing that I do not wish to
curtail the meaningful discourse and overlapping consensus that can be had by thinkers from a
broad array of inconsistent moral, religious, and political worldviews. In this paper, where my
accounts of human worth, humanity, and human rights reach their fundamental terms and
become dogmatic and disagreeable, I will be happy to cordon off those underlying moral
commitments and lean into what overlapping political consensus there is to be had at the higher
level. That is, whether one accepts my Wolterstorffian account or not, we may lean forward into
the general agreement surrounding the moral considerability of humans and the entities we call
“human rights.”
E. Looking Ahead
Hohfeld and Wenar offer their descriptive and functional analyses of rights, according to
which rights serve one of various functions. They describe rights as coming in the form of one of
four incidents, or as a “complex molecule” of these four incidents—privileges, claims, powers,
and immunities. I briefly introduced my own Wolterstorffian view, according to which all rights
are claims one has in distinct moral contexts, and the claims one has in a given context are
waivable only by oneself. Wenar characterized the rights-terrain as divided roughly into two
schools—will theory and interest theory.89 The categorization of these various rights theories
into the broad categories “will theories of rights” and “interest theories of rights” is a functionalist
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project aimed at discerning the sorts of things that rights do. My account of rights is most at
home in the interest theory of rights tradition, although it shares common ground with the
demand theories of Darwall and Feinberg—human worth as conceivable in the terms of “a case
meriting consideration,” or as an inescapable reason for acting in thus and such a way
regarding another. Deontological and consequentialist moral theories provide their own moral
frameworks, with different moral entities and first principles than rights at the foundations of their
views. But the Kantian and the utilitarian, within their respective moral frameworks, both reserve
critical spaces for rights. In Kant’s case, space is reserved for the right liberty.90 In the case of
Mill, work is done to reconcile our intuitions about justice and our intuitions about expediency—
cases of justice and cases of expediency ultimately align in Mill’s view. Beitz rejects this project
of providing a moral account of rights and opts for the more political approach of building out
from what overlapping consensus can be found regarding rights. 91
I hold that human rights (thought of as supervening on human worth in particular sociomoral contexts) get at the substance of our moral relations to one another in ways that
considerations of the collective good, social contract, moral laws, ideal observers, or human
status properties like “autonomy” or “consciousness” simply cannot. In what follows, I endorse
much of what Nicholas Wolterstorff has to say about rights, according to which justice itself is
properly understood in terms of respect for human worth (in terms of whether or not rightsholders are granted that to which they have legitimate claim). Under this view, rights are
intrinsically social moral properties had by humans that are authoritative in virtue of our
(humans’) tremendous worth, worth that is inherent and not had in virtue of some alienable
property or capacity of the rights-holder. Wolterstorff’s is a theistic account, but it need not be. 92
In addition to an alternative theistic understanding of Wolterstorff’s work, I will provide a
secularized version of Wolterstorff’s work. It is with this Wolterstorffian framework of rights at the
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bottom that I will attempt to answer the broader questions about justice and what is owed to
individuals and communities who have been traditionally wronged.

48

Chapter 2: A Wolterstorffian Take on Human Worth and Rights
A. The Wolterstorffian Rights Framework
Nicholas Wolterstorff’s political theology features a robust account of rights according to
which inherent human rights inhere in human worth.93 Wolterstorff conceives of human rights as
being normative social relationships.94 Justice and injustice, according to his view, are reducible
to talk of respect (or disrespect) for the worth of rights-holders, to talk of subjects getting (or not)
that to which they have legitimate moral claim. One’s being wronged is a matter of one’s being
treated, or one’s being withheld some good, in a manner that does not properly respect or
comport with one’s worth. It is the objective worth of human subjects that provides the normative
force of the claim-rights that demarcate the just and unjust treatment of those subjects. In my
account, respect for a rights-holder’s worth amounts to some moral agent rendering to the
rights-holder those life-goods and ways of being treated (or not) to which she has morally
legitimate claim. Important to note: Wolterstorff does include others refraining from treating the
rights-holder in certain ways in his concept of life-goods. Wolterstorff also develops an account
of the Judeo-Christian notion of agape love, and his primary claim in his examination of love is
that the works of justice are a subspecies of love. That is, rendering justice to our neighbor is
just one way to love our neighbor.95
I embrace most of what Wolterstorff argues in his political theology; however, in Chapter
3, my account will provide two alternative ways of understanding his claim that humans are
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inherently valuable. One way is a secularized Wolterstorffian account, and the other way will be
one-part critique and another-part refiguring of the theistic relational property Wolterstorff posits
in order to account for inherent human worth. I provide the alternative theistic story, because it
is sounder than the theistic story Wolterstorff tells. And my reasoning for providing a secularized
version of Wolterstorff’s work is twofold: first, I myself am partial to Wolterstorff’s theism, but I
acknowledge that it will likely be more dialectically effective to locate my rights-first theory of
justice in a non-theistic framework. In the spirit of Rawls’s work on overlapping consensus,96 I
find it helpful to organize my pursuit here by the guiding standard of developing a theory of
justice that people with radically divergent core theological or metaphysical commitments can
endorse from within their own private worldviews. So, while I find very much to agree with in
Wolterstorff’s theistic metaphysics and political theory, I plan to forgo their necessary appeals to
a theistic account of human worth. And second, as the reader will see in this chapter, there are
some serious inconsistencies in the foundation of Wolterstorff’s original theistic attempt to
account for rights, and those need to be addressed. In highlighting these problems, I hope to
demonstrate why my secularized Wolterstorffian take on rights is preferable to the original, and
even to the theistic alternative I will offer. If the reader prefers the alternative theistic story I offer
to the secularized version of Wolterstorff that I offer, the reader will be free to proceed according
to his or her preference. What I seek to provide with the alternative accounts is an acceptable
accounting for human worth, each for the theist and the atheist (or agnostic); the rights-first
theory of justice that I develop needs one or the other to get it going.
Here is a quick sketch of my Wolterstorffian framework (I will indicate where my theory
breaks from Wolterstorff’s theory): humans have all different sorts of rights, some of which are
conferred or the product of convention and some of which are inherent. Our inherent rights are
morally salient and authoritative in virtue of the worth that we have in virtue of various capacities
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or properties (some essential, some not) of ours.97 The properties or capacities that are
responsible for our worth can be properties that obtain of us that are conventionally established,
conditionally conferred, bestowed, or had only contingently; but as we will see later, in order to
account for the ineradicability of at least some of our inherent human rights, it would do us well
to conceive of our human worth as depending on at least some properties or capacities that are
essential to us, or that are necessarily true of us (as in, the relation of God to God’s human
creatures that Wolterstorff posits). Wolterstorff takes God to be responsible for establishing that
which should be considered “life-goods” for us, because in his view one thing that is needed is
for these life-goods to be reified and for our claims about them to be objective. But in the
interest of forging overlapping consensus, I suggest this secularized tweak: in virtue of the kinds
of things we are (human things, with our array of properties and capacities), certain objects,
states of affairs, and treatments are objectively “goods” for us. Contra Wolterstorff, we can
appeal to these objective facts about humans, without appealing to God at all, to come to
conclusions about that which is good for humans. And Wolterstorff would agree with this next
step: they are life-goods, because they, in themselves, add positive value to our lives and
safeguard our well-being.98 So, according to my Wolterstorffian view, in virtue of the kind of
things we are (human things, with the array of properties, capacities, and needs we have), we
have legitimate claims against others to certain “life-goods” (objects, states of affairs, treatment,
etc.) that safeguard our well-being. Wolterstorff takes it these legitimate claims to certain “lifegoods” just are our rights; and I accept that. These morally legitimate claims against others in
97
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turn obligate other moral subjects to treat us in certain ways and not to treat us in certain other
ways; the duties and obligations are normatively forceful, because of that morally significant fact
about us, our worth. Worth commands respect and regard.
In Wolterstorff’s account, both the rights one has and the obligation of others to treat one
in some ways but not others inhere in one’s human dignity. Shortly you will read Wolterstorff’s
claim that justice itself is “grounded on” human rights, and he elucidates the relation between
worth and rights to be that of inherence. But later, I will opt for a supervenience relation, rather
than speaking in terms of rights being “grounded on” or “inhering in” worth; I take the
supervenience of worth on some property and the supervenience of a right on that worth to be a
more illustrative set of relations than the inherence of worth and rights in some property, but I
take it that not much hangs on the difference between supervenience and inherence. The term
“justice” in both Wolterstorff’s view and in my variation of his view pick out states of affairs in
which
a. human individuals are given that to which they have a right as commanded by
their worth, and in which
b. human individuals act in accord with the legitimate claims others have on them.
When I violate someone else’s right, my moral status is that of blameworthy; the moral status of
the person whose right I have violated is that of wronged.
So we have my general Wolterstorffian view, from bottom to top: Humans have (1)
various properties on which (2) human worth supervenes,99 and this worth commands respect,
by which we just mean that the (3) morally legitimate claims to (4) certain life-goods that are due
a rights-holder of thus and such a sort (as dictated by facts about that which actually safeguards
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a rights-holder’s well-being)100 are claims that ought to be respected and regarded. Things of
sufficient worth are owed these life-goods, in the sense that they ought to be treated in the ways
established by their claims—this is a feature of worth. States of affairs characterized in terms of
respect or disrespect for those claims are to be considered (5) just or unjust, respectively. What
it means to be wronged is that one’s worth has been disrespected, that one’s legitimate claims
have not been met; what it means to be a victim of injustice is that one’s rights have been
violated. So, in my view, our human rights are moral properties that supervene on our worth
(together with facts of the matter about our interests), which supervenes on morally relevant
human properties, capacities, achievements, etc. Inherent rights supervene on human worth,
but other conventional rights may supervene on personal achievement, historical incident, etc.
One example may be the right to act as an authority on a matter—one’s PhD, not one’s human
worth, serves as the basis for that particular right. One’s accomplishment, in that case, is a
property that one has that lends new rights, new grounds for respect. But these sorts of rights
are not inherent human rights, which are the primary focus of my discussion, and neither do
they supervene on human worth simpliciter.
Worth makes claims normatively forceful. Worth “authorizes” the claims that obtain in
particular moral contexts and I take this relation of rights-to-worth to be another supervenience
relation. Claim-rights supervene on that worth, in particular socio-moral contexts, and on the
facts of the matter about which goods and treatment really are life-goods for the rights-holder.
My view: without worth there remain facts of the matter about which goods and treatments
would promote a putative rights-holder’s well-being were the rights-holder to be granted those
goods and treatment, but without worth there is no moral fact to authorize or generate a morally
legitimate and normatively binding claim to those life-goods.
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53

In his account of rights, Wolterstorff emphasizes the intrinsically social nature of claimrights:
I will defend the importance of justice and the importance of rights, in the context
of defending the thesis that justice is ultimately grounded on inherent rights…
Rights are normative social relationships; sociality is built into the essence of
rights. A right is a right with regard to someone… Rights are toward the other,
with regard to the other. Rights are normative bonds between oneself and the
other… those normative bonds of oneself to the other are not generated by any
exercise of will on one’s part. The bond is there already, antecedent to one’s will,
binding oneself and the other together. The other comes into my presence
already standing in this normative bond to me. This normative bond is in the form
of the other bearing a legitimate claim on me as to how I treat her, a legitimate
claim to my doing certain things to her and refraining from doing other things.101
Throughout Wolterstorff’s work, he entertains accusations against the rights theorist that talk of
rights is somehow inappropriate—that it smacks of “possessive individualism,” a so-called vice
characteristic of Enlightenment scholars whose work on rights is inaccurately hyperindividualistic.102 But Wolterstorff contends, as against the anti-rights crowd, that those who
conceive of rights as being hyper-individualistic have only conceived of rights inaccurately in the
first place. Rights, after all, are intrinsically social moral entities, and “sociality is built into the
essence of rights”—how could rights thus conceived smack of possessive individualism? To
speak of rights is to speak of individuals who are intrinsically socially situated, their duties and
claims held in virtue of the existence of other socially situated individuals and the standing
socio-moral relations between them.
And that individuals have rights certainly does not preclude that groups, organizations,
or States have rights. Wolterstorff calls on the rights theorist to recognize that individuals are
socially situated and to seek the boundaries and rules for right action for moral agents in light of
their social situation. Wolterstorff claims that rights are not a product of some act of will on the
part of the rights-holder—“the other comes into my presence” carrying his or her claims against
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me.103 So we have a picture of rights as being intrinsically social facts, claims made not in virtue
of the rights-holder’s capacity or exercise of will but rather in virtue of the rights-holder’s worth
and social situation. A discussion of an individual’s rights is, necessarily, a discussion of an
individual’s sociality.
A potential worry: could rights enable a person to pursue his or her claims even at the
cost of causing distress or pain to others? My answer: No, or at least not without warrant. A right
that would entitle one to violate another’s morally legitimate claims to being treated in some
ways but not others is no morally legitimate claim at all, and one’s morally legitimate claims
certainly would not entitle one to violate another’s morally legitimate claims to being treated in
some ways but not others. The morally legitimate claims of two rights-holders ought both to be
considered and prioritized, and rights-holders are always protected by their worth and morally
legitimate claims against unwarranted pain or distress; when an individual putatively acts on a
claim in a way that causes unwarranted pain or distress, that individual is acting contrary to
what respect for the other demands.
Wolterstorff is committed to the existence of different kinds of rights (although, he never
explicitly names them particular kinds of rights), with each kind of right associated with a
particular kind of origin story. Covered in Wolterstorff’s account are categories of rights that will
be familiar to the reader—contract rights, legal rights, natural rights, etc. But Wolterstorff is most
concerned with inherent human rights. Here, again, is Wolterstorff:
The inherent rights theorist agrees that many of the rights we possess are possessed on
account of something conferring them on us—some human agreement, some piece of
human legislation, some piece of divine legislation, whatever. But he holds that, in
addition, we possess some rights that are not conferred, some rights that are inherent.
On account of possessing certain properties, standing in certain relationships,
performing certain actions, each of us has a certain worth. The worth supervenes on
being of that sort… And having that worth is sufficient for having the rights.104
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So, Wolterstorff also insists here on the existence of inherent human rights. Throughout the
Wolterstorff literature, the definitions of some of these key terms are a bit ambiguous. But here I
will attempt to provide what I take it Wolterstorff means by some of these key terms, in the best
lights of his own theory; if this is not what Wolterstorff means, I think it is what Wolterstorff ought
to have meant, and in my Wolterstorffian account it is what I shall mean.
Rights come in two fundamentally different kinds: conferred rights and inherent rights.
Conferred rights are thought to be held by rights-holders in virtue of some conferral—by some
treaty, law, human contract, social contract, or divine proclamation. Then, under Wolterstorff’s
view, conferred rights ought to be conceived of as coming in two further varieties: conventional
rights and natural rights. Natural rights are conceived of as those conferred rights that are not
conferred by some human action or social convention; rights established by divine fiat and
activity, or by some objective moral law, are examples of natural rights.105 Conventional rights
are properly conceived of as rights that are conferred by human social agreement (by a law,
contract, founding document, etc.). These rights—both conventional and natural—are all
conferred rights in virtue of their ground or supervenience base being, in some sense or other,
external to the rights-holder (as in the case of a law or contract); that which is ultimately
responsible for these rights is not some property that inheres in the rights-holder.
We have defined conferred rights, of both the conventional and natural varieties. That
leaves us with inherent rights. In contrast to conferred rights, inherent rights in a Wolterstorffian
view are properly conceived of as those rights that supervene on something internal to the

The “divine right of kings” is an example of a natural right. It was neither an inherent human right nor a
conventional conferred right, but rather was thought to be a right conferred by God to one ruler, by divine
fiat. The rights God gives to rights-holders, under this view, are natural rights. Other natural rights include
the rights and duties that come with natural roles, like parenthood, which are neither inherent human
rights nor conventional conferred rights; these are rights that are proscribed by natural facts about these
relations and the moral laws or rules associated with them. Natural rights are those rights that are
conferred, but not through human agreement or social contract.
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rights-holder (namely, the rights-holder’s worth, conceived of as supervening on different human
properties, capacities, or accomplishments).106
We should make an important distinction here, with the foundation of Wolterstorff’s view
in mind: there are the relations themselves that we stand in vis-à-vis others, and then there is
the worth that supervenes on some relational property we may have.107 If one has some right in
virtue of their standing in some relation to another (as in, a “friend” or “colleague” or “employer”
relation), that right should be considered conferred; the relation itself should not be considered
inherent to the rights-holder, and if the right is a product of the relation and not some worth that
supervenes on some other property of the rights-holder, the right should be considered
conferred.108 But, Wolterstorff’s view insists (and I will argue against this): if one has some right
in virtue of their having worth that supervenes on a relational property of theirs (as in, the “friend
to God” relational property that Wolterstorff’s account of human worth will rely on), then the right
should be considered inherent. I take Wolterstorff’s notion of “bestowed” worth to be just that
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As I have said, I hold that Wolterstorff should have opted for the supervenience relation.
This is a Wolterstorffian distinction that I do not abide by. I do not think human worth supervenes on
any relational properties whatsoever. Strictly speaking, Wolterstorff never claims that worth supervenes
on or is grounded in relations, either; but he does claim that worth can be bestowed by certain relational
properties, like relation to God. I have claimed, here, that the distinction between a relation itself and the
worth that may supervene on that relation is a Wolterstorffian distinction, and I mean that only in the
sense that
a. I think Wolterstorff ought to have opted for the supervenience relation of worth on human
properties, and
b. had he gone that supervenience route, the distinction between a relation itself and the worth that
supervenes on that relation would be an important distinction in his account.
It would be important in his account because he is trying to offer an account of human worth and inherent
human rights, and his claim is ultimately that the human worth that generates inherent human rights
comes, somehow, from our relation to God. More on this as the chapter unfolds, but I reject what I have
here called the “Wolterstorffian distinction” because I reject that worth supervenes on relational
properties. I will reject the broader project of appealing to relational properties in order to account for
human worth largely because it would be bizarre to say that humans are valuable not in virtue of some
set of facts about them, but rather in virtue of their relation to some other thing (even God) or in virtue of
some set of facts about another entity to which they are related. As for Wolterstorff’s “bestowal” concept—
what is the difference between worth that is bestowed by a relation and worth that supervenes on a
relation (or worth that is grounded in a relation)? The reader’s guess is as good as mine. For now, let us
just stipulate that what Wolterstorff means by “bestowed worth” is “worth that supervenes on ‘bestowed’
properties, like a relation.”
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There is an assumed distinction here between natural kin relations like parenthood and socially
constructed relations like friend or colleague or employee. In furtherance of a distinction, I find it helpful to
hold kin relations like parenthood and childhood to be immutable and essential, whereas the merely
social relations like friend or colleague are highly contingent.
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kind of worth—the worth an individual has that supervenes on some (bestowed) relational
property.
Rights that supervene on the worth that supervenes on the rights-holder’s non-relational
properties are definitionally inherent rights, because an individual’s properties are inherent to
the individual. The distinction just made—that between rights that are the product of some
relation and rights that are the product of the worth bestowed or conferred by some relation—is
a critical distinction when it comes to the story Wolterstorff tells about why, exactly, he thinks
humans are immensely valuable. He will argue that inherent human rights are accounted for
with reference to a critical relation to God that “bestows” worth; but I will argue that is not how
we should think of inherent human rights, because relational properties (that is, our spatial or
social relations to another and to God) do not inhere in individuals as other more standard
properties do. It is my view that no relational property can be responsible for the kind of human
worth that concerns the inherent human rights theorist. Inasmuch as relational properties figure
into talk of rights, rights that are derived from relations should be considered to be conferred
rights.109,110

Some rights that are derived from relations will be “conventional” conferred rights (as in, the rights that
come from a human legal contract), and some will be natural rights (as in, the rights that come with
parenthood). It is a definitional stipulation that parenthood rights are natural rights, and therefore
conferred rights. The controversy here is a matter of how to sort our rights categories: it seems strange to
say that parenthood rights, for instance, are conferred. My response: parenthood rights are natural rights
and therefore conferred rights, definitionally. The parent-to-child relation is external to the rights-holder.
And the reason it seems strange to say that parenthood rights are conferred is because it seems clear
that those natural facts about us that make us parents and children are facts that are internal to the rightsholder. But when it comes to accounting for parenthood rights, we should refer to the parenthood relation
to explain the rights and duties of parents, not to those relevant and interesting biological facts that make
us parents and children. When asked, “Why are you allowed to discipline your child and I am not?” it
would be off base to refer to some biological fact; you should, rather, refer to your parent relation to the
child. Indeed, many parents (or guardians) do not have a relevant biological property that makes them
that particular child’s parent, yet they have parenthood rights and duties nonetheless. So, the facts that
make us parents or guardians can be either natural or socially established, but it is the parenthood
relation or guardianship relation that accounts for the rights.
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God’s love as everlasting or eternal. So, Professor Adler points out, if conferral is a temporal process,
God’s love is not conferred. My response: conferral is not a necessarily temporal process. It can be a
temporal process, but “conferral” can also describe a logical entailment or relation. The Queen can knight
an individual and thus confer new rights and privileges in time. However, it can also be that God’s love is
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Beyond the foundational issue with relational properties and the rights they may or may
not account for, there is other interesting ground here to explore.111 A taxonomy of rights that
carves out space both for rights that are conferred and rights that are had in virtue of inherent
worth comes with some interesting returns. For example: take the president of the United States
of America and any rights she may have. Surely, the president of the United States (let us name
her, stipulatively, “Elizabeth Warren”) uniquely holds some conferred rights in virtue of
Constitutional strictures and law—factors which ought to be conceived of as strictly social and
conventional. President Warren’s right to command the United States Armed Forces would be
one such example.112
Next, surely President Warren uniquely holds some other rights in virtue of the unique
worth that accrues to an individual in virtue of their being the sole current president of the United
States of America (or a former president, for that matter). Examples of such rights might be the
right to be consulted on important matters of State, privileged access to matters of state or
ambassadorial duties, the right to be given deference, the right to be obeyed or followed by
citizens, the right to be respected to a magnitude enjoyed by no other citizen, etc. One might
posit that the previous occupant of the Oval Office serves as a fitting counterexample to the
immediately preceding. Perhaps, one might think, President Donald J. Trump is not describable
in these terms. That is, perhaps even though doubtlessly the former president, this man will not
have maintained those new grounds for respect qua president. Political convictions aside (but
moral convictions not aside!), this raises interesting questions about whether an office holder
can engage in behavior that nullifies their rights to be treated in the various ways that their
occupation of that role would traditionally have granted. I am willing to concede that a former or
current president of the United States can demean themselves and their office to such an extent

atemporal yet still characterizable in terms of conferral, given that the love relation of God to God’s
human creatures is, very strictly speaking, external to the beloved.
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There will be more on the problem with relational properties in the next two sections.
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that the new grounds for respect that their unique office would typically have granted them are
nullified. Of course, there is a matter of fact about whether or not Donald Trump has done this—
some will say he has, and some that he has not. One of those camps will be objectively wrong
about the grounds for respect possessed by Donald Trump qua president. To be sure, however,
no conduct of any president can nullify the grounds for respect they possess as a human being.
So, as I speak of the rights a president gains with respect to the unique worth they attain in
virtue of their presidency, that particular worth should be conceived of as alienable. I could
employ the common locution—“He acts beneath the office of the presidency”—to describe those
cases in which a president or former president can be said to have foregone the grounds for
respect they otherwise would have been entitled to.
And that role-bestowed worth is real—in Wolterstorff’s view, achievements,
accomplishments, and historical facts about people are properties of theirs on which worth can
supervene, and one’s inhabitation of the office of the presidency would be considered one such
achievement, accomplishment, or meritorious role. In addition, President Warren would have
the full suite of human rights that any other human has due to the worth that supervenes on
critical facts about their humanity. So, some of the rights President Warren has in virtue of her
worth will be merely human rights—rights had in virtue of the tremendous worth President
Warren has qua human (as in, Elizabeth Warren’s right not to be treated cruelly and
inhumanely). But other of the rights President Warren has in virtue of her worth will be rights
that the president has in virtue of a worth that is unique to whoever occupies the presidency;
such rights arise from a worth that is the president’s exclusively, and the relevant worth is
alienable. To wit: some of the president’s rights are strictly conventional and obtained with the
role “president,” some are inherent human rights shared in common with the rest of us in virtue
of every rights-holder’s tremendous worth, and some are rights enjoyed uniquely by the
president in virtue of the unique worth she possesses that supervenes on certain historical facts
about her.
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So, you and I have some duties with regard to President Elizabeth Warren in virtue of
strictly conventional factors (as laid out by laws and norms), and another set of duties with
regard to President Warren in virtue of the president’s inherently valuable humanity, and
another set of duties with regard to President Warren in virtue of the worth that accrues to her
by accomplishment or role (namely, that she is the president of the United States of America).
Interestingly, the value that accrues to the individual in virtue of their being the chief executive is
just as morally significant as the value that accrues to the individual in virtue of their being
human, but the role itself of chief executive is strictly conventional. One might wonder: is the
worth that accrues to an individual in virtue of their being the sole president inherent worth, or
something else? How could the rights that supervene on that worth be conceived of as inherent,
in the same way that our suite of human rights is to be conceived of as inherent? I do not have a
satisfying answer to that question, other than to say, simply, that properties are properties.
Inasmuch as Wolterstorff is right that certain achievements, accomplishments, or roles can be
conceived of as an individual’s properties, and inasmuch as those properties can be conceived
of as supervenience bases for worth, then it is conceivable that President Warren has some
inherent rights (like that of being treated deferentially) contingent upon her possession of the
worth that supervenes on these historical facts about her. I have already granted that the unique
presidential worth is alienable. It can be lost or trumped, perhaps in such cases as when there is
behavior that fails to attain to the dignity of the office, in ways that normal human worth cannot
be. But I contend that the Wolterstorffian taxonomy stands intact: the rights that supervene on
our worth qua president and the rights that supervene on our worth qua human would both be
considered inherent. It follows from all of this that some inherent rights, at least, are alienable,
but I am not bothered with that output.113

The word “inherent” is ambiguous. Inherent can stand as the opposite of “acquired” and it can stand as
the opposite to “relational.” Nothing much hinges on this ambiguity in my work.
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In all cases, an individual’s worth supervenes on properties that are inherent to that
individual—whether it is worth that accrues to an individual in virtue of their status as human, or
whether it is worth that accrues to an individual in virtue of some conventional role they fill or
some property they gain via life accomplishment (or whatever). All the rights, then, that
supervene on worth are to be considered inherent rights.114 And all of the complexities of the
taxonomy of rights on hand notwithstanding, we should simply accept that certain roles or
conventions—like that of the role president of the United States of America—will give to an
individual like President Elizabeth Warren both some conferred rights in virtue of her occupying
the conventional role and an increased measure of alienable worth associated with that role (on
which certain new inherent rights may supervene).
In my model, human rights supervene on the human worth that supervenes on a certain
essential human property, rather than rights supervening directly on that property, for two
reasons. First, were I to conceive of rights as supervening directly on properties, without the
added element of human worth, I would be forced to account for why human rights that
supervene on some property (essential or not) obtain for humans but do not obtain for other
things that have that same or similar properties (as in, some capacity had by both humans and
bears, but to some lesser extent in the bear). The claim that humans have some property on
which human worth supervenes does not entail that non-humans lack that property; however, if
the property on which the relevant human worth supervenes is taken to be unique to humans,
like the property humanity that I will consider later, then it would of course be entailed that nonhumans lack the property, along with the worth that supervenes on it and the human right that
supervenes on the worth. Needed is an explanation for why humans have human rights, and
non-humans do not; and it is here that the importance of human worth is apparent. It is human
worth, and not some other sort of worth, that supervenes on the properties (essential or not) of
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humans, and it is human rights that supervene on that human worth; this explains why nonhumans do not have human rights, though they may have properties and capacities very similar
to those had by the human rights-holder.
But note that nowhere do I claim that other things or beings do not have rights; rather, I
claim that humans have human rights, exclusively, because human rights supervene exclusively
on human worth. Other non-human entities have worth and rights, too, (for instance, an animal’s
right to not be harmed without warrant) so we can still think of their treatment and mistreatment
in the terms of “justice.” And the supervenience of human rights on human worth is a better
model than the supervenience of human rights directly on certain human properties for a second
reason: the worth of humans gives the claims that supervene on that worth normative
significance. Were claims thought to somehow supervene directly on some natural property, we
would be left needing an account for how a right could be normatively forceful (or why it would
be normatively forceful), given its strictly natural, amoral base. Instead, we can talk of human
worth with the common understanding that worth, dignity, and value are normative entities, and
we can conceive of the entities that supervene on those commonly understood normative
entities to also have normative import. So, in my view worth authorizes claims, legitimizes them,
and makes them normatively forceful. Worth adds to natural facts of the matter about humans
and those life-goods which are legitimately in their interest (or secure their well-being) a
normative force that cannot be attained by bootstrapping from strictly natural facts of the matter.
So, basing human rights on human worth allows us to explain why only humans have human
rights, it allows us to explain why every human has human rights, and it allows us to explain why
human rights are normatively forceful. I take the normative character of objective human
worth—that it commands respect—to be a basic fact about human worth.
B. Wolterstorff’s Theistic Account of Human Worth
The issue of whether or not relational properties can give rise to inherent human rights is
an issue for Wolterstorff’s account of how inherent human rights are accounted for, because
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Wolterstorff ultimately accounts for the suite of inherent human rights in the worth that is
bestowed upon a person by the relevant relation to God. That we are in the requisite relation to
God is the worth-bestowing relational property that accounts for our inherent human rights, our
relation to God purportedly giving rise to a new status and new claims of ours to certain
treatment.115 Wolterstorff claims that the worth upon which a person’s inherent human rights
supervene is a worth that is bestowed by God,116 a claim that is problematic. That bestowed
worth would be neither essential to humans conceptually prior to their relation to God nor
established by convention. But he makes such a claim for want of an appropriate base or
ground for human rights, after arguing that all preceding grounding accounts are inadequate or
seriously problematic—he systematically rejects the various properties and capacities that are
constitutive of the human nature as appropriate grounds for inherent human rights.117
In saying that worth can be bestowed, we are committed to saying that there are certain
properties and relations that are responsible for that bestowal; otherwise, the worth that is
“bestowed,” independent of any bestowed property or relation on which that worth could
supervene, would be arbitrary. Such arbitrary worth might be something like a worth assigned
by fiat—but surely we should resist arbitrariness when conceiving of the worth a person has that
may or may not generate their rights. Certainly, we do not want our normatively binding social
relations—our rights—to be conceived of as supervening on a bit of arbitrary fiat-worth. Such
115

Wolterstorff, Rights and Wrongs, 360.
Wolterstorff does not clearly define what worth bestowal amounts to, but I will let that lie. As I said
before, probably “bestowed worth” amounts to the worth that supervenes on bestowed or conferred
properties (like relations). Here lies my primary objection to the story Wolterstorff is trying to tell: how
could a relational property, a purportedly morally significant relation that all told is external to the rightsholder, be responsible for any human worth at all in the rights-holder? What property of the individual,
upon which the relevant worth would supervene, would that relational property be? I think this core claim
of his fails, so I will offer a different explanation. I do not think relational properties like the one offered by
Wolterstorff can produce the human worth he’s looking for in his account—although surely relational
properties could confer some rights. For want of an alternative, I will offer a secularized version of all of
this that does not rely on Wolterstorff’s theistic claim here, and I will offer a different theistic relational
property—the child-parent relation of rights-holders to God, a constituent part of which includes some real
property of the rights-holder—that I think could more plausibly account for the inherent worth Wolterstorff
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fiat-worth would not be principled, it would lack an anchor, ground, or base. And it is hard to
imagine how an unprincipled worth could be morally salient or normatively forceful. Hence,
Wolterstorff’s position that the relevant bestowed worth is derived from that critical relational
property: God’s friendship toward God’s human creatures.118 In a Wolterstorffian framework, this
friendship to God relation bestows worth (i.e., is a supervenience base for human worth) and
serves as a ground for respect.
Before moving into my critique of Wolterstorff’s theistic accounting for human worth in
terms of this relational property, here are the various high points of Wolterstorff’s theory of
justice: Wolterstorff calls that to which we have legitimate moral claim “goods”—states of affairs
within one’s life and history that contribute to the non-instrumental worth of a human’s life and
history.119 He argues that classical Eudaimonism (a moral theory that centers the good life on
human flourishing) does not have the conceptual resources required to account for inherent
rights and he develops his own original account of “the good life” called Eireneism, a fusion of
three central elements:
i.

“the good life” conceived of as the Hebrew concept of shalom,

ii. the fundamental action maxim of “love your neighbor as you love yourself,” and
iii. a tri-structure of rights involving the rights-holder, his interlocutor, and the claim
itself.120
On his view, well-being, or shalom, is intrinsically social, as it depends on whether or not others
honor your rights to life-goods.121 Wolterstorff uses a “divine-desire” standard to define lifegoods, according to which the goods constitutive of a person’s actual shalom are what God
desires for that person’s life.122 This is supposed to objectify and reify life-goods, in much the
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same way that God-bestowed worth is supposed to objectify and reify inherent rights
themselves; the divine desire standard establishes that which is the proper object of a claimright and that which is not. Wolterstorff references Hohfeld’s work in endorsing what he calls the
“weak Hohfeld thesis,” according to which X has a claim-right against Y only if Y has a duty
toward X, as against the stronger claim that X has a claim-right against Y if and only if Y has a
duty toward X.123 It is the case, under Wolterstorff’s view, that for every claim-right there is a
correlative duty, but it is not the case that for each of our duties there is a correlative rightsholder; we might have a duty regarding a precious work of art, for instance, even in which case
it is clearly wrong to say that a painting is a moral patient complete with claim-rights.124
Wolterstorff presents rights in terms of respect for the worth of other persons. He
emphasizes that justice and injustice are intrinsically social,125 and he emphasizes that
consideration of rights trumps any consideration of “the greater good.”126 When rights-conferring
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I find any view that gives us duties toward inanimate objects—even ones of tremendous value—
suspect, although I will grant that, probably, we have duties to at least some things that do not have
(human) rights: things like dogs. And I will grant that surely things like dogs do have rights, although they
should be conceived of as animal rights, grounded in animal value; and, probably, according to the
correlativity principle our duties toward dogs are not the same kind of thing as our duties to other humans,
but are rather something like dog duties, in a class of moral considerability separate from the class of
moral considerability containing human rights and duties. Our “duties” toward precious works of art, for
instance, probably ought to be conceived of as duties to the other members of our community or to our
community as a collective, to those who have some right to enjoy the precious life-goods provided by the
aesthetic value of the art. Though we are duty-bound to treat precious works of art in ways that respect
their value, certainly the precious work of art itself ought not be conceived of as making claims against us;
precious works of art have social context and import, of course, but they are not socially situated in the
way that intrinsically social beings are socially situated. We gaze upon them, but do not stand in the
relevant moral relation to them. The claims are made upon us by the artist, perhaps, or by those others
who behold the art, and (perhaps) those who could some day benefit from the art (or statue, or building,
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Furthermore, Kant’s notion of duties of imperfect obligation is operable here, too. Duties of
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laws are broken the rights they confer are violated.127 Every case of one’s being wronged is a
case of one’s being demeaned, treated in a way not befitting one’s worth. 128
Precise definitions are lacking here for terms like “respect” and “demean.” I will attempt
to close those holes here and posit for my view:
a rights-holder’s worth is properly respected if and only if the rights-holder is
treated in those ways of being treated to which she has morally legitimate claim
and the rights-holder is granted those goods to which she has morally legitimate
claim.
So, what it means to “respect” a rights-holder is that you act in accord with the grounds for
respect she possesses; to do otherwise is to demean the rights-holder. Worth provides grounds
for respect, by which we mean both that worth is the normative force behind moral claims and
that worth generates those moral claims in the right social contexts. Subjects of sufficient worth
command respect in just those senses.
Every person has non-instrumental value and should be treated as an end in itself, but
not all persons are of equal value.129 If the reader has fairly strong egalitarian intuitions about
the worth of persons, as I do, the reader may initially resist that final claim—that not all persons
are of equal value. However, the claim that not all persons are of equal value is not the claim
that some persons are very valuable and others are not—it is simply the claim that not all
persons are of equal value. In Wolterstorff’s view, each person is immensely valuable, if only in
virtue of God’s desire for relationship with them. To further assuage the worries of the
egalitarian, presumably God has an equal desire for friendship with everyone, accruing to an
equal baseline of enormous personal value. But persons are still significantly different, to the
effect that their different properties—life achievements, skills, roles, relations, etc.—accrue to
them in different final tallies of worth, from person to person. To soothe the egalitarian, it must
127
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be insisted that no person is so defunct or boring as to fall short of the baseline of tremendous
worth that is bestowed on them by God’s desire for relationship with them. I think the nonegalitarian implications of Wolterstorff’s view pass muster, without the deleterious inegalitarian
effect that some persons ought to be considered morally considerable and others morally
inconsiderable. Persons have different final tallies of value, but each person is of sufficient value
such that the suite of inherent human rights obtains for them.
According to Wolterstorff, worth inheres in various properties, from which it follows that
the task of accounting for rights is that of identifying that property (that relation, that
accomplishment, that feature of human nature) it is in virtue of which the worth sufficient for
grounding human rights inheres in every human being. Wolterstorff takes to task traditional
secular and theistic attempts to ground rights. In his account of justice-as-rights, Wolterstorff
devotes a chapter to demonstrating that preceding secular attempts to account for human rights
in either human capacities or human dignity have failed.130 At the end of his chapter, he draws
the induction that since all varieties of such accounts to date have failed, it is unlikely that one
will prove successful, and for the same reasons that the failed attempts proved unsuccessful.
Wolterstorff phrases the challenge this way:
Is it possible, without reference to God, to identify something about each and
every human being that gives him or her a dignity adequate for grounding human
rights? If not, then what? Some think the challenge can be met. Many think it
cannot.131
“Secularist” Raimond Gaita formulates Wolterstorff’s concern this way:
Only someone who is religious can speak seriously of the sacred, but such talk
informs the thoughts of most of us whether or not we are religious, for it shapes
our thoughts about the way in which human beings limit our will as does nothing
else in nature. If we are not religious, we will often search for one of the
inadequate expressions which are available to us…We may say that all human
beings are inestimably precious, that they are ends in themselves, that they are
owed unconditional respect, that they possess inalienable rights, and, of course,
that they possess inalienable dignity. In my judgment these are ways of trying to
say what we feel a need to say when we are estranged from the conceptual
130
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resources we need to say it. Be that as it may: each of them is problematic and
contentious.132
Wolterstorff begins by dismissing Kant’s “capacities” and dignity-based account of
human moral status, according to which the reason humans have dignity is their capacity for
reason–but Wolterstorff dismisses this on grounds that some human beings clearly lack that
capacity, like infants or those with dementia.133 Wolterstorff dismisses different attempts to place
the infant or the incapacitated within “the circle of dignity” by offering and then dismissing
different variants of Kant’s account: that what may account for human dignity is that one does or
did possess the capacity for rational agency (but this would leave out infants), that one is a
being such that, if it matures, its maturation includes possessing the capacity for rational agency
(but this would leave out those humans who would not mature as such), or that one belongs to a
species such that maturation of its properly formed members includes possessing the capacity
for rational agency (but this is a strange property that, in fact, some non-humans would possess
to some lesser degree). Wolterstorff concludes his dismissal of Kant’s capacities account:
I submit that the problem confronting Kant’s version of the capacities approach
confronts every other version of the capacities approach as well. Whatever
capacity one selects, it will turn out that some human beings do not possess the
capacity.134
Wolterstorff presents and dismisses Dworkin’s “secular-sacred” view, on grounds that it,
too, fails to account for the worth and rights of every human. Here is Dworkin:
The life of a single human organism commands respect and protection, then, no
matter in what form or shape, because of the complex creative investment it
represents and because of our wonder at the…processes that produce new lives
from old ones, at the processes of nation and community and language through
which a human being will come to absorb and continue hundreds of cultures and
forms of life and value, and, finally, when mental life has begun and flourishes, at
the process of internal personal creation and judgment by which a person will
make and remake himself, a mysterious, inescapable process in which we each
participate, and which is therefore the most powerful and inevitable source of
empathy and communion we have with every other creation who faces the same
frightening challenge. The horror we feel in the willful destruction of a human life
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reflects our shared inarticulate sense of the intrinsic importance of each of these
dimensions of investment.135
Dworkin’s is a secular account and Wolterstorff accuses Dworkin of waxing poetic about the
sacred while lacking the metaphysical resources to rightfully invoke the sacred. Wolterstorff
points out that the weakness in Dworkin’s account stems from its reliance, too, on the
assumption that every instance of a human is an instance of “mature properly formed human
beings…creative masterpieces of natural creation and self-creation,” but this does not account
for the worth of the human being who is severely impaired from birth and it does not explain why
humans are to be considered quantitatively more “masterful” than things like bears and birds.136
We should ask, According to what standard?, and answers to that question would be subject to
the same sorts of counterexamples already covered. Wolterstorff considers Kant to have offered
a paradigmatic human dignity- and capacity-based account, and he offers Dworkin as an
exemplar of any dignity-based account not grounded in capacities.
Wolterstorff ends with Alan Gewirth’s account which uniquely appeals to the capacity of
rational agency, but does not appeal to the worth of that capacity or to dignity more generally.
Here is Gewirth’s attempt:
First, every agent holds that the purposes for which he acts are good on
whatever criterion (not necessarily a moral one) enters into his purposes.
Second, every actual or prospective agent logically must therefore hold or accept
that freedom and well-being are necessary goods for him because they are the
necessary conditions of his acting for any of his purposes; hence, he holds that
he must have them. Third, he logically must therefore hold or accept that he has
rights to freedom and well-being; for, if he were to deny this, he would have to
accept that the other persons may remove or interfere with his freedom and wellbeing, so that he may not have them; but this would contradict his belief that he
must have them. Fourth, the sufficient reason on the basis of which each agent
must claim these rights is that he is a prospective purposive agent, so that he
logically must accept the conclusion that all prospective purposive agents,
equally and as such, have rights to freedom and well-being.137
Wolterstorf paraphrases Gewirth:
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If I seek to bring about X, then I regard X as good; and if I regard Y as a
necessary condition of my bringing about X, then I must also regard Y as good.
Now for any purposive action whatsoever, freedom and well-being are necessary
conditions of my bringing about what I seek to bring about. So I must regard
freedom and well-being as “necessary goods” for me.138
Wolterstorff challenges the notion that we always hold the purposes for which we act to
be good (citing the drug addict who knows that acting on their addiction is bad or unhealthy but
does so anyway) and he points out that these necessary pre-conditions should be regarded as
only instrumentally good. I would add the observation that it hardly follows from “freedom is a
necessary precondition of my doing what I want to do and your doing what you want to do” that
“therefore, every purposive agent has the right to freedom.” Wolterstorff insists Gewirth’s
argument is fallacious:
…the argument, at least as it stands, is fallacious. The premises are these: first, I
am logically compelled, by reflection on the fact that I am a purposive agent, to
think of myself as having a right to freedom and well-being; and second, there is
nothing in this line of thought peculiar to me. The conclusion one would expect
Gewirth to draw is that I am compelled to think that others are compelled to think
in the same way I am about the implications of their being rational agents. But
that is not the conclusion he draws. Instead, he says that I am compelled to think
that all of us, myself included, do in fact have rights to freedom and well-being.139
It would be reasonable to expect someone to reason from the existence of these necessary
preconditions of practical moral reasoning that one cannot engage in purposive deliberation or
action without the preconditions of freedom and well-being. But instead, Gewirth skips directly to
a conclusion that does not follow from the premises: that the rights themselves to freedom and
well-being are derived, by simple deduction, from the mere recognition of those necessary
preconditions of purposive action. Wolterstorff ends his discussion of Gewirth by pointing out
that even if the argument weren’t fallacious, it would still only work for those humans who are
capable of rational agency, and clearly not every human is.140
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Wolterstorff challenges “the secularist” to account for that essential, uniquely human
feature in virtue of which one has the status human being, thinking by this point that it cannot be
done without appeal to theistic commitments. Whatever the feature, it must account for both the
ineradicability of human rights and the failure of non-human beings to attain to the status human
being. Otherwise, we are left with a theory of the essential nature of human beings, and a
resultant theory of human rights, according to which a human being could lose that feature it is
in virtue of which they have human rights; or, we are left with a theory of the human nature that
does not account for the reality that human rights are unique to humans. If that unique feature
could be lost, and if it truly is that feature in virtue of which a human has his or her human rights,
then what should be conceived of as ineradicable or inalienable rights are neither ineradicable
nor inalienable. Ultimately, Wolterstorff decides that the secularist’s project is doomed to fail,
and he closes his book Justice: Rights and Wrongs with his theistic grounding.
In a separate article dedicated to showing the inability of other rights theories to account
for the ineradicability of human rights, Wolterstorff defines human rights as those rights enjoyed
by one in virtue of one’s enjoying the status human being.141 Wolterstorff rejects several secular
attempts to ground human dignity: in the capacity for rational agency, in the capacity for
personhood, and in the instantiation of human nature. 142 Each of these confers tremendous
worth to an individual (and, presumably, gives rise to certain rights), but each of these attempts
to ground human dignity in capacities fails—counterexamples are abundant of human beings
who cannot and will not exhibit rational capacity, personhood, or full-fledged human nature, yet
whom we would intuitively judge to have human rights nonetheless. He denies, as well, that the
imago Dei grounds human dignity—the imago Dei, too, can only be interpreted in terms of
capacities that humans, as a matter of fact, can lose or lack.143 He points out that bearing the
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image of God just is one’s possession and exercise of a set of capacities that makes them
sufficiently like God.144 Any account of human dignity that appeals to capacities that can be
lacked by some human or other is similarly doomed to fail, whether the account appeals to
strictly natural facts or makes appeal to the sacred—human rights are to be ineradicable from
every human.
In addition to the accounts mentioned by Wolterstorff, others have attempted to account
for human moral status. Maimonides argues that the image of God just is human rationality and
that lacking the capacity for rationality or the exhibition of rationality is tantamount to lacking a
soul.145 Tooley references the ability of a being to recognize themselves as a subject with a
series of continuous states.146 Feinberg cites capacities to assume duties and responsibilities
and to value.147 Quinn posits that the candidate capacity is the capacity to will.148 Singer ties the
moral status in question to a being’s future-orientation and a being’s plans being guided by a
desired future.149 McMahan posits that the property or capacity of note is self-awareness.150
Jaworska posits the capacity to care.151 But the reader will see that each of these attempts is
subject to obvious counterexamples—instances of a being with worth and rights that lacks the
named capacity.
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Thus Wolterstorff’s motivation to create an alternative account—his position that the
worth that accounts for our human rights is a bestowed worth, a worth had in virtue of God’s
love for God’s creatures:152
What we need, for a theistic grounding of natural human rights, is some worthimparting relation of human beings to God that does not in any way involve a
reference to human capacities. I will argue that being loved by God is such a
relation; being loved by God gives a human being great worth. And if God loves
equally and permanently each and every creature who bears the imago Dei, then
the relational property of being loved by God is what we have been looking for.
Bearing that property gives to each human being who bears it the worth in which
natural human rights inhere.153
For the one who feels the worth bestowed on God’s creatures by God’s desire for relationship
with them is unsatisfyingly contingent, consider these various theological commitments the
theist could smuggle into an account like Wolterstorff’s: were there a God, one should conceive
of God’s love for God’s creatures not as contingent or arbitrary, but rather as necessary, in
virtue of the necessity and essentiality of God’s benevolence. That is, one need not be bothered
by the hypothetical, “What if God wakes up one morning and no longer desires to be in
relationship with God’s creatures? Would it then follow that God’s creatures would no longer be
of sufficient worth for grounding inherent human rights?” It may well be a feature of God’s
benevolence that because God is essentially benevolent, and because God’s love is
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everlasting,154 that God simply cannot but desire relationship with God’s creatures, assuming
such a relationship is a life-good for things like us. This appeal to God’s essential goodness is,
of course, in answer to the puzzle of how to ground rights, when all of the candidate properties
or capacities that have traditionally been taken to ground rights ultimately fail to bear out under
inspection (as when counterexamples are offered of rights-holders who lack the critical property
or capacity). Under this view, God is such that our status as beloved is immutable. Grounding or
basing the rights in something noncontingent—i.e., in the worth we have in virtue of the relation
we stand in to God due to God’s essential benevolence—certainly makes that which grounds
rights immune to counterexamples. It makes the relevant worth not an essential fact about us,
but rather a necessary one. The non-theist, though, remains free to reply, “Yeah, all of that is
interesting, but I’m not convinced because I’m just not convinced that there’s a God.”
So, to summarize and conclude: according to Wolterstorff, the property on which the
relevant worth supervenes is that relevant relational property of God’s relation to God’s
creatures. Justice is grounded on respect for worth and the claims it generates to objectivizedby-God life-goods. In a just state of affairs, everybody gets that to which they have morally
legitimate claim and nobody is treated in a way that demeans them (that is, nobody’s worth is
disrespected). Human rights are claim-rights against one’s moral interlocutors and they are the
normatively binding social relations one stands in to others—claimant, claim, and moral
interlocutor. We enter into others’ presence with our worth and so also with these claims against
others to their respect, to certain treatment, goods, provision, or care.155
C. Against Wolterstorff’s Theistic Account of Human Worth
Here I will spend some time criticizing Wolterstorff’s attempt to base or ground inherent
human rights in the worth that individuals have, not in virtue of some capacity or alienable
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property of theirs, but rather in virtue of God’s desire for relationship with them. I take this
explicitly theistic element in his account to be, by far, the weakest point in Wolterstorff’s theory
of justice. This is nowhere explicit in Wolterstorff, but plausibly it is the conjunction of:
i.

God desires relationship with everybody, and

ii. God’s desire for relationship with each particular human is a feature of God’s essential
moral goodness, that entails
iii. Every human has a tremendous worth that is bestowed on them by God in virtue of their
being beloved by God, or in virtue of their standing in the right relation to God, as a
feature of his essential moral goodness.
And presumably it is the necessity of one’s status as beloved by God or rightly related to God, in
virtue of the essentiality of God’s benevolence, that supplies the inalienability of the worth it is in
virtue of which one has inherent human rights. Wolterstorff does hold that at least some of our
rights (our human person-rights, the rights we have in virtue of the different roles or statuses we
occupy, contract rights, etc.) are accounted for in such a way that does not require appeal to
theological assumptions, but again, Wolterstorff is dissatisfied by attempts to ground inherent
human rights secularly (or even theologically, if the grounding is to be in the capacities that
constitute the imago Dei). These other grounding attempts appeal to human properties and
capacities that are alienable from a person and it is critical that our inherent human rights and
that which grounds them be conceived of as inalienable to us.
For a moment, let us be theists. And let us be critical of Wolterstorff’s theistic attempt to
account for rights not on the grounds that he is a theist and the reader is not, but rather on the
grounds that his theistic attempt to account for rights is problematic in its own right even
granting Wolterstorff’s own theism. My first of two objections to Wolterstorff’s theistic attempt is
that its appeal to relational properties that the rights-holder has vis-à-vis God seems too
contrived by half. I do not mean that it is an altogether unprincipled, unthoughtful effort; I mean,
rather, that in removing from humans the source of their own worth, and in outsourcing the
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source of their worth to God and God’s desire for friendship with things like us and our relation
to God, we are left with something counter-intuitive and awkward.156 Wolterstorff’s accounting
for rights in the relation of God to the rights-holder seems more responsive to the need for a
theory that can establish the inalienability of inherent human rights than it is responsive to the
tremendous worth that humans have in their own right. It is too contrived by half because what
we are after is an account of human worth and it is bizarre to claim that the worth of the rightsholder ultimately has very little to do with the rights-holder herself but rather very much to do
with God.
Wolterstorff likens the worth and status that are bestowed onto an individual to whom
God stands in the right relation to the worth and status that are bestowed onto an individual in
virtue of their being a friend of the Queen.157 I take it that his monarch analogy is supposed to
be theologically substantive. Certainly, there is something to the intuition that underlies this
analogy—the person who is a friend of the Queen seems, in some sense, elevated. But surely
such an elevation is merely cultural or social. Wolterstorff posits that it is plausible that being
befriended by the Queen bestows on an individual a good deal of worth, new grounds for
respect, and, therefore, rights. However, while being a friend of the Queen does confer to one
certain new rights (say, the right to go inside Buckingham Palace, or the right not to be arrested
upon approaching the Queen), I think it implausible to say that friendship with the Queen
bestows on one any real worth. This special relation to the Queen confers rights, but not
inherent human rights, not the sort that supervenes on human worth. Friendship with the
Queen, rather, grants to one a set of conventional claims that must be respected in virtue of
what it means that one enjoys the Queen’s friendship.
The rights that come from friendship with the Queen, then, should not be conceived of
as grounded in some worth enjoyed by an individual in virtue of that relational property
156
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“friendship to the Queen,” as we would conceive of that individual’s actual inherent human
rights. Rather, the rights that come with friendship with the Queen are conferred. This is a
problem for Wolterstorff, who needs friendship with God to bestow worth-enhancing properties
and thus bases in us for our inherent human rights, rather than to merely confer a new set of
rights in virtue of one’s relation to God. What Wolterstorff requires here is an account of how
any relation to another could bestow worth in the relevant way (via the bestowal of some
property on which worth supervenes) and thus give rise to inherent human rights.
I argue that friendship with the Queen cannot bestow on one worth, not because the
Queen has the wrong kind of value or is insufficiently valuable, but rather because relation to
any other is not the sort of property that can alter one’s worth or moral status in the desired way.
Right relation to the Queen—or any other—does not get at one’s human moral considerability.
All other things being equal, one enters the presence of the Queen, prior to one’s friendship with
the Queen, with the full force of one’s moral considerability, yet lacking certain conferred rights
that can be had only in virtue of friendship with the Queen; friendship with the Queen and
desirability to the Queen grant to one new claims and liberties, but not new objective human
worth. Again, this is not because the Queen is not actually uniquely valuable in virtue of her
status as the Queen; it is because relation to another just is not the sort of thing that adds to or
subtracts from one’s worth. Our relations to others are external to us—they are highly
contingent social or even spatial facts independent of that set of properties we have on which
our human worth supervenes.158 Indeed, imagine if one’s personal worth were at the mercy of
one’s social relations—if it were at the mercy of the Queen’s, or any other’s, daily mood! Would
getting blocked by the Queen on Facebook, for instance, actually decrease one’s moral
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considerability and eliminate some of one’s grounds for respect and, consequently, one’s
inherent rights?159 Surely not.
None of this is to challenge Wolterstorff’s assumption that inherent human rights,
grounds for respect, and worth are all conceptually tied together. Instead, I take it to challenge
just Wolterstorff’s claim that relational properties can be worth-bestowing properties, and thus
ultimately responsible for inherent rights. It still stands that relational properties can be (at least
sometimes) rights-conferring properties, whether by contract or convention. At issue, though, is
whether relational properties (even relation to God!) can sensibly be thought of as accounting
for the worth that is ultimately responsible for inherent human rights, and I hold that they should
not be thought of in that way.
Wolterstorff intends friendship-with-the-Queen to be an illustrative analogy, but it only
serves to spotlight the problem with Wolterstorff’s attempt to account for inherent human rights
in the worth we gain in virtue of the relevant relation to God. If it is true that relation to another
(or desirability to another) is not the sort of thing that can bestow worth-generating properties on
us, then it is false that relation to God (or desirability to God) is the sort of thing that can be
considered a worth-generating property for us, barring some principled and morally relevant
distinction between friendship with another and friendship with God.160 And that the desire God
has for friendship with us is essential to God’s nature would be no such principled and morally
159
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relevant distinction; that is a fact about God, not of us. The problem with conceiving of a relation
to another as the source of the worth that inheres in us in virtue of which we have our inherent
rights is not merely that these relations are usually highly contingent—it is that these relations
do not bestow human worth. Just as it is appropriate to hold that right relation to the Queen
confers certain rights, though, we should certainly allow that right relation to God might confer
certain rights. Indeed, such a rights-conferral is an important Christian theological
commitment.161 Just as was the case with the Queen, God is surely uniquely valuable, and any
relation to God that we have is an interesting fact about us that probably confers certain rights to
us, but it is misguided to conceive of that relation to God as being that which bestows human
worth on us. And if all of that holds up—if relationships can confer rights but not bestow worth—
then Wolterstorff is wrong that it is on our various relational properties to God that our
tremendous worth supervenes, in virtue of which we have our inherent human rights. And if it is
false that it is in virtue of our relation to God that we have the relevant worth, then we ought to
find a different source for that worth. My view: instead of appealing to relational properties to
God in an attempt to objectify and fix human worth, the theist should just hold that God created
rights-holders and they really are objectively valuable (independent both of what God has to say
about them and of their relation to God) for some other reason.162
My second objection to Wolterstorff’s grounding account is that in explaining why
we are such that we are candidates for the requisite friendship with God, Wolterstorff
must ultimately make appeal to the alienable properties and capacities that he begins
with rejecting. Let me explain. Accepting, à la Wolterstorff, that God loves human beings
and desires relationship with us, we should probably also accept that God loves other
sorts of things (and desires relationship with them, too, if they are the sort of thing
capable of being in a relationship). But in Wolterstorff’s account, humans, uniquely, are
I am talking here of the rights of “sonship” as discussed by New Testament authors, as in Galatians 3–
4 and Romans 8.
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bestowed by this love with the worth it is in virtue of which we have our inherent human
rights. So, it follows that there is something different about us from other sorts of things,
or there is something different about God’s love for us from God’s love for other sorts of
things, such that we are bestowed with the worth it is in virtue of which we have inherent
human rights and other things are not. Under Wolterstorff’s account, in order to account
for why we have inherent human rights and other things that are loved by God do not, it
seems that what is needed is one of two things:
1. a principled way to distinguish between God’s different kinds of love for different
things, such that the kind of love God has for us bestows the human worth we
have in virtue of which we have inherent human rights and the other kinds of love
he has for other things do not, or
2. a principled way to distinguish between the kinds of things that are from those
that are not the proper candidates for the kind of relation to God that Wolterstorff
posits is the source of the worth sufficient for one’s being a human rights-holder.
If we have (1), then we are able to say that God loves different things in different ways and it is
in virtue of the unique kind of love with which God loves humans that humans get to have
special inherent human rights-conducive worth. But then we should ask why God loves some
things (humans) in a human rights-bestowing way and other things (not-humans) in ways that
do not bestow human rights (or, perhaps, any kind of right)—and for a non-arbitrary answer, we
shall have to appeal to properties and capacities that are unique but alienable to humans. If we
have (2), then we are able to talk about God’s relationship with, say, dogs as being of one kind,
and his relationship with human persons as being of another kind, in virtue of dogs being the
kinds of things they are and in virtue of humans being the kind of things we are—but in this, too,
we shall also ultimately have to refer to properties and capacities that are characteristically
human but alienable. If we have neither (1) nor (2), then we have no principled way of
determining why humans are special, such that we get inherent human rights and non-humans
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do not, and we have no way of reserving the rights we take to be uniquely human (inherent
human rights) exclusively for beings who are human.
In our account of inherent human rights, we need to be able to say why humans have
inherent human rights and other kinds of things do not, and we need to be able to appeal to
facts about humans that are inalienable, else the account will fall to the objections facing any
account of personhood or moral considerability that grounds an individual’s personhood or
moral considerability in properties or capacities that can be lacked. That either (1) or (2) is
required to get Wolterstorff’s broader story off the ground is a problem for Wolterstorff, because
both (1) and (2) must ultimately make appeal to properties and capacities that a rights-holder
could lack in order to set the human rights-holder apart from things that are not human rightsholders. And central to Wolterstorff’s work is the attempt to characterize inherent human rights
as inalienable—the worth it is in virtue of which a human has his or her rights has to be
conceived of as inalienable and a human’s candidacy for worth-bestowing relationship with God
in the first place has to be conceived of as inalienable or else the whole thing tumbles like a
house of cards when one of the traditional counterexamples is offered.
Presumably, Wolterstorff would embrace (2) and say something like: God’s desire to be
in relationship with a person bestows on that person a worth or status that can only be had by
humans, and certainly not by things like labrador retrievers, and thus humans are special; it is
only humans who can have that special moral status, because only humans are the kind of thing
with the properties necessary for being in the requisite relationship to God. Wolterstorff could go
with (1) and claim that God has different kinds of love reserved for different kinds of creatures,
but that would be an unnecessarily complicated picture of God’s love for all the different kinds of
God’s creatures there are. Instead, in Wolterstorff’s framework it is more fitting to think of God’s
love for humans as being human worth- and human rights-bestowing, and his love for other
things as not being human worth- and human rights-bestowing, because humans are a special
candidate for friendship with God. But it really does not matter, as both (1) and (2) ultimately
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reduce the moral uniqueness of humans to properties or capacities held by humans that can
only be conceived of as alienable. Both (1) and (2) run aground on that old problem of
counterexamples.
Indeed, Wolterstorff claims that humans are uniquely candidates for friendship with
God.163 But we should ask what it is in virtue of which humans are special candidates for
friendship with God and labrador retrievers are not. Would not Wolterstorff answer that question
by appealing to some property or capacity of humans that makes them uniquely human and
precludes things like labradors from being humans? Personhood, say, or rationality or a sense
of morality. These are all likely candidates, but the problem is that Wolterstorff has already
rejected that it is some property or capacity in virtue of which humans have the special status
they have—for the only properties and capacities on offer to explain why humans are humans
and non-humans are not are properties that could be lacked by a person. Wolterstorff needs an
account of the special moral status of humans, or of the special candidacy that humans have for
friendship with God, that does not appeal to alienable properties and capacities, or else he has
simply pushed his original problem back a level: he landed on friendship with God as that
property of humans in virtue of which we have the worth we have, because that relation is
inalienable from us in virtue of God’s essential goodness—but this all assumes that the
necessary conditions of candidacy for friendship with God are themselves inalienable. And it is
not at all clear that something like personhood, or whatever capacity it is in virtue of which one
can be a friend of God’s, or whatever property it is in virtue of which one is beloved by God, is
inalienable. And if that property or capacity in virtue of which we have our special status (as
candidates for relationship with God) is not inalienable, then Wolterstorff has not solved his own
problem, and his account fails to meet his own standards.
What are the necessary conditions for candidacy for friendship with God, if not just a
complex of properties and capacities that could be lacked? And if the problem in the first place
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with grounding inherent human rights in capacities or properties was that we will inevitably be
presented with an individual (say, an infant or a comatose patient) who lacks the property or
capacity necessary for being of sufficient rights-conducive worth but whom we would still regard
as an inherent human rights-holder, then any claim that Wolterstorff makes about the property
or capacity it is in virtue of which humans are the proper subjects of friendship with God but
dogs are not is troublesome, because the only properties or capacities on offer are alienable. If
that alienable property or capacity would not do for grounding inherent human rights in the first
place, then it will not do for demarking those kinds of things which are from those which are not
fit to be the proper recipients of the bestowal of the worth it is in virtue of which humans have
their inherent human rights. If it is false that the property or capacity it is in virtue of which
humans are the proper subjects of relationship with God and other things are not is alienable—
that is, if it is in fact the case that every human has that property or capacity—then Wolterstorff
could have just tied the worth requisite for giving rise to inherent human rights to that property or
capacity. But he rejected properties and capacities altogether, because the relevant ones could
all conceivably be lacked by an inherent human rights-holder. Wolterstorff’s account demands a
starting point, but we have not yet arrived at one.
Without a principled way to distinguish things like humans from things like labrador
retrievers in the sense relevant to candidate for relationship or friendship with God, it seems we
have only two options: either God only arbitrarily embraces friendship with humans (but not
other things) in such a way that the worth sufficient for inherent human rights is bestowed on
humans but not other things (an arbitrariness that would be unacceptable to most theists) or
else God desires friendship with labradors and humans both and there is nothing in principle
special about humans such that we are qualified for friendship with God and dogs are not, so
dogs should be thought of as having the same rights we do in virtue of the worth bestowed on
them by God’s desire for relationship with them. The problems with both alternatives should be
apparent to the reader. I am far from denying that labradors have rights—in fact, I think
84

labradors do have inherent dog (or animal) rights. It is just that it is an implication of
Wolterstorff’s grounding story that if there is no property or capacity in virtue of which every
human is non-arbitrarily set apart from things like labradors as a proper subject of friendship
with God, then either labradors should be conceived of as having inherent human rights in virtue
of their God-bestowed worth or God’s morally special desire for friendship with humans is
arbitrary. But if there is a property or capacity in virtue of which humans are set apart from
things like labradors as the proper subjects of friendship with God, then that property or capacity
better be inalienable or else a single counter-example of a rights-holder who lacks the capacity
or property requisite for friendship with God will sink the whole framework. And if there is such a
property, one should simply ask: why not simply put that property at the foundation of an
account of inherent human rights, rather than appealing to relational properties like the relation
to God that Wolterstorff posits?164
I have demonstrated two fundamental issues with Wolterstorff’s account of human worth.
First, it is peculiar to account for human worth by appeal to facts about God and humans’
relation to God—we should want, in an account of inherent human worth, an account that points
to certain facts about humans. I argued that relational properties are not adequate grounds for
respect, in the sense that relational properties should not be thought to “bestow” worth the way
Wolterstorff posits they do. And second, at bottom, Wolterstorff’s account fails his own
standards. In accounting for why humans are special, vis-à-vis our candidacy for friendship with
God, we have only recourse to properties, traits, or capacities that could be lacked by a rightsholder. In search for a property or set of properties that could account for human worth,
Wolterstorff rejects human properties and capacities that could be lacked by a human rightsholder because he needs inherent rights to be inalienable; if these same properties or capacities
Wolterstorff might well answer: “Because I really do think it is relation to God that bestows human
worth on rights-holders. I was not merely looking for a terminus. I think there is something special and
morally relevant about that relation to God whether or not the necessary conditions of candidacy for
friendship with God are alienable, and when it comes to accounting for human worth the property alone
that accounts for candidacy for friendship with God does not cut it.”
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remain at the bottom of his account as I have demonstrated they do (those properties or
capacities that are constitutive of capacity for that worth-bestowing friendship with God), then
we do not yet have an account of the inalienability of the special moral status of humans. At
best, we would be left with an account of the special moral considerability of humans that is
subject to counterexamples—examples of rights-holders who lack the properties requisite for
friendship with God. And that would not do. On both of those counts, Wolterstorff’s picture does
not adequately account for human worth; his account of human worth is both counterintuitive
and internally inconsistent. In the next chapter, I offer theistic and secularized alternatives to
Wolterstorff’s account of human worth that will enable us to keep the broader Wolterstorffian
framework intact—they do not appeal to relations, and they do not appeal to properties that can
be lacked by a particular presumptive human rights-holder.
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Chapter 3: Some Wolterstorffian Alternatives
A. Some Alternative Theistic Foundations
In the next section, I will offer a menu of options, re-renderings of Wolterstorff’s account
of why humans are morally considerable such that they have the full suite of inherent human
rights—they will be, at bottom, secularized accounts of human worth. But first I want to offer a
couple theistic alternatives to the theistic relational property that Wolterstorff posits as that which
is responsible for humans’ inalienable worth. First, let’s jettison the friend-to-a-ruler
understanding of this relational property and adopt instead a more traditional understanding of
the human-to-God relation: that of the relation between parent and child.165 What does this
parent-child relation get us, as against that friend-to-a-ruler relation? It gets us a relation that is
more plausibly constituted by a set of properties that can be conceived of as belonging to the
rights-holder, a set of properties that resists both accusations of arbitrariness and accusations of
alienability or contingency. So, here, the relevant worth-inhering property becomes that of “child
of God,” or that set of properties that constitute that relation “child of God” (whichever locution
suits your preferences). The parent-child relation is not a merely spatial, social, or highly
contingent relational property, something alienable from those who currently stand in the
relation. In the natural world, that relation of parent to child is a relation that is constituted by
various essential properties that are natural; one has the parents one has as a matter of
essential causal fact and counterfactually one would be some other individual had one different
parents.166 That is, there are immutable facts about me more fundamental than the various
merely social or spatial relational facts about me, such that I am the son of John and Becky
Howard and such that they are my biological parents. In addition to those immutable facts about
me, I stand in social and spatial relations to my parents that are much like the friend-to-a-ruler
relations that Wolterstorff leans on. But in the ruler story, there are no deeper or metaphysically
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significant properties associated with that relation to speak of, as there are in the parent-child
relation. I suggest that Wolterstorff’s theistic account of human worth should be reconceived in
terms of that parent-child relation and those immutable properties that the parent-child relation
lends to both parent and child.
So, a theologically and metaphysically significant parent-child relation of God to
humanity would feature immutable properties of both God and individual humans. But would
that relation of God (parent) to humans (children) account for human worth in a way that
Wolterstorff’s friend-to-a-ruler relation could not? I offer three stress-tests according to which the
parent-to-child understanding of God’s relation to rights-holders is superior to the friend-of-aruler understanding of God’s relation to rights-holders:
Test 1:

Under which understanding of God’s relation to God’s human creatures
does God’s special love for humans escape accusations of arbitrariness
on God’s part?

Test 2:

Under which understanding of God’s relation to God’s human creatures
can the property on which human worth supervenes be conceived of as a
truly ineradicable or essential feature of the rights-holder?

Test 3:

Which understanding of God’s relation to God’s human creatures most
plausibly allows that relation of God-to-rights-holders to serve as a
supervenience base for the incredible worth associated with inherent
human rights?

Regarding (1), under the view according to which God’s special relation to humans is
understood in terms of a parent-to-child relation, God’s special regard for humans would not be
characterizable as arbitrary. Parents can understand this talk of God’s love for humans in the
context of their parent-to-child relations—when pressed, no parent would claim their love for
their child is arbitrary. But in denying that a parent’s love for his child is arbitrary, I am not
claiming that God loves God’s children for a particular reason; quite the opposite, I am claiming
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that parents neither love their children arbitrarily nor for reasons. Just as it would be strange to
insist that parents love their children arbitrarily, it would be strange to say that parents love their
children for reasons—there might be natural explanations for the agape love that parents have
for their children, but it is not as if parents weigh their children’s properties and characteristics in
deciding if and how much to love them. There may well be natural duties to treat their child in
the ways constitutive of their child being appropriately loved, but it is not as if parents employ
some rational calculus in determining how much to love their kid or in determining whether or
not their kid is an appropriate object of their parent-love. We could even conceive of the love
that a parent has for their child as being a constituent part of parents’ relation to their children; in
some sense, biological or otherwise, the love a parent has for their child is caused or entailed by
that relation. That parent-love is neither arbitrary nor the product of reasoned consideration of
the beloved, and it does not appeal to any properties whatsoever of the beloved, much less to
those properties or capacities of the child that could be lacked. So in the arbitrariness stress test
imposed by (1), the parent-child relation seems superior to the friend-of-God relation. The
friend-of-God relation has to answer accusations of arbitrariness along the lines of Why are
humans candidates for this critical relation to God and other things are not? and the parent-tochild relation of God to rights holders presumably does not—God has parent-love for those
things to which God is, as a matter of fact, related as parent.
Regarding (2), under the view that the better understanding of God’s relation to rightsholders is that of parent to child, that property or set of properties “child of God” would be
properly conceived of as ineradicable. The rights-holder’s status as God’s “child” would be an
essential fact about the rights-holder, an unalterable standing or relation to God. One might
wonder what, exactly, we mean in saying that humans are the children of God and thus that our
“child-hood” is an essential fact about us—we know what we mean when we say that Bobby is
the son of John and Becky, and that Bobby’s sonship to John and Becky is an immutable
biological property (and kin relation) of Bobby’s. In saying such a thing, we appeal to natural
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facts about biology and kinship. But in the relation of God to humans, there are no such
biological facts to appeal to (though there very well may be facts of kinship to appeal to). The
theist, here, would be tasked with choosing his own specification of what exactly it means that
God and rights-holders stand in the parent-to-child relation to one another. If I am to claim that
God is my father, I will need to specify in what sense, exactly, God is my father, if not in the
biological sense; the theist, here, will need to develop commitments regarding this relation
specific to his favored variety of theism. I take it that all such commitments will appeal to beliefs
about God’s being the cause, sustainer, or ground of the rights-holder—if not biologically, then
certainly causally, ontologically, or spiritually—in addition to God’s parental love for rightsholders. The theist might appeal to humans being of a particular kind of thing, in virtue of their
proceeding from God, being caused by God, being in the relevant relation to God, or bearing
God’s image;167 assuming that the general parent-child relation is essential, and assuming that
these facts about us associated with that parent-child relation of God to rights-holders would
also be essential, we could reasonably argue that the worth that supervenes on those properties
of ours is inalienable.
Regarding (3), I see no issue with conceiving of that property or set of properties that
constitute the parent-to-child relation of God-to-rights-holders as being that property or set of
properties on which the relevant human worth supervenes. Were we to take the parent-child
relation seriously regarding our relation to God, that would lend to humanity a significant degree
of something much like divinity or royalty. It would make us, in some respects at least, the same
kind of thing as God, at least in the very narrow sense that we are whatever sort of thing one
must be in order to be God’s children, that we share some bare minimum of similarity or identity
in kind. Presumably God is immensely valuable, and it seems true that our close relatedness to
God (both in kind and in “kin” relation) could amount to a property or set of properties on which
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considerable worth supervenes. Indeed, for some reason or another, God himself or herself is
taken to be immensely valuable. In this view, we would be valuable in virtue of our relation to
God not because we share properties and capacities of God that are eradicable from us, but
rather because this essential relation entails certain essential facts about us (a property or set of
properties that is ineradicable from us that is entailed by this kin- or kind-relation to God)
sufficient for our having the relevant human worth.
And emphasizing this further, here, is important: On this view, a rights-holder is not to be
conceived of as valuable because God loves them just as a parent should love their child, but
rather because God is related to them precisely as a parent is related to her child. Under this
view, it is not God’s love for God’s children that confers worth or properties on which worth
supervenes; rather it is the metaphysically substantive parent-to-child relation itself (or the
property or set of properties that constitute that relation) on which the relevant worth
supervenes. The rights-holder would have whatever properties are constitutive of their standing
in the parent-to-child relation to God, and great worth should be thought to supervene on those
properties. This parent-to-child relation is relevantly different from the friend-of-God relation in
two major respects: the parent-to-child relation depends on properties that are essential to both
the parent and the child (while the friend-of-God relation does not), and the parent-to-child
relation between God and rights-holders is plausibly comprised of a property, kind, or kinship
relation on which human worth could more plausibly supervene. If one wants a theistic
foundation in one’s account of human worth, I would recommend this refiguring of Wolterstorff’s
theistic foundation.
A different theistic foundation that is worth considering is an appeal to God’s unfailing
love for God’s human creatures. Under at least some traditional theistic views God’s love is
presented as everlasting and unchanging.168 We can conceive of God’s love as being an
essential property of God’s with regard to us, much in terms of God being omnibenevolent
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toward us. So, that we are loved by God, under this view, is a necessary and ineradicable fact.
If what is desired is a way to account for our human worth in a way that makes our human worth
ineradicable from us, this is one way forward. I prefer the previous accounting for our human
worth, however, for this reason: in appealing to facts about God (for example, God’s essential
benevolence) in order to explain why we are valuable, we fall short. A view that appeals to facts
about me, in order to explain my worth, seems clearly preferable. That I am beloved by God is a
sort of relational or tangential fact about me, but if what accounts for the fact that I am beloved
by God is the essential property of God’s benevolence and not some relevant fact about me,
then it seems we are stuck pointing to facts about God. In principle, there is nothing wrong with
that; but we should prefer accounting for our own worth by appeal to our own properties or
status. Above, I posited that some sort of shared kind or kin relation to God could well account
for human worth; under that view, the relevant kind or kin relation would not be some exclusive
fact about God, but rather some fact shared in common by us and God—some fact or property
or status that both God and humans participate in.
Abraham Heschel provides a noteworthy discourse on the imago Dei that could be
incorporated into either of the above theistic alternatives. In Heschel, we see the moral
significance of humans embedded in humans’ firm likeness to God:
Man is man not because of what he has in common with the earth, but because
of what he has in common with God. The Greek thinkers sought to understand
man as a part of the universe: the prophets sought to understand man as a
partner of God… It is a concern and a task that man has in common with God…
The intention is not to identify “the image and likeness” with a particular quality or
attribute of man, such as reason, speech, power, or skill. It does not refer to
something which in later systems was called “the best in man,” “the divine spark,”
“the eternal spirit,” or “the immortal element” in man. It is the whole man and
every man who was made in the image and likeness of God. It is both body and
soul, sage and fool, saint and sinner, man in his joy and in his grief, in his
righteousness and wickedness. The image is not in man; it is man.169
Here we see a radical identity of the image of God and humanity—a rejection of the appeal to
the traditionally offered properties and capacities to explain the imago Dei, and a reference to
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the “concern and task” that man has in common with God. This identity imbues every human
with worth and makes them a “world” in their own right. We are to love God because God is
inestimably precious and we are to love people for the very same reason. Heschel’s view is
intrinsically theistic and it defies Wolterstorff’s characterization of imago Dei accounts of human
worth as mistakenly appealing to capacities and properties that can be lacked. Heschel, here,
offers to the theist a way to conceive of the inalienable worth of humans that is immune to the
traditional counterexamples. One might ask: Why should sharing a particular “concern and task”
make one inestimably precious? Does likeness to God, whether we are appealing to traditional
capacities or properties or to Heschel’s identity of the imago Dei with humanity, sufficiently
account for the worth and rights we are discussing? But were one to accept that the imago Dei
would suitably account for human worth, Heschel’s particular imago Dei account would provide
the theist with an imago Dei account of human worth that does not run aground on the
counterexamples (image bearers who lack the necessary property or capacity) Wolterstorff used
to dismiss imago Dei accounts in the first place.
B. Some Secular Foundations
In the Chapter Two, we saw that even granting Wolterstorff’s theistic metaphysical
commitments, his theory still struggles, at bottom, to find a place to start that is not ultimately
just an appeal to alienable (or merely contingent) human properties or capacities. I just offered
some alternative theistic foundations, and I will leave it to the reader who insists on a theistic
foundation to choose their preference. Now, though, I will offer some secularized foundations to
Wolterstorff’s account and I hope to show that a workable secularization of Wolterstorff’s work
provides a suitable foundation for a compelling theory of justice that is reducible to talk of
human worth and morally legitimate claims, sans reference to God. In his search for a
foundation for human worth and inherent human rights, Wolterstorff argues that there is no
human capacity on offer that can satisfactorily serve as that ground—any of the capacities on
offer (like human consciousness, or the human capacity for reason, or the human moral sense,
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etc.) could conceivably be missing from a human we all would take to be a legitimate member of
the moral community (like an infant, or a comatose patient).170 But if the property that obtains in
humans such that humans are of a value sufficient for accounting for human rights is not some
capacity, then what is it?
In seeking an answer to this question, it is tempting to appeal directly to Wolterstorff’s
account, like this: What is the property of being such that God desires friendship with us?
Whatever that property is, any secularized version of Wolterstorff should just highlight and
emphasize that property. But that question is misled.171 In Wolterstorff’s account, it is not the
property of being such that God desires friendship with us that bestows on us tremendous worth
and new grounds for commanding respect; rather, what does the work in Wolterstorff’s account
is the relational property that obtains between rights-holders and God, and it is on that relational
property that tremendous amounts of worth supervene, sufficient for the generation of the full
suite of human rights. And the question above is misled because, clearly, that relational property
between God and the rights-holder cannot be secularized—any account of a divine being’s love
for rights-holders or their relatedness to rights-holders will be necessarily non-secular. So the
task of secularizing Wolterstorff’s account cannot be the task of secularizing the relation of God
to creature. Rather, the task is to find a fact about human beings distinct from said necessarily
theistic relation that could possibly account for human worth and the full suite of human rights.
In originally searching for such a candidate fact about humans, I went so far as to
entertain some sort of counterfactual property, something like: were there a God just like
Wolterstorff’s God, that being would desire friendship with us or would stand in the requisite
Wolterstorff’s discussion of those various accounts and various kinds of accounts can be found in
Chapter Two. Wolterstorff tidily observes that any characteristically human capacity that has been offered,
or that could conceivably be offered, as that which accounts for human worth could conceivably be lacked
by a rights-holder.
171
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one could use a line of questioning similar to this one to ask and answer questions surrounding human
rights-holders and their worth by reference to some sort of ideal observer, a perfect being, and an
idealized relation between that perfect being and human rights-holders. I bypass that here, though,
because it is not necessary.
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relation to us, and it is in virtue of our being such that that counterfactual God would love us (or
would stand in the requisite relation to us) that we have the worth and human rights we have.
But, again, it was never a feature of Wolterstorff’s account that what accounts for our human
rights is our being any such way—what accounts for our human rights, according to Wolterstorff,
is a standing relation to God. And for reasons I will not belabor, a merely counterfactual relation
to God is insufficient as an account of our worth and normatively binding social relations in the
actual world. In a Wolterstorffian framework, it is simply false that both:
a. what it is in virtue of which we have the worth that we have is that, independent
of God’s love for us, we have some such valuable property or status, X, and that
b. God loves us, because we are such that we have that property or status, X.
To Wolterstorff, inherent human rights-conducive worth is bestowed by the relevant relation to
God and attempting to think of human worth in terms of our being the particular way that makes
us proper candidates for God’s love for us (whether there is a God or not) simply
misunderstands the Wolterstorffian theory’s commitments. Such an understanding of
Wolterstorff’s work would also run aground on objections to capacities accounts that were
addressed in the previous chapter.
So the question remains: in this secular account, what fact about humans—some
property or capacity or relation or status—could possibly account for the worth and rights that
every human has? A secularized account necessarily removes God from the picture, and we
are left, then, with only normal properties and relations to choose from. The problem here is the
aforementioned one: all the remaining and traditionally candidate properties, capacities, and
relations are properties, capacities, and relations that could fail to obtain in any number of
humans (and human persons, if one opts into Wolterstorff’s distinction between humans and
human persons),172 the intuition remaining notwithstanding that these humans who lack the

Some humans aren’t human persons, under this view. Some humans lack the properties and
capacities necessary for human personhood. I agree there is a distinction between persons and non172
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property on offer are clearly rights-holders. We simply ought not to harm the comatose, for
instance, or the very young, whether or not they have the property, relation, or capacity of
distinction.
Needed here is a Rawlsian maneuver, because what follows in the candidate
secularized accounts will be unacceptably dogmatic to some. The Rawlsian maneuver: we have
general and overwhelming overlapping consensus that human beings (whatever, exactly, they
are) are inestimably precious and that their moral considerability and moral status accrue to
them in the form of a variety of rights (whatever, exactly, those are). The matters of controversy,
as covered, are What exactly are the necessary and sufficient conditions for ‘humans?’ and
Why exactly is every human relevantly morally special? and What exactly are human rights and
what accounts for them? In seeking answers to those questions, the philosophical community
splits in countless directions into heated debate.
There are, of course, thinkers who deny that there are rights, or who interrogate the
general project of the rights theorist. Alasdair MacIntyre holds that rights are “fictions,” simply on
grounds that believing they are real does not make them real and that no existing account of
rights satisfies him.173 Douglas Husak rejects that there are rights, because there is nothing
shared in common by all humans that could explain why all humans share some rights. 174
Elizabeth Wolgast questions the notion of rights from the perspective that they (at least
sometimes) unhelpfully turn rights-holders into moral agents that are combative, atomistic, and
undermining of a pro-social interrelation of agents.175
But, a broader overlapping consensus remains: human beings are inestimably precious
and their moral considerability and moral status accrue to them in the form of a variety of rights.
In answering why, exactly, those things are the case, we are presented with a plethora of views
persons, but in the case of non-person humans and humans who are also persons, I take the distinction
to be a non-morally relevant distinction when it comes to inherent human rights.
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and arguments that are far less supported than those objects of overlapping consensus. I am
intensely interested in the subject of what accounts for humanity, for human moral
considerability, and for rights, so I will continue to offer candidate accounts for those entities.
But I grant that none of the candidate accounts will enjoy the measure of overlapping consensus
as is enjoyed by the claim: human beings are inestimably precious and their moral
considerability and moral status accrue to them in the form of a variety of rights. It would be
unwise to offer starting points that are less supported (and less supportable) than that claim, so
I offer, instead, that what follows will be a menu of options that I take it are workable secular
accounts of the moral significance of humans. That human beings are inestimably precious and
that their moral considerability and moral status accrue to them in the form of a variety of rights
enjoys overlapping consensus, so let us grant that that is the case and use it as a starting point.
Debate and controversy will occur under the surface of that starting point in search for accounts
of why, but with this Rawlsian appeal to consensus regarding the moral significance of human
beings we can move into the more applied portions of my paper, if none of the following proves
to be sufficiently convincing to the reader.
I just mentioned that the following secularized accounts will be unacceptably dogmatic to
some readers, but I maintain that they will be no more dogmatic than many of our other moral or
value intuitions, or the core claims of competing theories. So here is the first attempt: what
accounts for our human worth ought not to be conceived of as some eradicable property or
relational property of humans on which our rights-producing worth supervenes. Rather, I
propose that the property we are looking for is the essential property humanity, or our essential
substance humanity, or the essential status human.176 Human worth, in this view, supervenes
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on that fundamental and essential human property or status, humanity. What is this essential
status or property, humanity? Here, my claim is simply that the status human or the property
humanity (whichever locution you prefer) is a fundamental and essential property that inheres in
every human being.177 Humanity (conceived of as a property or status) cannot be analyzed in
more fundamental terms and it is to be conceived of as a property separate from the suite of
other properties and capacities that humans may have, lack, or possess to varying degrees.
Humanity is an essential fundamental property or status, and it is on it that human worth
supervenes. These accounts demand one terminus or another, or else there is no answer to the
question, “What is it about every human being such that every human being has ineradicable
worth and inherent human rights?”; one way forward is to claim that the morally relevant
properties go no further down than that fundamental property or status of ours, humanity. There
DNA to be able to identify or characterize humanity, and I insist that it should be facts about an individual
that account for that individuals’ worth, and not facts about the broader species that individual belongs to.
And this view differs from theirs in a more important respect: In accounting for human worth and
the rights that supervene on that worth, I am not seeking an account of some objective, trans-species
moral standard of full moral status. I do not tie full moral status to human moral considerability. I am
seeking only an explanation of human moral considerability. I think it is likely that if any entity has full
moral status, humans do. However, I am not working within a framework that is committed to placing
humankind at some apex of moral considerability. Of course, I hold human beings to be immensely
valuable and worthy of rigorous moral consideration. However, I am not opposed to the great moral
considerability of any non-human (animal or being) that fits the bill. I am committed, though, to humans
possessing a unique human moral considerability and to the uniqueness (to humans) of the
supervenience of human rights on human worth. I am happy to ascribe to any entity, being, species, or
person that qualifies whatever measure of regard is afforded by full moral status; I think it likely that
humans are as morally considerable as any other thing, but I am not, in principle, opposed to some view
that could sensibly hold some other being or kind in an even higher regard than we hold humans.
My project is more modest than what the accusations of “speciesism!” and “anthropocentrism!”
would have the reader think—I seek only an explanation of why humans have normatively forceful human
rights and why non-humans do not. I am not seeking to provide grounds for thinking humans, or only a
certain subset of humans, are at some moral apex, and I certainly am not seeking to provide grounds for
thinking that we are the sole occupants of that moral apex. What other grounds are there for a nonhuman object’s, being’s, or person’s possessing a worth on which rights supervene? Certain morally
relevant properties, surely, like rationality or consciousness—but each being that possesses these
properties could potentially lose these properties or could potentially have lacked them. As with humans,
it may also be that Martians, for instance, possess a measure of worth that supervenes on their
Martianhood, that property conceived of as a brute, fundamental fact had in common by every Martian.
And if Martians are to be conceived of as having inalienable Martian rights, for instance, some such
property would be needed.
177
Under this view, this property or status needs to be conceived of as essential to every human, or else
some human rights-holders could be found that lack the property. And under this view, this property or
status needs to be conceived of as fundamental, so that the reductive project can be given a terminus.
Otherwise, the property or status on offer could potentially be reduced to lower-level properties that could
be lacked or that seem morally irrelevant (say, the possession of a particular DNA strand).
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is something in virtue of which every human is ineradicably human—that property or status,
humanity—and it is on it that our human worth supervenes.178
When we abstract away from the candidate capacities and properties typically on offer in
considerations of human personhood or personal value, human beings and their tremendous
worth remain. The comatose patient, the infant, the severely developmentally disabled, the fully
functioning human adult—these human individuals are located at different places on a range of
human capacity and productivity and personality, but they are each unequivocally human
beings. And it is on the fact of their humanity, and not on some other alienable or non-essential
property, that the tremendous human worth sufficient for human rights supervenes.179 The
alternative—that some humans have inherent human rights and others do not have inherent
human rights, because some humans lack the property or capacity of relevant moral
significance—simply flies in the face of our most pressing and forceful moral and justice-related
intuitions.180 I agree with Wolterstorff that the track record of the philosophical community in
locating that property or capacity in virtue of which tremendous value accrues to every human
being is pretty dismal, so here I appeal, instead, to the fundamental property or status,
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We and other beings have a plethora of other worth-conferring properties: rationality, agency, the
ability to make value judgements, the capacity to care, consciousness, the various capacities associated
with personhood, etc. But none of these is what it is to be essentially human, and the human worth on
which human rights supervenes should not be thought to supervene on any of these various other
properties.
179
I will mention here a view that I considered but ultimately decided against: that human rights-holders
are humans (i.e., they have that property the fact of our humanity) and that every human also has as an
essential property this human worth that is unique to humans. I am not opposed in principle to this view—
it simply eliminates the supervenience of human worth on humanity. Rather than saying “worth
supervenes on humanity” we would be left to say “humans are both essentially human and essentially
valuable” or “humans have worth essentially.”
When I say “worth supervenes on humanity” I certainly am also saying “humans have worth
essentially.” Holding that worth supervenes on humanity stipulates an important modal relation between
the former and the latter, but it does not eliminate that we have worth as a property. Under my view, it is
still accurate to say of humans “Humans have the property of unique ineradicable worth.” I just add the
supervenience relation, because it seems true that we have the value we have because of the more
fundamental fact about us, our humanity. I prefer a structure in which our humanity (a natural fact about
us) is responsible for our human worth (a value fact about us), that the properties humanity and human
worth aren’t merely held in conjunction; the supervenience of human worth on essential humanity
conveys that notion most clearly.
180
The pressing intuition: that if anything has these rights, this particular human on offer does, whether or
not they have the property you so value.
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humanity. Barring a groundbreaking resolution of the traditional reductive problem, this
fundamental humanity is a sufficient starting point.
One may contend that I need to offer an account for why I take it humans are humans in
the sense specified above but things like chairs and trees are not. Why, that is, do things like
chairs and trees not have human worth? I am satisfied by the answer: chairs and trees clearly
do not have the property humanity. No fully functioning, good-faith actor would insist that they
do; fully functioning, good-faith actors would be able to point to instances of humanity,
however.181 The more relevant problem for this account, though, would be that of determining
(for instance) whether or not embryos or fetuses have that property, humanity. It is clear that
embryos and fetuses lack certain of the properties and capacities traditionally on offer
(properties and capacities like consciousness, rationality, future-orientation, etc.) and it is clear
that embryos and fetuses lack many of the properties and capacities typically taken to be
constitutive of personhood. Here, I concede that I have not offered an explanation of this
essential property humanity that makes it clear or settled whether or not embryos or fetuses
have this essential property. On principle that it is unclear how the fundamental, ineradicable
property or status humanity is something that could be obtained by an embryo or fetus, I take it
that they do possess humanity and that the immensely ethically complicated space of the
abortion debate will necessarily be a consideration of moral contexts in which prima facie there
is a conflict between two rights-holders’ rights but in which (in that moral context) ultima facie
only one of those rights obtains and the other does not. Here, I have made no claims about the
personhood of embryos or fetuses; rather, I have indicated that I would accept a view in which a

Levinas’s ethics-first philosophy is worth mentioning here; see Levinas, Totality and Infinity. In
encountering another person, we experience them as such (and our responsibilities to them)
precognitively. Knowledge of others and whatever ethical truths obtain of them is “meta-physical” and
gained in the experience of the other. This ethics-first philosophy or ethics-first epistemology is worth
mentioning, because it terminates or precludes traditional reductive problems. What is a human? and
Why are humans valuable? and What are rights and why do we have them? would all have answers
obtained precognitively in Levinas’s view. Needless to say, Levinas’s ethics-first philosophy is disruptive
to the way this subject matter and debates over it are conventionally structured.
181
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human embryo or a human fetus has that essential property or status, humanity—a property
that that organism could not possibly lack.
A second way to figure this fact of humanity is in terms of a human family. This is similar
to positing belonging to the human species or the possession of some fundamental biological
essence as that which constitutes the property humanity, but the concepts used are less
exacting. Under this view, what accounts for a human individual’s special moral considerability
is not a particular property or capacity of theirs (or set thereof), but rather their membership in
the human family, a sort of kind or kin relation. Take me: I am a Howard. That is an immutable
fact about me. Imagine I were hit very hard in the head and lost the capacity for rational thought
or consciousness or empathy or what have you. I would still be a member of the Howard family,
yet I would now lack any given characteristically human property. What makes me a Howard is
not some eradicable property or capacity, but rather the metaphysically relevant connection to
the rest of the Howards. And were I to lack the relevant characteristically human property or
capacity, the rest of the Howards would still insist on my rights—there is still a right and wrong
way to treat me, indeed even were I dead, not in virtue of some alienable property or capacity of
mine, but rather in virtue of my standing as a Howard.
So in this human family view, one would appeal to humanity as a sort of essential kin
relation that can save the moral considerability of beings who lack some alienable
characteristically human property or capacity. Wolterstorff takes aim at eradicable properties
and capacities like consciousness, capacities for reason and thought, the capacity to care or be
future oriented—counterexamples of the sort offered by Wolterstorff to the eradicable properties
and capacities views are harder to come by for this kind of human family view. With humanity at
large conceived of as a family, and with individual humans conceived of as participating in
membership in the human family essentially, it is hard to imagine what could alter the status of a
particular human, such that they would cease exhibiting membership in the human family. This
sort of view more solidly resists the sort of counterexamples offered by Wolterstorff against the
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capacities accounts of humanity. But, note: appealing to a human family in this way does not
account for why individual members of the human family have worth because it does not
provide an obvious explanation of what makes the human family, in general, morally special. It
is only potentially an account of why, if it is already accepted that humanity and humans in
general are valuable, one particular human who lacks some eradicable and characteristically
human property or capacity still ought to be considered morally considerable. They are morally
considerable qua human, whether or not they possess some relevant and eradicable
characteristically human property or capacity, because of their membership in the human family.
C. Against Speciesism and Anthropocentrism
An aside to address potential accusations of speciesism and anthropocentrism: It does
not follow from my position that humans are of a unique moral considerability (that human rights
supervene on human worth and that human worth supervenes on the irreducible and
fundamental property, humanity) that humans are of paramount moral considerability. I take it
that the right of every being with rights—human or not—should be prioritized. In all of the
various moral contexts in which inalienable human rights obtain, they obtain inalienably, as do
the inalienable rights of non-human beings. In these moral contexts in which rights obtain, to
violate a right is gravely wrong, no matter of what sort the being is whose rights are violated. I
have focused on states of affairs in which the worth and rights of humans are in question,
because in this work I am most interested in human rights. I have used the term “justice” as
such, as applied to the domain of the respect or disrespect for the worth of humans. But
nowhere have I claimed that questions of justice and injustice (questions of whether or not the
rights that obtain in a given state of affairs are being respected) cannot be applied globally or
take as their purview the worth and rights of nonhuman rights-holders. The wronged animal or
Martian or ecosystem—we should evaluate these instances of injustice, too, in the same way
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that we evaluate disrespect for human worth.182 I have simply kept my scope narrowed to the
domain of the worth and rights of humans. We should handle the cases when a human’s right
conflicts with a dog’s right, for instance, or the cases when a human’s right conflicts with a demigod’s right, just as we handle those cases where it appears that the rights of two humans
conflict: à la Mill, when presented with cases of apparently conflicting rights, we should offer,
instead, that in that particular moral context there is no such conflict of rights. No right is being
trumped by another right or superseding principle; one of the rights obtains and the other does
not in that particular moral context; so what appeared to be a conflict of two rights is really no
such conflict, and we are not led into a troubling prioritization of countermanding rights. Every
violation of a right, no matter the kind of right it is, is wrong and instantiates injustice.
Puzzling questions, here, arise. For example: is it just as wrong, then, to violate a dog’s
right to not be tortured (without warrant) as it is to violate a human’s right to not be tortured
(without warrant)? Before I answer this question, let us agree that the wrongness of an action
should not be conflated with the disgust, offense, or outrage that an action causes—though,
these are natural reactions to moral wrongness, and I think various magnitudes of disgust or
outrage probably do generally track with well-examined moral judgments.183 I hold that the worth
of a human qua humanity and the worth of a dog qua dog are incommensurable. They are
simply different kinds of worth, and the two quantities of worth cannot be weighed directly
against one another using the same scale of value; so, there is no ranking of species strictly in
terms of worth, although shortly I will point out that there are ways to compare different sorts of
organisms objectively, and some of those grounds of comparison should be considered morally
relevant. Above, I argued that the worth on which a right supervenes also accounts for the
normative force of a right. It follows from that commitment, along with this commitment to the
incommensurability of the various sorts of worth that there are, that it will be complicated to
182

I am being permissive here with my suggested applications, and perhaps overly so, on purpose.
Of course, there are plenty of examples from history when disgust and outrage did not appropriately
track with wrongness and rightness.
183
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compare the wrongness of the violations of two rights, the supervenience bases of which are of
two incommensurable kinds.
I certainly do not think there are different kinds of wrongness, when it comes to
evaluating the violation of different kinds of rights—that is, I do not think it is dog-wrong to
violate the dog’s right not to be tortured and that it is human-wrong to violate the human’s right
not to be tortured. I take it there is only one kind of wrongness, and only one kind of injustice,
when it comes to the violation of normatively binding social relations—such violations are simply
wrong and unjust, as determined by whether or not the worth in question was respected. So,
given that and this worth-incommensurability, if there is a principled ranking to be had of the
wrongness of a violation of some human right and the violation of some dog right, such a
principled ranking would have to appeal to some other difference than that of a difference in
degrees of two incommensurable worths or kinds. But if it is possible to rank violations of rights
had by humans and rights had by dogs, what accounts for that ranking, if the underlying
supervenience bases are incommensurable? I agree with the commonsense view that says
torturing a human, for instance, should come with a harsher punishment than does torturing,
say, a dog; now I owe you a principled way to hold to that, the kicker being that it needs to
survive accusations of arbitrary speciesism and anthropocentrism.
On what grounds do I believe that torturing humans warrants harsher punishment than
torturing dogs, if not on grounds that humans are more valuable than dogs (a claim that would
entail a value-commensurability that I have already rejected)? I have indicated my commitment
to the worth of the human qua humanity and the worth of the dog qua dog being of two
incommensurable kinds, so I believe it is literally false that humans qua human are more
valuable than dogs are qua dog. But humans and dogs are certainly commensurable along
other dimensions—as in, evaluating the ability of each to feel pain, express care, have futures of
worth, mental capacity, be future-oriented and rational, consciousness, etc., and whatever worth
supervenes on those various properties. I take it worth supervenes on those various properties
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of each different kind of being in a way that is commensurable. That is, there is not human
rationality and dog rationality—there’s just the one capacity, rationality, that different beings of
different kinds have to different degrees. Worth supervenes on that property, rationality, to
different extents in different individuals, in accordance with the extent to which that being is
capable of exercising the capacity, and then rights supervene on those various degrees of
worth.
So, I believe that we cannot compare dog-worth and human-worth, but we can compare
the extent to which a human being and a dog have certain other morally relevant capacities and
properties, like rationality or capacity for pain and pleasure. So, there are dimensions of the
moral considerability of dogs and humans that can be compared, and fairly without controversy,
to whatever extent that dogs and humans have moral considerability that supervene on
properties and capacities that can be had by both dogs and humans. The violations of the rights
that supervene on those properties, properties had by both kinds of beings, are comparable,
and we can generally sensibly say that violating the human’s right is worse than violating the
dog’s right, not on grounds that dogs qua dog are less morally important than humans qua
humanity, but rather on grounds that the very same underlying morally relevant properties are
had to objectively different degrees. So, we can see how we might go about comparing
injustices committed against dogs and injustices committed against humans, and how one might
go about saying that violating a human’s right is worse than violating a dog’s right in a way that
is immune to accusations of speciesism and anthropocentrism. There are properties shared in
common, but had to different degrees, that make for non-arbitrary metrics.
But, of course, what is left to account for is the incommensurable human worth and dog
worth that will obtain, and the violations of rights that supervene on just those incommensurable
moral entities (worth), and how those violations can (or cannot) be ranked. How do we conceive
of the difference in two violations of two individuals’ rights, when those rights supervene on bits
of worth that are different in kind, if we cannot measure the underlying worth on the same
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scale? I first considered this answer: Violations of the rights that supervene on the worth that
supervenes on an individual’s essential humanity and violations of the rights that supervene on
the worth that supervenes on an individual’s essential dog-hood cannot be weighed against one
another, full stop; this follows from the fact that a right’s supervenience base (the worth)
accounts for the normative force of the claim issued. The supervenience bases are
incommensurable, therefore the violation of two rights that supervene on two different bits of
incommensurable worth cannot be evaluated in the same terms. But I think that line of thought
is fallacious. It does not follow from the incommensurability of human worth and dog worth that
the violation of an inalienable human right that supervenes on human worth and the violation of
an inalienable dog right that supervenes on dog worth cannot be compared full stop. That each
is an instantiation of injustice gives us, I think, grounds for saying that both are wrong and in the
very same sense. But given the worth-incommensurability, we have no obvious conceptual
resources for ranking those two particular wrongs, aside from any ranking made possible by any
worth that may supervene on other properties that are shared in common by the two different-inkind beings.
So here is where we stand: it is clearly worse to violate certain rights had by humans
than it is to violate certain rights had by dogs (those rights which supervene on worth that
supervenes on capacities had in common by dogs and humans but to different degrees) and
potentially vice versa, on grounds that those rights are accounted for by properties that are
commensurable across kinds; in these cases, it is easy for us to see that one of the two different
sorts of entities has more moral considerability than the other along that single objective
dimension of evaluation. But when it comes to comparing the injustice of violating inalienable
human and inalienable dog rights, isolated from any properties than can be objectively
measured against one another across-species—what then? In demonstrating that it does not
follow from the incommensurability of dog worth and human worth that violations of the two
different sorts of rights cannot be compared full stop, I indicated that the violations of inalienable
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human rights and inalienable dog rights are in fact commensurable along at least one
dimension—that of their both being instances of either justice or injustice. Violations of both
entities’ rights is unjust, full stop, regardless of whether there can be a further ranking of the
wrongness or the injustice. I leave open the question of whether we can rank violations of rights
that supervene on inalienable human worth and violations of rights that supervene on
inalienable dog worth—both violations are wrong and unjust, but I see no conceptual resources
for a more illuminating analysis than that, aside from any analyses we could conduct of the
properties and capacities shared in common by the beings in question.
We feel the need to be able to rank those violations of rights, and I offer that that felt
need arises from the need to be able to discern which right trumps the other when it seems two
specific rights conflict; I have made the case that there are no such conflicts, and that when
there appears to be such a conflict one is merely misperceiving—in a moral context in which it
appears two rights conflict, one of the rights obtains in that moral context and the other does
not. The open question—What to do with incommensurable dog- and human-worth and the
rights that supervene on those entities exclusively?—loses some urgency when we unravel the
underlying needs to rank rights and discern which of two countermanding rights trumps the
other. I will leave the question What to do with incommensurable dog-worth and human-worth
and the rights that supervene on those entities exclusively? with this: in the real world, there can
never be a consideration of two morally significant individuals of any kind that does not take into
account some property or other apart from the worth the individuals have qua that individual.
The abstraction away from all the properties that can be objectively compared from species to
species (properties like rationality, capacity for pleasure or pain, future-orientation, etc.) is
theoretically interesting but cannot find an application in the real world. It is not a dodge, then, to
say, in response to the question What to do with incommensurable dog- and human-worth and
the rights that supervene on those entities exclusively?, that: incommensurable dog- and
human-worth and the rights that supervene on those entities are never the whole story in any
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moral context; rather, morally significant beings like humans and dogs step into any moral
calculus in their entirety with no morally significant and commensurable property abstracted
away.
There is an important difference of levels to emphasize: incommensurable worth at the
more fundamental level with its one standard of evaluation (amount and kind of worth) and the
rights that supervene on that worth at a higher level with a wholly different standard of
evaluation (whether or not, and to what degree, the underlying worth of whichever kind was
disrespected). I prefer the commonsense position, that violating an inalienable human right (like,
not being tortured without warrant) is worse than violating an inalienable dog right (like, not
being tortured without warrant), on grounds that there will be objective standards for cashing out
the worseness of the violation of the human’s right. Both violations are horrendously wrong. One
can accept dog-worth and human-worth incommensurability while also accepting that torturing
humans is worse than torturing dogs because of other commensurable factors. And we can
compare humans and dogs objectively along those other dimensions—their properties and their
capacities, and the extent to which they have those properties and capacities.
And these other properties and capacities, and the extent to which they are had,
certainly provide us a metric for comparing two things that are incommensurable at some other
dimension of analysis (that of their worth). To wit, violations of the rights of dogs and the rights
of humans are both wrong; human worth and dog worth are incommensurable; dogs and
humans possess certain morally relevant properties and capacities to different extents,
according to which the violation of one being’s right can be adjudged in a principled way to be
morally worse than the violation of the other’s right; but this ability to compare the gravity of
violations of rights does not entail that there will ever be a true conflict of two different rights—
when it appears there is such a conflict, in the moral context under consideration one of the
rights obtains and the other does not, so we will never need to determine which right comes to
the table with greater urgency for the sake of determining which right trumps the other.
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In my view, humanity serves not as a unique grounds for full moral considerability writ
large, but rather as the unique grounds for human moral considerability. I accept that other
properties like reason, rationality, the capacity to care, and the capacity to make evaluative
judgements serve as further grounds for a moral considerability that can be had by any human
or non-human entity that has those capacities; and I accept that rudimentary cognitive
capacities serve as further grounds for moral considerability that can be had by any human or
nonhuman entity that has those capacities; and I accept that a potentially very valuable future
can be further grounds for a measure of human or nonhuman moral considerability; and human
or nonhuman beings both might have some other property or capacity, like foresight or the
capacity to plan and reason, that makes treating them in violation of that capacity wrong. Here, I
am rejecting that identity of human moral considerability with full moral considerability. Instead
of full moral status, simpliciter, there are varying kinds of moral status—human moral status,
Martian moral status, robot mind moral status, person moral status that different kinds of things
will have to varying degrees, rational being moral status that different kinds of things will have to
varying degrees, dog moral status, etc.
So, I do not claim that humans sit at the apex of moral considerability. On the contrary, I
claim that in the most fundamental respects humans and other beings are morally
incommensurable—this, a refutation of any accusation that I have claimed in some unprincipled
way that humans are more valuable or more morally considerable than non-humans. To further
undercut such an assumption, I happily grant: to the extent that the moral considerability of
humans can be compared to the moral considerability of non-humans (as in, comparing the
capacities or properties had in common between humans and non-humans), there are
potentially very many beings that are of far greater moral considerability than humans. There
will be some respects in which humans and the beings that are more morally considerable than
humans are incommensurable (in particular, regarding the worth each being has qua the kind of
thing it is)—but there will be many respects in which, say, a demi-god is of greater moral
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considerability. A demi-god could be far more rational, have a far greater capacity for pain or
pleasure, have a far greater future-orientation or capacity for rationality, etc. That a particular
human is objectively more rational or compassionate or future-oriented than a particular dog,
and that that serves as grounds for thinking it is more wrong to torture that human than it is
torture that dog (for example), is hardly the claim that humans sit at an apex of moral
consideration. If such capacities are morally relevant, as it is reasonable to think they are, then
such capacities serve as objective grounds for comparing at least some of the dimensions of the
moral considerability of two beings; but other dimensions will be incommensurable. And I have
granted that some non-humans, be it the demi-god or the highly evolved Martian, could have
greater moral considerability than even humans do (along those dimensions of analysis that are
commensurable).
D. Moral Non-naturalism
I hold the view that moral facts are non-natural facts that are neither identical with nor
reducible to underlying physical facts. Non-natural moral facts supervene on physical facts, like
humanity or consciousness or what have you, so moral facts are not non-natural in the sense
that moral facts are wholly autonomous from the domain of the physical sciences—they are
unanalyzable in the terms of the physical sciences, but a covariance relation between the
natural and the non-natural obtains. I have indicated an important relation between non-natural
human worth, for instance, and the fundamentally natural humanity on which it supervenes.
Natural properties are generally conceived of as those properties that fall into the
domain of the natural sciences.184 As far as non-naturalism goes, Shaver is an exemplar of the
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See Moore, Principia Ethica. Though, this presumes a general agreement that does not obtain among
philosophers about that which is the proper subject matter of the natural sciences. We have presumed a
hard line between natural and non-natural facts, for instance. But why think that because physics has
nothing to say about moral facts, moral facts are not natural? The line is definitional. Might we have just
assumed that physics has its act together and can, right here and now, responsibly discuss all that is
physical; that physics cannot discuss the moral; and that, therefore, the moral is not natural? We probably
have merely assumed that, for better or worse. One may insist, rather, that moral facts are natural facts
that our sciences and epistemologies do not yet know how to discuss, and that moral psychology
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view that moral terms cannot be analyzed in physical terms.185 Pigden holds that moral
properties are irreducible sui generis entities.186 My moral non-naturalism is a realist’s view that
holds moral properties to be objective and knowable and I take moral properties to be
irreducible to natural properties. My non-naturalism is also a rejection of the claim that natural
properties and the concepts we use to talk about them, exclusively, can account for normativity
and entities like worth and rights.187 Moore’s paradigmatic moral non-naturalism was primarily
concerned with the notion goodness and the various evaluative judgments concerned with
goodness and badness.188 I am not so concerned with notions of goodness and badness and
evaluative judgments regarding the like, as much as I am concerned with characterizing human
worth (and other kinds of worth, too, like the worth that supervenes on the various non-essential
properties humans have and on the essential and non-essential properties of non-humans). I
hold worth, then, to be a non-natural property that supervenes on certain natural facts; the rights
and claims that supervene on worth, too, are non-natural properties.
The obvious problem with any version of moral non-naturalism will be an epistemological
one—at the end of the day, is moral non-naturalism just moral intuitionism, with all of its
epistemological worries, or can it be something more epistemologically respectable than moral
intuitionism? The assumption that underlies this worry is that moral naturalism and moral nonnaturalism are on significantly different epistemic footings, the former being more justified than
the latter when it comes to the beliefs we form about the moral entities under consideration. But
that assumption is not undisputable. Let’s begin with the general worries, and in exploring them
we will find the assumption that moral naturalism enjoys a surer epistemic footing than does

somehow traces something objective out in the world. I’m happy to endorse a metaphysically deeper
claim that, in principle, physics has nothing to say moral facts, while also accepting the claim that moral
facts are objective and knowable facts, though not physical.
185
Shaver, “Sidgwick’s Minimal Meta-ethics.”
186
Pigden, “Naturalism.”
187
I reject Mackie’s error theory in which moral concepts refer to non-natural entities and in which nonnatural moral concepts refer to nothing real; cf. Mackie, Ethics.
188
Moore, Principia Ethica.
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moral non-naturalism to be problematic. The general worries: if moral properties like worth are
non-natural properties, impenetrable to the natural sciences, how do we learn about them, and
what are our criteria for forming justified beliefs about them, and when should we take ourselves
to know things about them?
I have posited that non-natural moral properties invariably supervene on fundamental
(or not) natural properties, so my view is somewhat insulated from accusations that nonnaturalism only works if we posit some spooky faculty of intuition in virtue of which we are
capable of recognizing moral facts. On the contrary, granting that properties like worth invariably
supervene on humanity in particular moral contexts, we need only start with the capacity to
perceive that property, humanity, and some capacity (learned or innate) to recognize the moral
considerability that supervenes on it from context to context. In this sense, my view is no more
vulnerable to charges of explanatory impotence than the view of the moral naturalist who holds
that moral properties are identical with or reduce to underlying natural properties—whether a
naturalist or a non-naturalist, if morality is at all connected to that property humanity, the
recognition of moral considerability will be found in conjunction with the recognition of that
property humanity (or whichever natural property one is examining). The naturalist and the nonnaturalist both have to answer the question: once one has recognized the relevant natural
property, whether the moral property reduces to (or just is) that natural property or whether it
stands irreducibly and separate from that natural property, how then does one recognize the
moral property in question? In the case of that naturalist, there is a further question—why posit
moral facts at all if they ultimately just are or are exhaustively accounted for by the underlying
natural facts? Both the naturalist and the non-naturalist faces an epistemological problem here,
regarding the beliefs we form and the judgments we make about moral facts. It does not help
the naturalist out of this problem to claim that the moral facts just are the natural facts, because
that reduction does not explain why we make moral judgements above and beyond the natural
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facts we can perceive and its appeal to natural facts from top to bottom does not account for
normativity or oughtness.
I hold that non-natural moral facts are real and objective and that we learn about them
much as we learn about anything else: by learning and by association. Things like us inarguably
have capacities for moral psychology and moral judgments, to various extents, and we learn to
associate certain moral facts with certain natural facts.189 I have posited a theoretical framework
of the supervenience of non-natural moral facts on natural facts like humanity, but I do not claim
that one should be able to perceive the supervenience of human worth on humanity. I am not
bothered by our inability to perceive this supervenience relation, because there are all sorts of
physical facts that supervene on other physical facts, the supervenience relation between which
we cannot readily perceive—relations of natural facts to other natural facts that we are
incapable of perceiving and that are mysterious to us, but that we are committed to due to their
explanatory usefulness. If the accusation against my account is that the relation between nonnatural moral facts and certain natural facts cannot be observed, then my account here falls
prey to an accusation that should be levered at any thoroughgoing account of anything, at its
bottom: Your various fundamental entities and your various unanalyzable concepts and the
relations that obtain between them all can neither be observed nor explained in finer-grained,
more helpful terms—so I think the fundamental entities you posit are not real. But every
account, when examined all the way to its starting point, needs to eventually buck reduction,
conceptual analysis, and further inquiry; and, like I have said, there are plenty of supervenience
relations that cannot be observed, like the relation of mental states to brain states.
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In question in any discussion of moral psychology is whether the deliverances of our moral psychology
are judgments about chimaeras, or if they’re judgments about real entities out in the world. That we have
moral perceptions and make moral judgments is at least some reason to believe there may be real,
objective moral entities; that there is broad moral disagreement is hardly an overriding reason to believe
that our moral intuitions are always wrong or that they chase fictions. I am a moral realist, and I think we
ought to proceed in moral deliberation with both general humility and intellectual humility. Needed,
generally, are agreed-upon principles for how to handle moral disagreement. But that falls outside of the
scope of this particular work.
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All of that leaves important epistemic worries standing: what are our criteria for forming
justified beliefs about non-natural moral facts, and when should we take ourselves to know
something about non-natural moral entities? I am going to side-step those two very big
questions because I do not take my account to be burdened to answer them; no more so than
any other account is burdened to answer them, at least. Any ethical theory, any scientific
theory, any religious theory, etc., will be burdened with general epistemological worries about
where justification and knowledge start, and I will leave the matter at this: whatever our
standards for justification and knowledge are in other domains, those standards should obtain in
moral deliberation, even about non-natural moral entities. But intuitionism of most varieties is
vulnerable to some particular standard objections. For instance: it seems lucky that we should
have such a faculty at all, it seems like a mighty cosmic coincidence that our moral intuitions
would track reliably with causally inert non-natural moral facts,190 it seems unlikely that our
concepts could reliably refer to sui generis non-natural, causally inert moral entities,191 and it
seems that intuitionism provides us with no firm way to handle conflicting intuitions. The only of
these worries that bothers me is the last one, because it is indeed worrying that perhaps the
primary way we can gather knowledge about non-natural moral entities is by intuition—what are
we to do with conflicting intuitions? There will be more on this problem in Chapter 4.
But the other weaknesses listed for the intuitionist are, again, not unique to intuitionist
accounts. It is a mystery in traditional philosophy of mind and philosophy of language that any of
our concepts and language, not just those which refer to non-natural facts, are about truths out
in the world. And any capacity that we have, and not just the capacity of moral psychology, is an
interesting fact about us the possession of which may seem to the casual observer to be tooconvenient by half; but all of our capacities have etiologies to be told, and the same could be
said of our moral faculties and the processes through which we deliberate morally. It is another
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mystery in the philosophy of mind that our minds would have a world-oriented character, that
our mental states would be hooked onto the natural world in the relevant way so as to produce
true beliefs—that is no different than the mystery noted about the faculty of intuition.
We cannot readily account for the phenomenon that any of our mental states should be
world-oriented or truth-tracking, so a similar inability to provide an account for how our moral
cognition tracks truth should not be a mark against the intuitionist; further, we cannot readily
provide an account for how we can have knowledge of causally inert non-natural entities like
numbers or formulae or laws or programs, so the same inability to provide an account for how
we can have knowledge of causally inert non-natural moral entities should not necessarily be
counted as a mark against the intuitionist. Intuitionism in particular and non-naturalism in
general have been burdened with answering objections from epistemology, psychology, and
philosophy of mind that naturalistic accounts struggle to answer, too. So that non-naturalism
struggles to answer those questions is not necessarily a mark against non-naturalism. That
there is an explanatory gap between physical facts and moral facts when it comes to evaluating
normativity and that beliefs about non-natural moral entities like worth and rights are
explanatorily helpful when placed into a broader framework, are marks in favor.
E. The Fundamental and Ineradicable Property or Status, Humanity
The view that human worth supervenes on the fundamental property or status, humanity,
is dogmatic, in the sense that there is no answer in terms more fundamental than “humanity” to
the question, “Yes, but what is the property or status humanity? What is it in virtue of which
those who have the property or status humanity have that property or status?” I have no
necessary and sufficient conditions to offer in answer, deeper than that foundation. All I can do
for an answer is to point to humans, and most humans will uncontroversially have that property
or capacity. And further, after asserting that it is in virtue of the property being human that rightsholders have their tremendous value, we are left asking, “Yes, but what is it in virtue of which
everything with the property or status is a human being is tremendously non-instrumentally
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valuable?” That is just the way it is! is not a satisfying answer. Again, the best I can do is to offer
up the deliverances of broad intersubjective agreement—according to our moral cognitions, the
humans around us are to be characterized in terms of their seeming immeasurable worth, and
human worth is all but universally recognized.
And a simple way to cash out that relation of humanity and human worth is in terms of
non-natural human value supervening on the essential property humanity. Humanity eludes
analysis, yet quite uncontroversially obtains; in much the same way, the concept of human
personhood has classically eluded analysis, yet human personhood clearly obtains. A pragmatic
but explanatorily sweeping way forward is to offer, simply, that the relevant human worth
supervenes on that fundamental and unanalyzable feature about us, our essential humanity;
that non-natural human worth does not obtain of things like trees and chairs is explained by the
fact that humanity is not a property or status that obtains of things like trees and chairs.
An appeal to a fundamental essential status or property humanity is consistent with
some other important moral intuitions: I judge people to be very valuable, both people I know
and people who, for instance, are currently seeking asylum at our southern border. And it is
clearly false that the reason these people are valuable, or the reason why I judge these people
to be morally considerable, is any one of the characteristically human properties or capacities
that has been offered as a candidate for that which makes an individual human, or that in which
human worth inheres. When asked, What is it in virtue of which your friend is valuable? What is
the source of the El Salvadorian refugee’s worth?—it seems that answers to these questions of
the kind “Well, my friend’s capacity for reason grounds my duties toward him!” or “The refugee
family’s consciousness is that in virtue of which I am morally responsible for their care!” are the
wrong kind of answer. Certainly, a capacity for reason and human consciousness are valuable
and serve as bases for value. But such things surely are far from why my friends possess the
relevant inalienable worth, or why the asylum-seeking family should be granted a home among
us. Similarly, an appeal to some biological essence like human DNA misses the mark—I know
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of nobody whose respect for others’ normatively binding claims is understandable in terms of
some conviction of theirs regarding the moral considerability associated with human DNA
(although, human DNA is miraculously complicated and elegant, and can surely be thought to
be sublime in a biological or mechanical sense).192 Such answers miss the forest for the trees;
those answers either posit entities of the wrong sort (entities that are ill-suited for moral
considerability) or they appeal to alienable and contingent properties. Rather than appealing to
these other various sorts of properties, I contend that our fellow humans are the sort of things
that ought to be valued the way we value them (as in, their being objectively and ineradicably
valuable) precisely because they are the kind of thing they are, human, at the fundamental level;
human worth supervenes on humanity, and the alternative is ground that is riddled with
counterexamples.193
If one grants this humanity as an essential property or status on which worth
supervenes, then the traditional search for the property or capacity (or set thereof) on which our
tremendous human worth supervenes can be called off; we need not appeal to some property
or capacity (or set thereof) more foundational than the basic fact of our humanity. It is in virtue of
nothing more (or less) than being human that a person has the worth and inherent rights that he
or she has. Dogs, trees, and chairs, of course, lack the property humanity, while an infant or
comatose patient has the property. Computers and Martians lack the property or status
humanity, etc. This is not to say that dogs and trees and computers and Martians lack worth or
rights altogether, rather it is just to account for why these beings and things that lack the
I am not interested here in answers to the question, “What makes people subjectively valuable to other
people?” I am concerned only with the question, “Why do we take others to be objectively valuable in their
own right, independent of us and our judgements about them? Where do we locate others’ objective
worth?”
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Remember: if one cannot accept this entity, humanity, that resists analysis—if one cannot accept that
humans, in virtue of their essential property or status humanity, are basically and irreducibly valuable in
such a way that gives rise to the normatively binding social relations they find themselves in to others—
one is free to begin one’s theory of justice with the widely accepted and relatively uncontroversial view
that humans are valuable for some reason or other and have rights, and to remain agnostic regarding a
precise account of why exactly. Either way, one can accept the broader picture: that regardless of why
humans have worth, normatively binding claims supervene on that worth, and justice and injustice
amount to whether or not those claims are met.
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property being human also lack inherent human rights; these other things, too, have properties
that humans do not have, which serve to account for their particular worth and any rights they
might have (even rights that, potentially, humans would not have).
I need to defend this formulation of the fundamental, ineradicable fact of our humanity
and the worth that supervenes on it from accusations of arbitrariness. If we are merely going off
of intuitions and moral judgements, the objector might ask, what is to keep someone from
arguing that the relevant worth supervenes on some property other than their humanity? I need
to show how my account does not leave the door open to some other who wants to argue along
similar lines for a position most of us would find morally abhorrent: that, for instance, only men
are basically and ineradicably valuable, such that men (and not women, and not those who
identify otherwise) have the worth on which inherent human rights depend; or that only white
people are basically and ineradicably valuable, such that white people and none others have the
worth on which inherent human rights depend. Or else, above and beyond some baseline of
human worth, that men are somehow more valuable than women, or that white people are
somehow more valuable than Black people, etc. What is to stop the sexist or the racist from
arguing, with an argument that has a structure like mine and with appeal to their own (bigoted)
intuitions, that only men or white people have the worth that is tantamount to humans’ special
moral considerability, and why is my starting point (all humans have the human worth on which
human rights supervene) principled but the sexist’s or racist’s starting point (only some humans
have special moral considerability) is not?
Here, I lean into another Rawlsian maneuver. Were this a strictly metaphysical
conversation, the bigot would be free to argue from their own foundational commitments to their
abhorrent conclusions. But this is not a strictly metaphysical conversation. It is also a political
conversation and just as the matter of the moral status of humans and the existence of rights
are agreed upon by thinkers from within even radically divergent worldviews, so, too, does the
matter of egalitarianism enjoy relative consensus. And though there is a metaphysical
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discussion to be had, the widely accepted view and starting point (no matter one’s worldview) is
that people are to be treated fairly and with equity. The political space within which an
overlapping consensus of a variety of worldviews is enjoyed precludes bigotry. And the
overlapping consensus is that every human being possesses rights.
But let us entertain the metaphysical conversation for a moment: I have offered that
human moral considerability supervenes on the property or status of being human, and being a
human of thus and such a color or sex or gender or religion or nationality can hardly make a
human more or less morally considerable. That assumes, of course, that humanity really is the
morally salient feature, and, of course, that assumption could be taken to beg the question
against the bigot who offers that it is not humanity but rather some other property that is at the
bottom—a property like sexual orientation, or biological sex, or skin color. So as not to beg the
question, let us say this: there are properties, and then there are properties. That is, there are
morally salient properties on which worth and moral considerability can reasonably be taken to
supervene and there are properties that provide simply no reason for believing they should
figure into calculations of human moral considerability (like hair color or height or gender or skin
color). The bigot who would argue that some humans do not have the rights that we are
interested in accounting for is simply projecting a moral significance that is not there onto
metaphysically shallow and morally irrelevant properties like skin color, gender, or religious
beliefs. The bigot’s “moral judgments” are far likelier to be the outputs of deep-seeded
insecurities, simple ignorance, wishful thinking, biases, or whole complexes of false beliefs
about the objects of their racial or gender resentment. Given the deliverances of biological
anthropology, cognitive science, ethics, theology, history, and truly intersubjective moral
discourse, there is reason to think that moral judgments like mine are more informed than moral
judgments like the bigot’s, and that the bigot’s claims are merely attempts to dehumanize some
humans.
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I am aware that the bigot (or the devil’s advocate) could charge: it is race that is morally
significant, humanity is axiologically irrelevant, and it is absurd to carve up moral spaces
according to this notion of the fundamental fact of rights-holders’ humanity! But with that, the
bigot has to carry burdens that I do not. The bigot would need to explain why some humans do
not have human rights, given the overlapping consensus that humans do have rights; or else,
the bigot would need to argue that certain subsets of humans are somehow subhuman; or else,
the bigot would need to reject that there are human rights in the first place. The bigot sets out to
deny that some particular humans stand in normatively binding social relations to others. We
should place onto the bigot the burden of demonstrating non-arbitrarily why morally insalient
properties like race or gender or religious commitments should be conceived of as being that
entity which best accounts for one person’s rights and disqualifies another from having rights. It
may be fair to charge this account with being an analytically unhelpful take on humanity and the
worth that supervenes on that property, but it is unfair to charge this account with arbitrariness—
this account is a principled appeal to the universal (to humans) property or status humanity and
the worth that comes with it, however unanalyzable that property or status may be.
Were the bigot asked why humans of thus and such a race, but not humans of some
other race, are immensely valuable and superior (and the same for sex or religious commitment
or what have you), the bigot could answer: worth is a non-natural property that supervenes on
white skin, clearly. To which we should say: skin color is a highly contingent, alienable, and
morally insignificant property and the bigot’s appeal to skin color is arbitrary and misguided. In
addition to failing to explain why every human is inalienably valuable, the bigot’s appeal to white
skin pigmentation fails to explain why every white person is inalienably valuable; after all, skin
pigmentation can change, and the notions of whiteness and racial superiority are the contingent
outputs of political history, economic exploitation, power struggles. I have started with Every
human has normatively forceful human rights—let’s explain why. The bigot starts with either:
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a. I and the people like me are human, and these others are subhuman and are,
therefore, in a different moral class than us, or
b. we are surely all humans, but humanity is not a morally salient category, and
some other property (skin color, cultural norms, religious belief, or an individual’s
or community’s history) had by some humans but lacked by others is the morally
salient property.
The bigot, then, would be left to explain what makes some of us humans and the others
subhuman, or what makes some other property than humanity the morally relevant category.
The bigot, too, would be tasked with demonstrating why the overlapping political consensus,
with its various egalitarian commitments, is wrong.
So, I have offered, with appeal to the fundamental property humanity, that every human
is valuable; the bigot offers that some humans are valuable and some are not. There is broad
intersubjective agreement that humans are morally considerable. I have attempted to offer an
account of inalienable inherent human rights as supervening on the worth we have due to that
ineradicable property of ours—the fact of our humanity. I place the property or status humanity
at the foundation of rights-holders’ moral considerability because it is both an essential fact
about us and a property or status that obtains of every human one could point to. And this
approach is preferable to Wolterstorff’s approach because what makes a rights-holder morally
considerable should be conceived of as some fact about the rights-holder, rather than some fact
about humans vis-à-vis their relation to some other thing (even to God).
In defense of my own account: it is on the bigot to demonstrate why metaphysically
shallower traits like sex or gender or skin color or religious tradition should be weighed in
looking for the relevant moral considerability; if he argues that those shallow traits are where
moral considerability lies, rather than in the rights-holder’s humanity, the bigot will need to
defend his moral judgments that appeal to (contingent, alienable) properties some humans have
and others lack. If the bigot appeals to contingent and alienable properties to justify his bigotry,
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then the bigot’s view of worth and moral considerability falls to the same sorts of objections
(from counterexamples that point to a property’s or capacity’s alienability) mentioned in previous
chapters. Furthermore, to index moral considerability to those shallow features would exclude
many humans who are considered by the vast majority of the moral community to be immensely
morally considerable from being considered legitimately so; these excluded humans are
valuable in virtue of their humanity, but also in virtue of the various characteristically human
capacities that can be lacked.
I have offered Wolterstorff’s account of human worth, critiqued it, and provided
alternative understandings of his account of why every human being is valuable and has
inalienable human rights. I offered that, if the goal is to account for human worth by appeal to
humans’ relation to God, the parent-to-child relation between God and humans is a more
feasible relational property than that of the friend-to-a-ruler relation offered by Wolterstorff.
Whether one chooses an intrinsically theistic account of human worth or a secularized account
like the one offered here, one will have the resources needed to get core Wolterstorffian claims
off the ground: that every human being has an ineradicable worth sufficient for the full suite of
inherent human rights, that when these grounds for respect are violated injustice obtains, and
that rights-holders are owed the life-goods to which they have legitimate claim. I also explored
objections to my account on grounds that I am guilty of speciesism and anthropocentrism—that
I have elevated human moral considerability in an unprincipled way. If the reader is not satisfied
by any of the foregoing accounts of why humans are morally considerable and have rights, then
the reader should begin with that object of overwhelming overlapping consensus: the claim that
human beings are inestimably precious and that their moral considerability and moral status
accrue to them in the form of a variety of rights.
In the next chapter, we will discuss rights-holders in the context of the other rightsholders, systems, and institutions to which they are socially situated. Because of their worth,
rights-holders make myriad claims against these other moral entities. The next chapter
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discusses structural justice and structural violence and it will set up a discussion about what is
owed to individuals and communities who are or who have been systematically wronged by
other rights-holders and the institutions to which they are socially situated.
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Chapter 4: Structural Justice
A. Introduction
In the preceding chapters, I have argued for a rights framework in which our moral
obligations to one another amount to the obligation to respect rights and the evaluations we
make in terms of “justice” are evaluations of whether or not those rights have been respected.
So, in the case of our moral obligations to one another, these moral obligations should be
conceived of as turning on respect and disrespect for human worth. And when we say that
worth has been respected or disrespected, we mean that one has received (or not) that to which
one has morally legitimate claim because of one’s worth. Right action and wrong action
regarding others (or, at least, regarding rights-holders) is determined by the sets of normatively
forceful claims that obtain between us. Worth commands respect—that is, it is a feature of
human worth that the claims it generates are normatively binding and ought to be answered—
and it accrues to individuals in particular social contexts in the form of rights.
Briefly here, I will address duties of imperfect obligation; that is, cases in which
obligations present themselves as duties to do X or not do X, but in which there is no
corresponding rights-holder in possession of a legitimate claim to X. One example might include
a case in which a very wealthy person may be said to have an obligation to give to charity, but
there is no particular rights-holder commanding or claiming that behavior. Other examples may
include instances of obligations to treat animals in some ways but not others or obligations to
not destroy precious artifacts, certain cultural practices, or historically and culturally significant
landmarks (as in a temple) or land (as in a sacred river or burial ground). The latter two cases
are simpler, so I will address them first.
In the case of the proper treatment of animals, in my view it is the case that (at least
some) animals command respect and have rights; in cases where I have obligations to treat
animals (like dogs) in some ways but not others, those obligations are accounted for not by
some human right of the animal, but rather by some morally legitimate claim of the animal
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against me. And the claim is given moral force in its supervenience on the animal’s worth. In the
case of obligations to properly treat artifacts, cultural practices, and land, in my view it is the
case that such duties are accounted for by the claims against me held by potentially very many
rights-holders to the preservation of those artifacts, practices, and land. A sacred space does
not have rights; rather, the inheritors of the space or the cultural practitioners who identify with
the space’s significance do have claims against others to their proper treatment of the space.
Not to overcomplicate things, but we should conceive of the moral force of our property rights as
ultimately derivable from our special moral status; so, too, we can conceive of our duties to treat
artifacts in thus and such a way as being derived from a set of something like cultural property
rights. And in this view, it is not the culture that has morally legitimate claims, but rather all those
individuals who constitute the culture or society. If we can conceive of members of organizations
as exerting certain exclusive claims, we can conceive of practitioners of a particular culture as
exerting certain exclusive claims.
But the first example is trickier—that of the wealthy man who could be said to have
obligations to give money to charity. The first thing to be said is that it is not obvious that the
very wealthy man does have such an obligation. That is, while it would be very good for the very
wealthy man to give to charity, it is not necessarily a duty, and so the problem of being unable to
identify a particular rights-holder who makes such a claim against the wealthy man does not
necessarily stand. I am partial to this view, according to which charity is supererogatory and not
mandated by respect for any particular rights-holder’s worth.
But what of the plight of the impoverished? It is also my view that the very poor have
rights if not to the eradication of poverty full-stop then to the provision for their basic human
needs, like food, water, shelter, some level of education, and healthcare. These rights should
be conceived of as claims against the State. And it is the State’s role to establish in society a set
of economic relations within which those rights to provision for basic human needs are
answered. So, for instance, there should be a set of tax brackets that empowers the State to
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meet the basic human needs of those who do not possess the means to provide for those
needs for themselves and their families; and if the very wealthy evade their taxes, such that the
needs of everyone else cannot be met, then the very wealthy are certainly in violation of duties
proscribed by law and potentially whatever rights that we all have against one another to our
good-faith participation in society. In those societies in which there are not such economic
relations and legal obligations, and also in which there are the very poor, I grant that the very
wealthy do have obligations to the poor or to charity; but these duties would not be duties of
imperfect obligation, but rather duties simpliciter. In such cases, it should be said that the very
poor have morally legitimate claims against the very wealthy to their working toward the
resolution of their suffering, claims that give rise to the duties and obligations of the very rich if
not to a redistribution of wealth then to work that better the situation of the worst-off. Such duties
should be conceived of as the complements of the very poor’s morally legitimate claims against
the wealthy. But to finish, according to my view any person who acts in violation of another’s
worth is acting unjustly. But were one to act in violation of a duty of imperfect obligation, and not
in violation of some correlative rights, we should say that one has done something (simply)
morally improper.
Members of the moral community, simply in virtue of their worth, exert a normative force
on other members of the moral community in the form of their inherent claim-rights and those
rights’ correlative duties. No person is a moral island—no person is a moral subject somehow
insulated from the claims made against them by other members of the moral community, and no
moral subject can enter into the presence of another without their worth and the claims it exerts
(the particulars of which depend on the socio-moral context). Our social relations to others and
to the institutions and systems in which we are located are the landscape of justice, and our
rights are the normatively forceful entities that obtain along the contours of that landscape.
In this chapter, after discussing how justice ought to be conceived of as grounded in
human worth and rights, I take a structural turn. I examine the relationship between the worth of
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rights-holders and the systems, societies, and institutions in which rights-holders are located.
After we have examined what, exactly, the relation ought to be between a rights-holder and the
systems, societies, and institutions in which they find themselves—and after we have a working
notion of what, under my view, structural justice is—we can begin to answer questions about
that which is owed to individuals and communities who are, or have been, wronged (either by
other individuals or by the systems and institutions to which the wronged is socially situated).
B. The Relation between Worth and Rights
Rights are normatively binding social relations as against any old relation. I (and
Wolterstorff, too) intend for normatively binding social relations to be real normative entities—
the claims, and their correlative duties, that obtain between two rights-holders. In this chapter,
I’ll discuss the normatively binding social relations that obtain between rights-holders and
institutions, systems, and organizations like the State. À la Wolterstorff, we should conceive of
ourselves as placed into a deeply complicated web of normatively binding social relations. The
web of social relations in which rights-holders exist is complicated, because there are countless
rights-holders and objects of worth that command respect from us, and for a host of different
reasons. And each of the rights is contextual—each right obtains in a particular moral context,
and some rights (inalienable rights) perhaps obtain in all contexts. For example, a state of
affairs characterized by “famine” is one moral context, and a state of affairs characterized by
“abundance” is another moral context. In those two very different moral contexts, different rights
of ours obtain or fail to obtain.
We shall resolve cases in which it appears that two rights conflict by clarifying that, in the
given moral context, there is no real conflict between the two rights, but rather what we have is
a context in which one of the rights holds (and the other does not) or else neither of the rights
holds. We have no need to speak of one right trumping another—in the context in which a right
appears to be trumped, the “trumped” right simply is not a morally legitimate claim. Each of the
various rights tugs at us, from a distance and up close, according to our worth and according to
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particular moral contexts. In particular socio-moral contexts, particular rights supervene on
human worth—so from social context to social context, one’s rights vary, not because one’s
worth has been altered, but rather because the supervenience of a particular right on human
worth is indexed to certain socio-moral contexts—in the moral context characterized by
abundance a child has the right to a full belly, for instance, but in the moral context
characterized by famine a child can have no such right. Put another way: most of our human
rights are not “inalienable” in the sense that one has them in every socio-moral context; rather,
our inalienable human rights are “inalienable” in the sense that rights-holders have that right in
the socio-moral contexts in which the relevant supervenience relation obtains inalienably.194 So,
a rights-holder’s rights are socio-moral facts that obtain of the rights-holder in the right social
situation because of other morally relevant facts (human worth, facts of the matter about that
which is a life-good for things like us) that obtain of the rights-holder at a more fundamental
level. Human worth obtains inalienably in every socio-moral context.
I have no problem, in principle, with a view that grants to a child in times of famine a host
of rights that cannot be met—to food, for instance. Such would be a prima facie right, and in the
context of famine the right is deferred or inert. But take a revised example: a child is hungry,
there is famine, and a man has only enough bread for his own children and not for the other
child. In such a case, were we to choose the prima facie rights explanation of conflicting rights,
each child would have a prima facie right to the bread that would nourish them. However,
because some of the children happen to have a father who has just enough bread for them,
they get that to which they have claim but the other hungry child does not. The child who
remains hungry is simply unlucky and his prima facie right to bread is overridden by the other
children’s prima facie and perhaps ultima facie right to the bread. If we take the prima
facie/ultima facie route to explain what is happening in moral contexts in which it seems rights-
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I will leave it open whether or not there is an inherent human right that obtains in every socio-moral
context; that is, whether the right in question supervenes on human worth in every socio-moral context.
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holders’ rights conflict, then it seems that some rights would trump other rights for non-moral
reasons (or at least for reasons not directly pertaining to the worth and rights of the rightsholders involved). The children who get bread and the child who gets no bread do not differ in
moral significance; the hungry children who get food in the time of famine are simply lucky.
I have chosen a view that indexes a rights-holder’s rights to their moral context, rather
than claiming that each right obtains in all moral contexts, due to cases just like the one just
covered. I resolve this case of two rights-holders with seemingly conflicting rights by appealing
to the socio-moral context: in that context, the one hungry child does not have a right to the
bread that the man’s children need and the man’s children do have that right to the bread.
Rather than two rights conflicting and the one trumping the other for non-moral reasons, we can
resolve a seeming conflict of prima facie rights by appeal to the socio-moral context and by
appeal to which rights do and do not obtain in that context. What explains why the man’s
children get the bread, but the hungry child does not? The children’s claims against their father,
and his duties to them. But that the children happen to belong to the man with bread and that
the hungry child does not is hardly a difference in moral considerability or human worth between
the sets of children; rather, it is a difference in their socio-moral context.
I take it to be true that the hungry child does have claims against the people and world
around him to their working for a world in which he is no longer hungry; however, those sorts of
claims do not amount to a particular claim to the bread that man has somehow secured for his
children. One may object: but what of a ruler who engineers a famine, and prolongs it, so as to
justify withholding from his subjects that to which they otherwise would have morally legitimate
claims? Again, I take it to be true that the hungry would have legitimate claims against the ruler,
if not to the food they need, then to a cessation of the famine (assuming this ruler is evil and has
engineered and is prolonging such a terrible situation) and a resolution to the unavoidable and
tragic socio-moral context, such that their physical needs could possibly be met.
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My view of rights that obtain from moral context to moral context can also be contrasted
with a view that would say something like the following: that one always has some right, X, but
that X is only relevant in certain circumstances (as in, when one is not being treated in accord
with what X demands). But that view is subject to charges of arbitrariness—if one has right X in
all circumstances, but X is only sometimes relevant, who is to decide when one’s right is
relevant and when it is not relevant? Why would a right that one has be only sometimes relevant
or only sometimes morally forceful? To avoid that problem, I, instead, conceive of objectively
normatively binding rights obtaining in some socio-moral contexts but not others. So there will
never a case in which one has a right, but also in which the right is not morally forceful; in my
view, when one finds oneself in a socio-moral context in which right X obtains, that right to some
life-good ought to be upheld.
My talk of individuated socio-moral contexts allows for some commonsense fluidity in
considerations of rights. The case of a rights-holder’s hunger in times of abundance and famine
is a good example. Most will agree that in times of abundance (one socio-moral context) there is
a human right to some baseline of sustenance and nourishment—the hungry and full alike have
claims against the individuals, systems, and institutions around them to that baseline of
sustenance and nourishment. But what happens when we alter the socio-moral context? Place
that same rights-holder into the socio-moral context of famine, and what happens? We could
conceive of a rights-holder, say, in a time of extreme civilization-ending famine, having claims
against the people around him to food. But such claims would entail correlative duties to the
claimant to provide them with food—and, in a time of such intense famine, how are we to
conceive of those duties to feed the hungry, assuming that if the famine is bad enough the
duties cannot be met?
Imagine an extreme scenario in which nobody has any food, and it is impossible for the
normatively binding claims of the hungry to be met—would that mean the hungry rights-holder is
being wronged? I think not. I take it that in that particular socio-moral context, there are no
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such claims to a full belly. Otherwise, we would be talking about holding people morally
accountable for meeting duties that are impossible to meet and answering claims that are
impossible to answer. This is not to say that humans do not have inalienable rights to that
baseline of nourishment; it is just to say that in the socio-moral contexts in which their claims
cannot possibly be answered, we should not think of those claims as obtaining, and it is to say
that in those socio-moral contexts in which the rights-holder’s claims can be answered those
rights supervene invariably on their worth, whether they are hungry or not. In a moral context
such as extreme civilization-ending famine, nobody is at fault for failing to meet such a claim to
that baseline of nourishment, and in my view, there is no such claim. None of that implies that
the hungry rights-holder is any less valuable in times of famine and it does not ignore their
human suffering; it just means that in that particular socio-moral context, the claims to basic
nourishment do not supervene on their ineradicable worth.
Inherent human worth and inherent human rights are moral properties that obtain of the
very same individual at two different levels of analysis. Worth is a morally salient property that
rights-holders have at the more foundational level, and worth serves as a supervenience base
for the higher-level moral property, the right. Rights and duties thus conceived are the moral
facts about us that are salient at the level of our social relations to others—they are inalienable
human worth placed into social situation in tandem with all the objective facts about that which
is good for things like us, and they give our social relations to others their normative aspect. And
because rights-holders are both intrinsically valuable and intrinsically socially situated, all moral
contexts are social contexts, and in all social contexts there will be talk of some right or another.
One might worry that a supervenience relation establishes that when there is a change
at one level then there is a change at another level, and that surely we do not want to say that
when we enter one social situation from another, since our rights change our worth also
changes! The worth that most concerns the rights theorist is supposed to be ineradicable and a
change of rights from context to context should not indicate a change in ineradicable worth; I
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grant that and suggest, instead, that the supervenience itself of a particular right on worth is
indexed to particular social contexts (according to our social situation and to those objective
facts about our interests and life-goods in those situations). That is, every time individual X finds
himself in social context Y, X’s ineradicable worth generates set of rights R, necessarily; but
there may well be a social context Z in which individual X lacks R. What has varied when one
“loses” or “gains” a right from context to context is not one’s ineradicable worth, but rather one’s
moral context and social situation.
And take again the case of the evil ruler who could prolong or even engineer a famine so
as to avoid getting to people that to which they have legitimate claim: in moral contexts in which
it is impossible for a claim to be met, the claim does not obtain, but that does not mean that the
rights-holders have no other claims or set of claims relevant to the situation. So, the hungry
child has no morally legitimate claim to food in cases where there is simply no food, but certainly
the hungry child has morally legitimate claims against those with the power to bring about
changes that would make it possible for the child’s needs to be met.
If you throw something of a sufficient kind and amount of worth into a particular sociomoral context—if you place it into a particular web of social relations to other things, beings, and
itself—that thing will have a plethora of rights (and correlative duties).195 Its relations to other
things (in the right contexts) will have a moral character because of its worth and the respect
that worth commands and that complex web of social relations will be one of normatively
binding social relations because respect is due to things of the requisite objective worth. Failure
to respect another’s worth is the failure to reckon with another on the terms set out by that
195

That is not to imply that a rights-holder can ever leave a social situation. I am committed to an
individual’s being intrinsically socially situated. An individual is never non-socially situated. Even the
person alone on an island occupies a social situation. They have, for instance, claims against the
industrialized powers to their not melting the ice caps and flooding the real estate of the marooned. Or
you could imagine a rights-holder stranded alone on another planet—surely, this rights-holder would have
claims against the humans far, far away to their not destroying the planet. Or you could imagine a
universe occupied by only one person and no other rights-holder or moral agent; in such a case, surely
that being has certain claims against and duties to their own self that can vary from moral context to
moral context.
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individual’s worth; it is the failure to act regarding him according to what is due to him. Claims
can be denied or flouted, but only in defiance of the respect their worth commands and it is an
injustice every single time.
One might be concerned that there is no way, without some principle or set of principles,
to derive just from the worth possessed by individuals the set of rights that most would take to
be constitutive of the full suite of our inherent human rights. How do we get, for example, a
child’s right to a basic level of education, simply from the moral facts that obtain of that child—
that the child is of great ineradicable human worth, that the child is set into a complex web of
normatively binding social relations to us, and that the child either is or is not in one of the
contexts in which the right to a basic education obtains. If not some bridge principle or set of
bridge principles, why should we think that the worth of the child generates for that child sets of
claims to, for instance, a basic level of education (at least in many social contexts)? The United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights is replete both with human rights that would not
surprise most of us (like the right not to be tortured) and human rights that might strike very
many as over-reaches of moral theorizing (like a child’s right to an iPad for at-home instruction,
the right to travel over national borders unregulated, etc.).196 Had we a list of principles or rules,
we could derive a robust list of the rights that persons have—we might even deliver that list to
the authorities, they could enforce it, and the world would be far better off. Many of these as-yet
unmet claims are examples of Feinberg’s “manifesto rights.”197 In my view, there are moral
contexts in which these rights obtain and individuals or institutions are beholden to them and
there are moral contexts in which these rights do not obtain and no entity is held under a duty to
answer them. The people in societies that are characterized by moral contexts in which these
rights obtain are owed.

196
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United Nations, “Universal Declaration.”
Feinberg, Social Philosophy.
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I will not attempt to provide that exhaustive list of rights, but I will simply say: human
worth, in conjunction with objective facts about the interests we have in virtue of the sorts of
things we are, commands certain treatment and precludes other treatment. What I do need to
provide, however, is some epistemological starting point that can serve as a foundation for my
later claims about rights to race reparations. I will do that now.
There is a school of thought called specificationism, and according to it there are no
absolute rights, but rather rights have their definition in a delineated set of conditions that
establish when the right does or does not obtain. The specificationist, who insists (like I have)
that rights are indexed to particular socio-moral contexts, has to fend off objections that accuse
the specificationist of offering an epistemically untenable view—that the full list of rights one has
is unknowable.198 After all, the reader can imagine the vast scale of recording such a delineation
of exactly the contexts and circumstances in which each right obtains and does not obtain. But
the epistemic worry faced by the specificationist and the broader epistemic worry that without
bridge principles we do not know how to construct a corpus of rights are not worries that are offputting to me—the objectively right and wrong ways to treat beings of particular kinds and
amounts of worth obtain, with or without a list. 199
I grant that if one insists on an elucidation of the right and wrong ways to treat others in
virtue of their worth in a given social context, what is needed are some epistemological
standards for accepting one another’s judgements that a certain behavior does or does not
express proper respect for human worth in the context in question. I take it that such an
endeavor will need to be intersubjective, our intuitions about that to which our worth entitles us
needing to be tested against others’ intuitions. It will require a popular epistemological standard

For examples of specificationism, see Shafer-Landau, “Specifying Absolute Rights” and Oberdiek,
“Specifying Rights.” For examples of the view’s critics, see Sinnott-Armstrong, “Moral Dilemmas” and
Kamm, Intricate Ethics.
199
Ontologically, they are not off-putting to me. In theory, the morally legitimate claims are there, whether
we know about them or not. I grant that pragmatically these epistemic worries are troublesome. But any
moral theory wrestles with such epistemic problems.
198
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(or set thereof) for judging our intuitions about human worth and the claims it generates in
particular moral contexts, and it will require more: we will need to discuss whether or not our
moral intuitions about how to treat beings of thus and such a kind in various contexts are
reliable at all (I think they certainly are!), we will need to discuss how to appeal to the broader
moral community when it comes to finding moral consensus about the proper treatment of
others, we will need to clarify the contexts in which a given right does and does not obtain, and
we will need to seek some sort of mechanism for settling the inevitable moral disagreements
between individuals and societies about which rights do and do not obtain and in which
contexts. These are worries for any theory that appeals to fundamental moral concepts and over
which there can be expected to be some disagreement.
Resolving these concerns would require several more chapters, so I leave those
universal problems from moral epistemology unfinished here. But of course it should be noted
that one’s inability to give a thoroughgoing justification for why X is a right and Y is not, and
one’s inability to answer those fundamental epistemological worries, does not indicate that one
is either not justified or simply incorrect in holding that X is a right and Y is not; neither does it
preclude one from holding to a reasonable and practicable model. Intersubjectively, spanning
moral contexts that vary radically, the moral community will need to work toward an extensive
corpus of rights that can be broadly agreed-upon, along with establishing mechanisms for
handling disagreement within the moral community. Indeed, this was much of the project of the
UN’s declaration of rights.
And Rawls proceeded similarly, providing only illustrative examples and never claiming
to attain to the creation of a completed list. Rather than compiling a definitive list, Rawls carves
out space for further reasoning about rights by reference to those moral entities required by
those with his two moral powers; for this, Rawls offers a process for moral agents to use as they
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learn more about their society and establish what they can require of one another.200 Rawls is
explicit that his project is political, not metaphysical. I have offered a metaphysics and I have
offered that where my metaphysics of rights falls short or fails to inspire consensus, we simply
must get on with the broader rights projects; because, after all, there is general agreement that
there are rights. Rather than compiling a definitive list of all the rights I take it there are, in my
view I carve out space for further reasoning about rights by referring to those life-goods that
objectively further rights-holders’ well-being and by reference to whatever claims human worth
gives rise to from moral context to moral context.
I will claim that Black Americans living today, in particular, are owed direct and structural
reparations for the historical wrongs committed against the Black community and for the wrongs
that continue to accrue today. But what justifies that claim? How do I get from the inalienable
human worth of Black Americans, objective facts of the matter about that which is a life-good for
every human, and empirically verifiable historical facts about the treatment of Black Americans
to the claim: Black Americans have been disrespected and have morally legitimate claims to
race reparations. The basic argument for that claim should be structured like this:
1. Black humans have immense, ineradicable human worth, in virtue of their
humanity.
2. Beings of thus and such a worth command respect. That is, any morally
legitimate claim of theirs is normatively forceful.
3. Morally legitimate claims are normatively binding, so to violate one makes
one blameworthy; to violate intentionally is a wrong and, definitionally, is an
instance of injustice.
4. On human worth, claims supervene against other individuals—and against
the systems and institutions in which Black humans have always found
themselves—to certain treatment and life-goods. The particular goods and
200
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treatment to which humans have claim vary from context to context but are
determined by objective facts of the matter regarding that which is good for
things like us, humans.
5. These claims preclude the permissibility of many of the historical wrongs
committed against Black humans: institutions like human chattel slavery,
police brutality, hate crimes and racial slurs, racist economic or housing
policies that impoverish or disadvantage Black humans, etc.
6. Violations of such claims result in real psychological, bodily, or economic
damage, the latter of which can compound over generations of injustice.
7. So, Black people have historically been wronged, and to the extent that these
race-related wrongs continue, at least some Black people are currently
wronged by them.201
8. Those individuals, institutions, or organizations that committed (or commit)
the wrongs are blameworthy and ought to be held accountable.
9. Corrective justice and redistributive justice need to be applied to instances of
such wrongs.
10. Those who violate the rights of Black rights-holders, then, ought to be
punished in accordance with the law, and reparations ought to be rendered
such that the well-being of the wronged is as if the wrong were never

201

Examples of the continuation into the present day of a historical wrong are racialized disparities in
wealth that are traceable to human chattel slavery, Jim Crow employment policies in the South, and racist
redlining and mortgage lending policies. No contemporary American is enslaved, but plenty of
contemporary Americans did not inherit wealth from their parents; and such disparities are acutely
racialized. Of course, there are plenty of economically disadvantaged people in this world whose
economic situation cannot be said to be the product of structural racism or human chattel slavery. Each
instance of disadvantage will have its own etiology—some evaluable in the terms of justice and injustice,
and some not. Every person is equally worthy of respect and has morally legitimate claims against others
to the appropriate level of well-being, but not every person is owed compensation or reparations for past
and present racial wrongs. A complete account of justice will have answers for every instance of structural
disadvantage; but in this chapter, I am addressing those instances of disadvantage that are racialized or
the product of direct or structural racism.
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committed, or such that the well-being of the wronged is improved to that
point to whatever extent possible.
11. These wrongs, then, generate for Black rights-holders new claims against the
State to its execution of justice; and they generate for Black rights-holders
new claims against those who wronged them to repayment for damages.
12. Therefore, in virtue of past and present wrongs, at least some Black
Americans have morally legitimate claims to corrective and compensatory
justice; that is, race reparations.
One might raise a concern here, about a rights-holder’s inability to answer a given
morally legitimate claim, and what that means for that claim. Take the problem, posed this way:
enslaved Black people in the USA were mistreated. But in that point in history, it was impossible
for them to obtain their rights. Any individual slaver could have freed their slaves, but they could
not have put them in a situation in which all of their rights would be respected. Therefore,
Bobby, since in your account rights that cannot be answered do not obtain, those slaves’ rights
did not exist. Therefore, these slaves or former slaves, and much less their descendants, cannot
claim compensation. This is an important set of concerns that helps to clarify what my account
says and does not say.
Remember that I have claimed throughout that the rights one has depends on one’s
socio-moral context. In differing socio-moral contexts, our human worth is constant, but the
social, economic, environmental, cultural, technological, and physical conditions we find
ourselves in differ widely. Across time and across geography, these variations in socio-moral
context can be expansive. So, we have both:
a. the enslaved had the same human worth and grounds for respect that any
human today has, but
b. the enslaved existed in a socio-moral context that differs greatly from today’s
socio-moral context.
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So in light of that, we need to ask and answer: What human rights did the slave have?, Against
whom did the slave have those rights?, Which rights would have obtained for the enslaved in
some moral contexts (like the context we find ourselves in today), but did not obtain in their
actual socio-moral context because factors unique to that socio-moral context rendered some
claims unanswerable?, and finally, What compensation, then, is owed to those who were
wronged in that socio-moral context and to their descendants in the socio-moral contexts that
followed? I would offer that each enslaved person possessed morally legitimate claims to their
freedom against their slaver and against the nations that sponsored a slave trade. In holding
slaves and perpetuating a slave economy, slavers, the nations that sponsored a slave trade,
and those who participated in and benefited from a slave economy were in violation of each
enslaved person’s claims to freedom. And each enslaved person was owed compensation for
years or decades of stolen life and labor; similarly, their descendants are owed compensation.
It is incorrect to say, since it would have been impossible for a slaver or nation to situate
a freed slave such that they would have enjoyed full human respect in that time period (the
intractable bigotry on display today is just a shadow of the bigotry of that time period), that the
enslaved person had no claims against the slaver or nation. We can readily identify at least one
morally legitimate claim that was, from day one of the international slave trade, actionable no
matter the socio-moral context: each enslaved person’s morally legitimate claim to being free.
The violation of those claims amounted to generations of stolen wealth and life, and
compensation of some kind and measure can certainly be said to be owed, regardless of
whether or not other rights obtained for the enslaved in that socio-moral context. I hold that
other rights certainly did hold for the enslaved—claims of the enslaved or formerly enslaved
against every individual around them to decency and fair treatment, claims of the enslaved or
formerly enslaved against local institutions to a fair application of law enforcement, claims of the
enslaved or formerly enslaved against their government to new policies that would yield greater
economic and educational equity, and so forth. And the violations of these claims were wrongs,
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and merit further compensation. My view does not commit me to holding that since in that
particular socio-moral context no slaver could possibly have ensured that a former slave would
be respected according to their worth, then the enslaved had no claims against the slave owner;
the enslaved possessed a manifold of rights against slavers that were viciously violated over
and over again, but one of these was not some underdetermined claim against a slaver to their
guaranteeing full legal status for the enslaved and the transformation of bigoted hearts.
The failure of a right to obtain in a particular socio-moral context is a function of whether
or not that particular claim can possibly be met. In a time of famine when literally nobody has
food, nobody has the right against any other to a full belly, though perhaps the famished do
have claims against their nation’s leaders to their working to resolve the widespread hunger
(assuming such a course of action is possible); in famine that is localized, hungry people in the
famished nation probably do have morally legitimate claims to food against the people and
nations in other parts of the world that are enjoying abundance. In even the cruelest of sociomoral contexts, every slave had morally legitimate claims to (at least) freedom, full human
respect and standing under the law, and fair treatment from the people around them—that is,
those against whom those claims were made were absolutely capable of meeting those claims.
To the extent that it was literally impossible to realize some life-goods in that socio-moral
context, some rights likely failed to obtain in that socio-moral context. For instance, one might
say that to whatever extent any human enjoyed a morally legitimate claim to the best college
education available at the time, every newly freed slave had a morally legitimate claim to the
best college education available at the time. I am not opposed to that in any sense. But in my
view I have simply attempted to be sensitive to the realities of that socio-moral context—that for
many formerly enslaved (given the realities of the educational and wealth gaps created by the
system of slavery, and given their life situation and age) higher education would not have been
accessible.
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Of course, all along enslaved persons had morally legitimate claims to access to the
tools of literacy and education, and these claims were violated. Too, they surely had claims
against others and the State to their working to establish the conditions necessary for
educational equity. But to wrap up, that some right or set of rights failed to obtain (because of
the impossibility in a particular socio-moral context of meeting a particular claim) does not entail
that no rights at all obtain and the same goes for the compensation that is due to rights-holders
because of the violations of rights that did obtain.
The twelve-statement argument above relies on a handful of judgments provided by folk
moral psychology and on some stipulations from my Wolterstorffian account: that Black humans
have immense, ineradicable worth; that human worth in tandem with objective facts about our
interests commands respect in the form of legitimate claims to some forms of treatment but not
others and some goods but not others; that one of the basic rights had by any human is a claim
or set of claims against unwarranted suffering or violations of their autonomy; that rendering
justice to cases of injustice is at least sometimes (i.e., in cases where damages are done) onepart punitive and another-part reparative. So here, I have not given the reader a guide to
constructing an extensive list of every right had by every rights-holder in every socio-moral
context, but I have provided a line of moral reasoning with which one can go from the
ineradicable worth of Black rights-holders directly to the morally legitimate claims of (wronged)
Black rights-holders to various forms of race reparations for past and present wrongs.
C. Rights and Justice
At the very beginning of this work, I insisted that my work would be guided by the search
for answers to two fundamental questions:
Q1.

What is justice?

141

Q2.

What are the requirements of justice with regard to Black Americans
today, in light of historical wrongs?202

Over one hundred pages later, and I have spent little time on those questions. But we are finally
ready to answer the first of those two questions.
So, what is justice? In my framework, justice (or injustice) is a property of socio-moral
states of affairs, those states of affairs in which individuals who are intrinsically socially situated
make their claims against one another, against groups and organizations, and against the State
with a normative force that comes from their worth. A state of affairs in which individuals and
institutions treat rights-holders with the respect that is due them in virtue of their worth can be
characterized as just; evaluating respect for worth just is an evaluation of whether or not a
rights-holder is getting those life-goods to which they have legitimate claim. So far I have
focused on inherent human worth and the inherent rights that come from that worth; but justice
must instantiate respect for conferred rights, too, because a violation of someone’s conferred
rights still disrespects them.203 A state of affairs is just in which every rights-holder is treated in
accord with their morally legitimate claims; a particular relation between two rights holders is just
in which the claims that obtain between the rights-holders are met.204 But justice and injustice
are also properties of societies themselves, and the justice or injustice of a society will be the
most relevant ground of discussion in what follows, when I will be discussing structural
injustices.

202

In Chapter Five, we will explore the demands of justice with regard to those who have been wronged
directly, to those who descend from those who were wronged directly, and to groups. Each different sort
of case requires a different reparative response.
203
The normative forcefulness of conferred rights needs unpacking, but I will not spend much time on it. I
propose that the worth of rights-holders gives their conferred rights normative force, too, even though
those conferred rights should not be thought of as supervening on human worth or on worth that
supervenes on some morally insignificant property. A violation of an individual’s conferred rights is still a
violation of the grounds for respect that individual has—their human worth—even if the way we account
for an individual’s conferred rights is different than the way we account for an individual’s inalienable
rights. Conferred rights do not supervene on worth, then, but are normatively forceful because of it.
204
Justice and injustice, in my view, are sensitive to rights being met or not. Justice tracks normatively
binding social relations and whether or not human worth is respected; when claims are violated, new
claims are generated to corrective and compensatory justice.
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The correction of injustice amounts to a correction of wrongs, to a restoration to the
rights-holder of the goods and treatment to which they have morally legitimate claim. We
cannot have a proper sense of what justice is, removed from talk of that which is owed to
individuals in virtue of the worth that supervenes on their humanity, and we cannot have a
proper sense of what injustice is, removed from talk about disrespect for worth. Truths about
justice are ultimately truths about morally legitimate claims and the sources of the rights in
question. In my framework, then, justice is not ultimately to be conceived of in terms of social
contract or moral laws or maxims about utility or the proper treatment of ends or divine
command; in my framework, justice, like rights, is best thought of as turning on worth and the
morally legitimate claims that obtain to certain life-goods. My justice-as-rights view does not
necessarily preclude any of these other notions from the history of philosophy.
In my view, an instantiation of justice in a given state of affairs or society, then, just is an
instantiation of proper respect for the worth of the rights-holders in that state of affairs; justice
obtains in states of affairs where claims are met, and injustice obtains in states of affairs where
claims are violated. So there is very little conceptual space between our moral judgments
regarding others and our judgments about justice—in my framework the right thing to do
regarding others, the good, our moral responsibility to others, rightness and wrongness
regarding others, and the aspirations of society with regard to others all turn on respect for
human worth and inherent human rights (and on respect for any morally legitimate claims that
are, strictly speaking, conferred and not the product of any inherent worth). There are activities
that are wrong and immoral, of course, that have little or nothing to do with disregard for human
worth and the rights that supervene on human worth—like wrongly harming an animal, for
example—and that require an accounting for both their wrongness and their injustice that does
not appeal to human worth. But in the domain of our socio-moral relations to other people, I do
intend for this to be a unification of our justice concepts and our human rights-concepts. Rights
and worth are at the bottom, the normatively binding claims on others that obtain in particular
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social contexts; justice is at the top, characterizable in terms of whether or not those normatively
binding claims at the bottom are met. Considerations of justice just are considerations of the
rights and duties of one another, of the State, of salient groups or institutions, etc. Thus, justice
is grounded in respect for worth and the claims it generates.
Whole societies can be qualified as just or unjust and they can be qualified as justly or
unjustly structured. The just society is an ideal to which we aspire205, but we approach that ideal
with limits, given the realities of scarcity, limited resources, and the human condition. The justly
structured society, however, is attainable, and it should be considered our goal, if there are to
be collective political and social goals. I conceive of the justly structured society as that society
which is structured:
i.

in such a way that persons can be rendered all of that to which they have morally
legitimate claim by other members in the moral community,

ii. in such a way that persons are rendered all that which they are owed by the
State and other public institutions, and
Iii. in such a way that persons are protected by enforceable laws from actions of
others who would demean them or withhold from them their right.
In the justly structured society, a State will enforce the new claims to corrective and
compensatory justice generated by an injustice.
In examining the structure of our society and whether or not it is just, we should examine
our society’s laws, its distributions of resources, and the ways its institutions advantage or
disadvantage different groups. My first condition of the justly structured society claims simply
that the justly structured society will not be structured such that it is impossible for the worth of
every rights-holder to be universally respected—the justly structured society makes it, in
Amartya Sen denies that “the just society” is a helpful ideal, and instead offers that the goal should be
continuous movement toward a more just society; see Sen, Idea of Justice. In my work, I have maintained
that the just society is like a limit we can approach. And I would just insist that a working idea of “the
ideally just society”—whether or not it can ever be actualized—informs our judgments about what
constitutes movement toward are more just society.
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principle, possible for a society to wholly instantiate justice. My second condition of the justly
structured society claims just that, in the justly structured society, the State and other public
institutions (like public schools, law enforcement agencies, etc.) do respect the worth possessed
by those things which are morally considerable. If the state or some public institution wrongs an
individual or community, the State or that institution ought to be reformed and any damages
repaid, or else the society can no longer (if it was in the first place) be conceived of as justly
structured. My third condition of the justly structured society claims simply that, in the justly
structured society, there are laws and procedures in place that protect the rights of rightsholders and according to which one who has been wronged has legal recourse in response to
the unjust actions of the individual, state, group, or institution responsible for the injustice, such
that corrective justice and compensation are rendered.206
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Professor Jacob Adler contends that, rather than conceiving of rights as I do (as obtaining only relative
to particular socio-moral context), cases where rights standardly obtain but then for whatever reason do
not obtain are best explained in terms of prima facie and ultima facie rights. He offers this example to
show a potential problem with holding, like I do, that a particular morally legitimate claim does not obtain
in cases where it cannot possibly be met: “Bobby lends Jacob $1,000. Jacob promises to repay on June
1. On June 1, Jacob can’t pay. The right is extinguished. Subsequently, Jacob gets in better financial
shape, but since the right was extinguished, he doesn’t pay. Bobby sues. Court rules for Jacob, saying
that Bobby’s right was extinguished on May 1, so he is not being disrespected now.”
I hold, above, that when a person cannot meet another’s claim against them—as in, someone’s
claim to food in a time of famine—there can be no morally legitimate claim of one person against the one
who’s unable to meet the claim. I hold this, because I conceive of rights as normatively binding sociomoral claims, and because no one can be normatively bound to doing what they actually cannot do.
Rights are like moral gravity, and the rights tug at others when they obtain, and cases in which rights do
not tug are best explained by saying that the rights simply does not obtain in that context. So, in such a
case, there is no right. What is happening in a case when, for example, one’s standard right to food goes
away in times of famine is that the socio-moral context has changed; the socio-moral context in which one
has a morally legitimate claim against me to food ceases to obtain, so the morally legitimate claims that
are indexed to that particular socio-moral context cannot obtain. When the necessary socio-moral context
returns, the morally legitimate claim to food returns. Strictly speaking, it is not the case that one has
ceased to have the right under consideration in the particular socio-moral context; rather, the socio-moral
context has changed.
I offer that Professor Adler’s objection does not sink my account of rights as obtaining in particular
socio-moral contacts (rather than obtaining always but being sometimes suspended or insalient). I would
answer Professor Adler’s objection above by pointing out that one should not enter into that kind of
agreement; one should clarify in their contract that a debt between two parties would not simply expire
following a repayment date and that were one party unable to repay the other by some agreed upon date
legal action should be taken. We should characterize the rights landscape in the purported
counterexample like this: the lender has claims against the indebted to repayment according to the
agreement between the two. In a case where the claim cannot be met by the indebted—as in, when their
bank account is empty and they cannot make the payment—the socio-moral context is such that no right
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Less formally, take some examples: in a justly-structured society, every rights-holder can
be respected. So, the laws of that society do not prevent the society’s members from being
treated in the ways they deserve to be treated. So, any society with institutionalized slavery or
legally established gender discrimination would fail to meet condition (i). In such a society,
disrespect for some rights-holder’s worth is codified. The injustices committed against some
rights-holder is a feature of the system. In a society in which grave injustices are legally
established, the instantiation of injustice is an inevitability. Take another example: any society
with social institutions (like police departments) that commit wrongs and are permitted to commit
wrongs is an unjustly-structured society. An institution like a police department is a furniture
piece of society; if one of the public’s institutions is itself engaged in wrongs (like police
brutality), the society is disqualified from being justly-structured. And finally: imagine a society in
which there is no recognized or sanctioned method for correcting wrongs. In our society, we do
have a recognized and sanctioned method for correcting wrongs—the courts and the justice
system.207 But if we did not have such a method, wrongs would persist without a final backstop
or any real hope for correction. Justly-structured societies have judicial processes designed to
mend instances of injustice.
The difference between the justly-structured society and the just society can be
illustrated with a picture: gardens require constant work and maintenance, with ongoing needs
for weeding, pruning, and fertilizing. A garden is never finished, or fully realized. In the real
obtains to repayment on that day. Surely, though, various other rights still obtain, according to the
agreement between the lender and the indebted—rights of the lender to collect higher interest on the
loan, rights of the lender against the indebted to pursuing legal action, rights of the lender against the
indebted to collect the payment in whatever way provided for by the contract between the two parties, or
rights of the lender against the indebted to the indebted’s doing whatever is in their means to do in order
to repay the debt in a timely manner. Were it the case that the two parties foolishly entered into an
agreement that did not allow for a scenario in which repayment could not be made on the allotted date,
and were it the case that the indebted refused repayment after that date and the courts backed the
indebted per the contract, then we should say that the lender has no legal claim against the indebted, but
that the indebted has disrespected the lender and violated morally legitimate claims nonetheless. Were it
to pan out as just explained, this would be an example of jurisprudence failing to be sensitive to the moral
rights terrain.
207
Of course, our recognized methods of righting wrongs are far from perfect, and they have played their
own role in the commission of certain wrongs and the perpetuation of other wrongs.
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world, justice is never fully instantiated, because justice is an ideal notion to aspire to, and
because given what we know about human nature and human history there will always be some
instance or other (big or small) of disrespect for a rights-holder’s worth.208
We will address Q2 soon, which asks what the demands of justice are for Black
America. That question just is another set of questions: In what ways have members of Black
America been wronged, in what ways is Black America currently being wronged, and what
goods or treatment are due to rights-holders in light of the manifold of ways disrespect has been
shown for Black America’s worth and rights? Questions of justice are concerned with both
questions of interpersonal relations and questions pertaining to how our laws are written and
institutions structured. So, a holistic discussion of the requirements of justice with regard to any
wronged individual or group will need to cover individual incidents of disrespect for worth as well
as the more entrenched (and more difficult to locate) issue of structural injustice and while some
of the requirements of justice will orient us toward discussions about interpersonal behavior and
attitudinal dispositions, other aspects of this conversation will point us in the direction of policy
solutions and structural reform.
D. Structural Justice
In this section, I will present justice in structural terms, incorporating the concepts of
direct and structural violence. Richard Rubenstein provides an insightful way to conceive of
violence and injustice structurally that I will adopt here—with Rubenstein’s concepts
incorporated, my broadly Wolterstorffian account of justice and injustice can speak in structural
terms and address the sorts of injustices there are that are not strictly interpersonal. 209 Shortly,
they will enable me to speak more comprehensively to the sorts of injustices to which Black
Americans have been subjected and the new claims that arise from those injustices.
208

Originally, I suggested that the difference between a just society and a merely justly structured society
is the difference between a baked cake and a countertop with all the ingredients necessary for a cake laid
out in preparation. Professor Jacob Adler pointed out that cakes, unlike just societies as I have defined
them, can be fully baked and final. So, at his suggestion, I opted for the far healthier option of gardening.
209
Rubenstein, Structural Conflicts.
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Rubenstein’s claim is that justice and violence ought to be conceived of in structural terms and
that much of the violence and injustice in the world are products of structural injustice;
Rubenstein highlights how, in the real world, failure to address structural injustice only
perpetuates both direct and structural violence.
In addition to addressing the injustices that obtain between two moral agents and the
disrespect for the worth of persons those injustices represent, any theory of justice must also
have the conceptual resources required for addressing structural injustice, structural injustice
being the sets of wrongs that are committed as a consequence of patterned social
arrangements and social structure. One’s theory of justice must be sensitive to concentrated
disadvantage, to use Elizabeth Anderson’s language,210 because in situations of concentrated
disadvantage rights-holders are denied that to which they have morally legitimate claim (even
though there is no moral actor who is singularly at fault). If a theory of justice lacks the
resources necessary for evaluating the wrongs that accrue in virtue of social structure, that
theory of justice cannot give a full accounting of the rights and wrongs that there are.
This, of course, is controversial; conservative political philosophers are committed to the
view that the only relevant moral actors are individual persons and that speaking of being
wronged by a structure or institution is a misclassification or category error. I do not wish to take
up that debate here. I insist that structural disadvantages are evaluable in the terms of justice,
on grounds that in such cases rights-holders are clearly withheld that to which they have morally
legitimate claim, and the moral agency involved in the wronging of the victim of structural
injustice is found with the persons who control the unequitable distributions of resources or the
persons who compose the “immoral” institution. In cases of concentrated disadvantage, the
wrong is a product of social structure, or of the actions of some collective or individuals who
compose the system in question, and justice requires that moral agents work (individually or
collectively) to alter the relevant social relations. My theory of justice evaluates the injustices
210

Anderson, Imperative of Integration.
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committed by individuals in terms of violations of the morally legitimate claims of rights-holders
had in virtue of their worth, and it will evaluate instances of structural injustice and concentrated
disadvantage in those very same terms. The social structure under examination ought to be
such that the systems, institutions, and social arrangements that constitute society do not
deprive rights-holders of that to which they have morally legitimate claim.
All of this is just a conjunction of my Wolterstorffian rights-first theory of justice and
Rubenstein’s and Anderson’s works on structural injustice and concentrated disadvantage. The
deeply complicated webs of normatively binding social relations we find ourselves in are not
composed exclusively of rights-holders. Entire nations are in that web, as are other institutions,
organizations, economies, complexes of social arrangements, and patterned distributions of
resources—and rights-holders are related to other rights-holders and to those other morally
salient entities in ways that accrue to their advantage or disadvantage. Structural injustice is
ultimately a variety of disrespect for the worth of rights-holders in which the moral agent doing
the wronging may be a collective of individuals, or an institution composed by individuals, or a
nation operated by individuals.
A person can wrong another person directly and persons can wrong other persons
indirectly via law, treaty, group, or governmental agency. Standing social arrangements and
resource distributions can similarly result in rights-holders failing to get that to which they have
morally legitimate claim. And it is these instances of structural injustice that perpetuate much of
the disrespect for the worth of rights-holders that can be found in our world. Much of the
disrespect for the worth of persons that is intractable is a structural disrespect for the worth of
persons and when we speak of that structural disrespect for worth and the concentrated
disadvantage that accrues because of it, we speak of structural injustice. In such cases, the
buck stops with the agents who either compose the unjust structure or who control the unjust
structure; when we say that an international corporation wrongs the global poor, for instance, we
should mean that there are individual moral agents (or an assembly thereof) at fault for the
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injustices and ultimately responsible for any reparations that need to be made. If the agents
responsible for the wrong and correcting the wrong do not do so, then we should conceive of
the State and its various institutions as being the relevant moral actors.
Even if there is no identifiable moral actor responsible for the injustice in question, there
are identifiable moral actors responsible for the injustice’s resolution. Otherwise, we would be
left with a view that holds a patterned distribution of resources, for instance, to be responsible
for correcting itself—an impossibility—or else that we ought to simply tolerate the injustices that
there are. To hit it from the positive side, structural justice requires a systemic, institutionalized
respect for the worth of rights-holders; structural justice requires a systemic, institutionalized
answering to rights-holders’ morally legitimate claims. Structural injustice tends to be more
difficult to locate than more ordinary instances of injustice, responsibility for structural injustice is
shared, and in liberal democracies like ours the alleviation of structural injustice requires
collective action and systemic and institutional reform. Practically speaking, then, addressing
structural injustice requires maneuvering around certain epistemological and political barriers. In
the final chapter, I will ask and answer questions about race reparations, and that will require a
theory of justice that is sensitive to the injustices committed against the Black community by
both individual and structure, and the different kinds of claims to compensation and reformation
that arise from those different kinds of injustices.
Rubenstein explains his notion of structural violence, building on Johan Galtung’s work.
Let’s begin with Galtung’s framework, which I endorse:
… let us say that violence is present when human beings are being influenced so
that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential
realizations. This statement may lead to more problems than it solves. However,
it will soon be clear why we are rejecting the narrow concept of violence according to which violence is somatic incapacitation, or deprivation of health,
alone (with killing as the extreme form), at the hands of an actor who intends this
to be the consequence. If this were all violence is about, and peace is seen as its
negation, then too little is rejected when peace is held up as an ideal. Highly
unacceptable social orders would still be compatible with peace. Hence, an
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extended concept of violence is indispensable but that concept should be a
logical extension, not merely a list of undesirables.211
Violence is here defined as the cause of the difference between the potential and
the actual, between what could have been and what is. Violence is that which
increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which
increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which
impedes the decrease of this distance. Thus, if a person died from tuberculosis in
the eighteenth century it would be hard to conceive of this as violence since it
might have been quite unavoidable, but if he dies from it today, despite all the
medical resources in the world, then violence is present according to our
definition...In other words, when the potential is higher than the actual [it] is by
definition avoidable and when it is avoidable, then violence is present.212
The fourth distinction to be made and the most important one is on the subject
side: whether or not there is a subject (person) who acts. Again it may be asked:
can we talk about violence when nobody is committing direct violence, is acting?
This would also be a case of what is referred to above as truncated violence, but
again highly meaningful. We shall refer to the type of violence where there is an
actor that commits the violence as personal or direct, and to violence where there
is no such actor as structural or indirect. In both cases individuals may be killed
or mutilated, hit or hurt in both senses of these words, and manipulated by
means of stick or carrot strategies. But whereas in the first case these consequences can be traced back to concrete persons as actors, in the second case
this is no longer meaningful. There may not be any person who directly harms
another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows
up as unequal power and consequently as un- equal life chances.213
Rubenstein is in agreement with this expanded conception of violence, reserving a place
on the list of violent states of affairs for those states of affairs in which the violence is a product
not of a single moral actor but rather of systems, distributions of resources, and social
structures:
The fundamental idea animating the study is that certain violent conflicts are not
only the result of misunderstandings, prejudice, power-lust, or some other
manifestation of evil intent but are also the regular products of social systems
that reproduce them as part of their normal operation. These systems, like the
prison system…, tend to be elite-dominated, inequitable, and exploitative.214
… not only do structured systems fail to produce peace, they succeed very well
in producing violence. Violent social conflicts need not be the result of system
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dysfunction. Depending upon the type of structure in play and other factors we
will shortly discuss, they may be entirely ‘functional.’215
Structural violence, [Galtung] stated, is force or influence exerted in accordance
with patterned social arrangements that prevent people from realizing their
human potential and satisfying basic developmental needs… If I withhold food
from you, intending to starve you to death, that is direct violence. If the system of
food production delivers food only to those who can afford to pay for it, and you
starve because you can’t afford the price, that violence is structural.216
There may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure.
The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and
consequently as unequal life chances. Resources are unevenly distributed, as
when income distributions are heavily skewed, literacy/education unevenly
distributed, medical services existent in some districts and for some groups only,
and so on. Above all the power to decide over the distribution of resources is
unevenly distributed. The situation is aggravated further if the persons low on
income are also low in education, low on health, and low on power - as is
frequently the case because these rank dimensions tend to be heavily correlated
due to the way they are tied together in the social structure.217
Thus, when one husband beats his wife there is a clear case of personal
violence, but when one million husbands keep one million wives in ignorance
there is structural violence. Correspondingly, in a society where life expectancy is
twice as high in the upper as in the lower classes, violence is exercised even if
there are no concrete actors one can point to directly attacking others, as when
one person kills another.218
According to Rubenstein, a structural injustice is any unjust social arrangement—or any unjust
system, institution, or policy—that causes these deficits of mental or somatic realizations.
Here, Rubenstein conceives of justice and injustice in terms of social arrangement—a
conceptualization that is similar to the broader Wolterstorffian model of justice as being
ultimately reducible to talk of normatively binding social relations, and with Anderson’s relational
theory of inequality. Across these views, the relevant object of consideration is the socio-moral
relation that obtains between rights-holders (Wolterstorff), the systems that facilitate or restrict
those relations or that themselves cause harm (Rubenstein), and the patterned distributions of
resources inside of those systems and across those interpersonal relations (Anderson). The
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justice or injustice of a state of affairs is a matter of how wrongs or goods accrue to individuals
in virtue of their situation with respect to other individuals and to the systems in which they live,
and each of these various views addresses that fundamental claim from a different angle.
For the peace theorist, peace is intrinsically social, and for the Wolterstorffian theorist
justice is intrinsically social, and for Anderson justice is a matter of how advantage and
disadvantage are distributed in virtue of the structure of society—all are matters of a rightsholder’s relations to other rights-holders and to the social structure in which the rights-holder
finds himself or herself, and how those relations accrue in the form of well-being, advantage, or
violence.
Rubenstein and Galtung (and I) offer a reformed definition of violence—they
characterize many states of affairs as violent that would never be considered “violent” in
common parlance. They do so because the narrower concept of violence—directly violent
encounters between two individuals—fails to provide grounds for saying that there is something
wrong with certain sub-optimal states of affairs, and fails to make such states of affairs
evaluable in the terms of moral responsibility and justice. The gender pay gap does not look like
war, but it is a form of harm and there is something wrong with it; hate mail does not look like a
mugging, but it is a form of harm and there is something wrong with it. For my part, my use of
this expanded notion of violence, à la Galtung, is an attempt both to provide a unified analysis of
the various types of sub-optimal states of affairs there are and to characterize what, exactly, is
wrong with any instance of violence: that in a given suboptimal state of affairs there is a deficit
of mental and somatic realizations (some deficits being far larger than others). Here, I am not
necessarily advocating for a legal redefinition of violence; rather, I find this more expansive
notion of violence to be conceptually helpful.
But the reader may still be concerned: Doesn’t this expanded definition of violence
permit too many legitimate accusations of violence? That is, perhaps expanding the notion of
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violence to apply to states of affairs in which there is no applicable moral actor goes a bridge too
far. Coady takes Galtung to task:
First, let us look briefly at the formulation of his definition, which has some rather
curious features. It seems to follow from it that a young child is engaged in
violence if its expression of its needs and desires is such that it makes its mother
and/or father very tired, even if it is not in any ordinary sense “a violent child” or
engaged in violent actions. Furthermore, I will be engaged in violence if, at your
request, I give you a sleeping pill that will reduce your actual somatic and mental
realisations well below their potential, at least for some hours. Certainly some
emendation is called for, and it may be possible to produce a version of the
definition that will meet these difficulties (the changing of “influenced” to
“influenced against their will” might do the job, but at the cost of making it
impossible to act violently toward someone at their request, and that doesn’t
seem to be impossible, just unusual).219
In defense of Galtung’s expanded definition of violence, I will first offer some clarifying thoughts
so as to diffuse one set of accusations against his view, and then I will propose a revision of
Galtung’s view in answer to Coady’s insights.220
First, note that Galtung’s definition of violence and the analyses of states of affairs that it
makes possible are both descriptive and normative. It is descriptive in that it allows for analyses
of the various causes of deficits of realizations and it is normative in that it offers that we ought
to work to resolve the avoidable deficits. Definitionally, avoidable deficits are instances of
violence, but unavoidable deficits are not; one is free to then draw conclusions about what one
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Coady, Political Violence, 7.
As I’ve said, Galtung’s notion of violence and use of the word “violence” deviates from standard usage
and conception. For Galtung, someone who was never trained to sing, but who could have been a
Broadway star were they trained to sing, instantiates a deficit of mental and somatic realizations, and so
violence. But you and I would never call that violence in ordinary discourse—doing so would seem to
dilute the word of its moral significance. Galtung has named “violence” any such deficit; so we should
acknowledge that the working concept violence above is not what we standardly employ when we say
such things as “he was violent.” Galtung’s notion of violence applies far more widely than the standard
use.
Note, though, that standard usage “violence” concepts and language can be ambiguous, too
(words like “harm” and “offense”). None of this is intended to be a linguistic trick; I am not attempting to
over-populate the set of “violent” states of affairs with states of affairs that have been mischaracterized as
“violent.” The persuasive redefinition of the “violence” concept, rather, is intended to show that we can
understand in exactly the same terms what has gone wrong in violent states of affairs—from hunger, to
lead water pipes, to domestic terrorism, to kids who miss a fulfilling career opportunity because their
school doesn’t have a Drama department. These states of affairs are drastically different, but each of
them is characterizable in terms of deficits of mental and somatic realizations; however, each of them is
not necessarily, in turn, appropriately termed an “injustice.”
220
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ought or ought not to do in light of avoidable deficits, given widely shared commitments
regarding our obligations to act to prevent avoidable bad states of affairs and so forth. But
Galtung’s definition of violence—a real gap between potential and actual mental and somatic
realizations—does not come couched necessarily in agent-caused terms; that is, it makes an
analysis of states of affairs in terms of violence possible even void of any action or intention of
any particular moral actor, and it allows for the possibility of violence that cannot be laid at the
feet of any particular moral actor. I raise all of this in defense of the concept of structural
violence. Without this expanded concept of violence, we simply have no way to characterize in
moral terms the full set of harms suffered by moral objects (like those harms caused or
instantiated by systems, distributions of resources, or structures and institutions); with this
expanded concept of violence, we can offer a unified account of all the various harms that there
are.
But I also raise all of this so as to address Coady’s second objection above (and other
objections of that sort)—objections to Galtung’s notion of violence from the problem of consent.
One of Coady’s problems with Galtung’s definition is that (he thinks) such things as self-harm or
consensual drugging would be considered violence under Galtung’s view and Coady’s intuition
is apparently that if I have asked Coady to drug me and he does, then Coady ought not to be
faulted for acting violently toward me. I share Coady’s concern, generally, that Galtung’s
definition is silent about the problem of consent and the willful receipt of harm, but this objection
of Coady’s does not undermine Galtung’s definition. I take the ground: Coady is simply correct
that, under Galtung’s definition, states of affair in which there is self-harm or consensual
drugging should be characterized as violent, because in such cases there is an avoidable gap
between the potential and actual realizations.
This is not necessarily a problem for Galtung, because that is Galtung’s project. He has
provided a definition of violence that allows for analyses of states of affairs in terms of violence
that are neutral to the agent’s or object’s consent, intentions, or motivations; in the above, he
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has not entered into a discourse with the legal community. I think we can say here: though an
agent’s consent is salient in legal evaluations of states of affairs and would, for instance, get a
“drugger” off the hook (legally speaking), the state of affairs that we have referred to here as
“consensual drugging” should still appropriately be referred to as “violent” under the expanded
concept of violence that we have been using. In legal practice, the consent of the drugged
makes for one set of evaluations; but when evaluating a state of affairs in terms of whether or
not there is an avoidable deficit of mental or somatic realizations, at least some cases of
consensual drugging are appropriately called violent. There are two potential cross-pressures
here: the first being that it is possible that our legal principles regarding consensual harm (even
though widely accepted) are wrong, too permissive, and fail to track with the relevant moral
principle (ceteris paribus, avoidable deficits are bad) and the second being that it is possible that
the legal conversation about consensual harm and the moral conversation about consensual
harm are two very different conversations that need to be teased apart.
Take a different example: often, chemotherapy is necessary and warranted, though it
causes all sorts of deficits of mental and somatic realizations. Surely, we do not want doctors to
never be permitted to cause a deficit of mental and somatic realizations (presuming they have
some reason to believe that causing a particular deficit, as in chemotherapy, will heal or
preserve life). Chemotherapy is arguably violence, under Galtung’s definition of violence as
avoidable deficits of mental and somatic realizations, and chemotherapy is only a
counterexample to Galtung’s project if we are first committed to some version of we ought
always to end or prevent avoidable deficits of mental and somatic realizations (as conceived of
by Galtung) no matter what. If we reject that last clause—no matter what—we can neutralize
Coady’s concern. We should take the doctor’s expert administration of chemotherapy for what it
is: not a mere application of harm, but rather a regimen of treatments designed to preserve that
patient’s life and well-being.
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Coady’s more pressing problem for Galtung, however, is the problem of suboptimal
states of affairs that, surely (according to Coady), ought not to be considered violence. This is
illustrated in part by the chemotherapy example above. There are two ways to proceed here.
One is for Galtung (or someone writing in his defense) to simply bite the bullet and grant that,
yes, a baby who keeps his parents up at night is a violent actor, or at the very least that those
resulting states of affairs are violent. We could insist that, yes, the loud baby instantiates
violence because the loud baby is causing avoidable deficits of mental and somatic realizations.
There is no problem, in principle, with going this route; that is, one can go this route and keep
Galtung’s framework intact. The result would just be counterintuitive returns in ordinary
language (loud babies victimizing their parents, for example; or, the violent reality of young
parents).
I am in agreement with Coady and depart from Galtung, here. What is needed in these
sorts of cases is a conceptual space that allows for suboptimal states of affairs that are not to be
characterized in the very same terms as such states of affairs as unjust war, torture, verbal
harassment, etc. So I share Coady’s intuition that if a loud baby is violent in the very same
sense and for the very same reasons that a car bomb is violent, then we have a problem. So, I
suggest the creation of a conceptual space that allows for deficits of mental and somatic
realizations that ought not to be characterized in terms of violence. So, let us carve out a space
for states of affairs characterized by deficits of mental and somatic realizations—arduous
medical treatments, studying intensively for exams or writing dissertations, inconsolable
infants—that ought not to be termed violent. And the difference will be a difference not in the
degree of the deficit of realizations, but rather a difference in the kind of the deficit of
realizations. We could simply create classes of protected deficits of realizations to which the
label violence would simply fail to apply—acceptable deficits associated with medical treatment,
with difficult tasks like studying, with the duties of parenthood, and so on. And in all other
cases, Galtung’s definition would apply.
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The only alternative is to grant that Galtung’s definition applies to cases like the
inconsolable child and to characterize such states of affairs as violent; I prefer the route
characterized above, but like I have said in principle I see no issue for Galtung were he to
simply bite the bullet. That is, if I can characterize a society as violent (by which I just mean that
that society is characterized by various deficits of mental and somatic realizations) without
laying moral responsibility at any one agent’s feet, then surely I can characterize the home life
of the young parents raising a child as violent (by which I just mean that that family is
experiencing various deficits of mental and somatic realizations) without laying moral
responsibility at the baby’s feet. After all, it is the deficit of realizations that we can all agree on,
and if we can accept the deficits without terming babies “violent,” perhaps there is no real
problem. And perhaps this ability to characterize states of affairs as violent in an agent-neutral
way is enough to avoid Coady’s concerns about how counter-intuitive it would be to judge that
an infant is being violent.
Rubenstein holds that direct and structural violence arise from the seedbed of structural
injustice—those unjust, inequitable, and exploitative social relations that generate violence
either intentionally or unintentionally. Rubenstein’s point is that when you place normally
functioning individuals into a set of sufficiently exploitative, abusive, or unfair structural
arrangements, the only way to survive or overcome which is through violence, then the
predictable and reliable outcome is violence; and the abusive and exploitative relations
themselves are violent. With that established, the peace-theorist’s only reasonable recourse to
action in their effort to eradicate violence is to address the violence-manufacturing structures
into which people are placed. This understanding of the intersection of structure and violence, in
conjunction with a Wolterstorffian account of the morally legitimate claims of rights-holders,
allows us to conceive of the agents in those systems as not only being the victims of structurally
unjust arrangements, but also as their having morally legitimate claims against their being the
victims of such systems. Correcting structural injustice and violence will take an accurate
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conceptualization of the agency and moral responsibility of those who constitute the unjust
systems and institutions, those who benefit from them, and those who have the power or liberty
to change the systems and institutions as they currently stand. Later, when it comes to
questions of race reparations for Black America, we will need to answer questions about the
claims of Black Americans against the State and other institutions that are generated by past
and present structural violence.
Galtung’s notion of violence deviates from standard use to such an extent that I
emphasize here its conceptual, rather than political, role in the account I am building. Galtung’s
definition provides a way of distinguishing the ideal from the non-ideal, and one further way of
characterizing what has gone wrong in cases of injustice or violations of rights. In my account,
rights are claims against others to certain life-goods—certain goods or ways of being treated.
“Violence,” here, refers to avoidable deficits of mental and somatic realizations; “life-goods,”
here, refers to those goods and ways of being treated that maximize well-being and mental and
somatic realizations. Definitionally à la Galtung, any avoidable deficit of mental or somatic
realization is “violent,” although you and I would never refer to some such deficits as an instance
of violence in ordinary language. Some deficits of mental or somatic realizations constitute a
violation of rights, some deficits of mental or somatic realizations are caused by violations of
rights, and some proceed from natural occurrences and are not evaluable in the terms of justice.
I maintain Galtung’s non-standard utilization of “violence” in my account for its usefulness in
identifying and characterizing the full suite of suboptimal states of affairs. We could re-name
Galtung’s violence concept something like “Bernard,” so as to distinguish it lexically from the
standardly used concept violence, but I choose to keep Galtung’s conceptual space intact. As I
have said above, I endorse Galtung’s expansive use of the term violence in part because it
simplifies the terrain and in part because it unifies (albeit to a limited extent) the terrain.
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Take the difference between forcibly kidnapping someone and holding them hostage,
and merely finding someone in a house and then locking the door so they cannot escape.221
And take Galtung’s example: the difference between directly stealing food from another and
acting to make it impossible for others to obtain food. I grant that these cases are radically
different, both legally and morally. But each of these cases is evaluable in just the same way in
Galtung’s terms of violence—in terms of avoidable deficits of mental and somatic realizations
that we ought to mitigate. Each of these examples is wrong and condemnable for its own
reasons, whether or not one accepts Galtung’s expanded of definition of violence. Calling them
all instances of “violence,” and explaining that concept in terms of avoidable deficits of
realizations, allows us to conceive of these states of affairs as all being comparable along the
same dimension, in addition to their all being wrong or bad or illegal for some reason or other.
The reader may still insist, “But surely there are avoidable deficits of mental and somatic
realizations that are not violent!” And my only response to the reader at this point is to say, “Yes.
Above I suggested the creation of a class of protected deficits. But you and I are still using the
word ‘violent’ differently—I am trying to convince you that it is helpful to judge each avoidable
deficit of mental and somatic realizations to be violent, and I am trying to allay your concerns by
pointing out that violence comes in degrees. In my view, hate speech and capital murder are
neither equally bad nor equally violent, but they are both bad and they are both violent.”
E. When the State Should Intervene
In what follows, I rely on the work of Galtung and Rubenstein so as to have operable
concepts in place. To fit Galtung’s concepts into my broader work on worth, rights, and justice,
let’s establish some definitional stipulations. Peace and justice typically characterize the very
same sets of states of affairs—those states of affairs in which rights-holders are not being
wronged and in which they are not subject to violence.222 This establishes an important relation

221
222

This example offered by Professor Jacob Adler in a round of comments.
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between “being wronged” and “deficits of somatic and mental realizations.” But this relation is
not an identity; it is more nuanced.
For instance, one’s right being violated in some domain and just any deficit of somatic
and mental realizations within that domain are not identical states of affairs. Consider:
hurricanes, for example, lead to deficits of somatic and mental realizations, but surely
hurricanes cannot accurately be characterized as wronging hurricane victims; further, the
violation of one’s privacy rights, for instance, does not necessarily instantiate some harm to
one’s mental or somatic well-being (as in a case where one’s privacy is violated, but one has no
idea such a violation has taken place), but such a violation is surely a wrong. But I do intend the
terms “peace” and “justice” to ordinarily characterize the same states of affairs, and the term
“violence” to be ordinarily coextensive with the term “injustice.” “Direct violence” refers to those
states of affairs in which rights-holders are harmed and/or wronged directly by other rightsholders, and “structural violence” refers to those states of affairs in which the violence
experienced by rights-holders is caused by system or structure or institution or social
arrangement. The situations in which nobody is wronged and in which each rights-holder gets
that to which they have morally legitimate claim just are the situations in which “somatic and
mental realizations” approach their potential (barring natural, non-moral factors that might put an
upper bound on one’s mental and somatic realizations, relative to their potential realizations)—
these we should call just states of affairs and peaceful states of affairs. Though I take those
terms to generally pick out the same states of affairs, not all states of affairs characterizable in
the terms of violence will also be characterizable in the terms of injustice (take some flood that
caused deficits but did not wrong anybody). There will be deficits of mental and somatic
realizations that are unavoidable and so do not amount to violence à la Galtung (for instance,
hunger that is not avoidable in a particular socio-moral context) and there will be instances of
wrongs not associated with any deficit of realizations whatsoever (for instance, as when a
hacker steals your personal information unbeknownst to you) and there will be instances of
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wrongs that are associated with unavoidable deficits of realizations (for instance, a ruler whose
people are hungry and who could act to end a famine sometime in the near future but does not
so act for corrupt reasons). Most instances of unwarranted physical violence (direct violence)
will be instances of wrongs that instantiate avoidable deficits of mental and somatic realizations.
All of this is fertile ground for counterexamples. What of the example above, that of an
arduous medical treatment—is it violent, is it unjust? What of the inconsolable baby—is it
violent, is it acting unjustly? What of a professional mixed martial arts fighter who gets beat up
for a living—does she experience violence or injustice? And what of the society where one
gender or caste is assigned an inferior role but then gladly accepts that assignment—are they
victims of violence or injustice? The simple answer is that these are examples of cases where
the terms violence and injustice are not co-extensive. Each, to be sure, is an example of a
deficit of mental or somatic realizations and, under Galtung’s original definition, constitutes
violence or instantiates a violent state of affairs. However, none of those listed is obviously a
case of injustice—a case of someone’s right being withheld. So here, we have potential
exemplars of the kinds of cases in which our notions peace and justice may be teased apart.
The MMA fighter is physically wounded, yet in entering the octagon she has waived her claims
to bodily safety; the young father is emotionally depleted, yet in taking on the duties of
fatherhood he has waived his claims to a full night’s sleep. There is a clear and avoidable
deficit, yet no clear violation of some right. Above, I suggested a revision of Galtung’s definition
of violence so as to carve out a conceptual space for suboptimal states of affairs that it would be
bizarre to consider violent. So in such cases as these, we have two options: hold strictly to
Galtung’s formulation and call these instances of violence but not instances of injustice (on
grounds that they constitute no violation of a right) or accept that at least some of these cases
might be the “protected” kind of cases in the sense that they are suboptimal states of affairs but
are not appropriately termed “violent.”
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Take a different sort of consideration—that of an ideal realization that exceeds what is
needed for flourishing. For example, consider the wealth of Jeff Bezos and consider your failure
to attain to his measure of wealth; imagine also that, although you are not as rich as Jeff Bezos,
you are happy and you neither need nor want anything in addition to what you already have. So,
it is possible for you to be richer, but you are flourishing. In such a case, I take it that it would be
incorrect to say that you are experiencing violence, as conceived of by Galtung. Certainly, you
could have a larger quantity of money; but, as just established, you also experience flourishing.
If we are to measure or judge mental and somatic realizations according to one’s net worth,
then it is in principle impossible to do anything but experience violence—because one can
always possibly have one more dollar. Instead, I offer that we should say: a case in which you
do not have as much money as Jeff Bezos, but in which you know real flourishing and your
current amount of money is no barrier to knowing more flourishing, the deficit of mental or
somatic realizations that you experience (if any) is not attributable to the fact that you have
fewer dollars than Jeff Bezos. You may be experiencing violence for some reason other than
your current net worth; indeed, it is likely that Jeff Bezos, even with his fortune, experiences
violence at times. But here, I contend that, assuming you have enough money to meet your
needs and realize flourishing, the mere fact that you have less money than Jeff Bezos (that is,
less money than it is possible to have) fails to constitute a deficit of mental and somatic
realizations.
It is incorrect to say, in my account, that in the justly structured society there will be no
injustice. Rather, in the justly structured society there will be only those instances of injustice
upon the discovery of which the State or other rights-holders shall move to resolve them and
none of the injustices that obtain shall be committed by the State itself. In this section I add to
my conceptualization of the justly structured society that violence-dimension, drawing on
Galtung: any deficit of mental or somatic realizations that shall be permitted to persist in a justly
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structured society is of an unavoidable variety and the standards avoidable and unavoidable are
to be indexed to a particular socio-moral context.
Important to note here: the avoidability or unavoidability of any particular deficit of mental
or somatic realizations must be judged in terms of the ability of agents and states in that sociomoral context to end, prevent, correct, or make compensation for each such instance of that
deficit. Take, for example, a prima facie avoidable deficit that is extremely minor: a child’s
missing out on bedtime reading on Thursdays because his parent works on Thursday nights.
The deficit is prima facie avoidable because we could imagine the government sending a nanny
to the child’s bedroom to read bedtime stories on Thursdays, but the deficit is not ultima facie
avoidable, because the government could not possibly resolve each such instance—such minor
deficits play out millions of times over on any given day (and most of us would not want
government-mandated bedtime nannies sent to our homes, regardless). So a particular deficit is
avoidable only if rights-holders or the State are capable of bringing it to an end; a justly
structured society is only on the hook for those deficits of realizations that it is capable of
addressing.
So, the avoidability or unavoidability of a deficit of mental or somatic realizations is
determined by socio-moral context and the distinction between the two is a matter of the ability
of rights-holders (and other moral actors, like states) to alleviate the deficits. Take the sociomoral context we examined earlier, that of famine: in a famine, the deficit of mental or somatic
realizations caused by hunger is unavoidable. The deficit cannot be avoided in a case of intense
famine and in such a case there can be no moral prerogative of rights-holders in that sociomoral context to alleviate the suffering; that would place a moral obligation on rights-holders that
cannot be met. However, in a time of relative abundance, the deficits of mental and somatic
realizations characterized by hunger are avoidable; the rights-holders in such socio-moral
contexts do have morally legitimate claims to their not suffering from hunger and there are moral
obligations on other rights-holders to meet those who are suffering at their point of need. In both
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socio-moral contexts the violence is bad, and the suffering is real; however, claims obtain in the
one context but not the other, and the deficit is avoidable in the one context but not the other.
What makes a society unjustly structured is either that:
i.

the State itself disrespects the worth of rights-holders, or

ii. the society’s structure is conducive to inevitably exploitative social arrangements,
or
iii. the society permits (or causes) avoidable deficits of mental or somatic
realizations, or
iv. the society fails to meet the claims to corrective and compensatory justice of
those who have been wronged.
In throwing aside the ideally just society as an unattainable goal and embracing the justly
structured society as our proper practical aim, and in granting that rights-holders have legitimate
claim to certain life-goods, the need arises for a way to determine the appropriate boundaries of
state intervention in rights-holders’ lives.223 In aiming for the justly structured society and not the
ideal justice, and in opting for a society in which wrongs are addressed but not plausibly
eradicated altogether, I open the gates to hard questions about appropriate State intervention in
the private lives of rights-holders (intervention that is aimed at alleviating violence and wrongs).
We need upper and lower boundaries for determining such State intervention. In the
interest of distinguishing those cases of violence and injustice in which the State is required to
intervene from those cases in which the State is not required to intervene or is required not to
intervene, I offer simply that in a justly structured society unavoidable deficits of mental or
In The Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen breaks with traditional attempts to define “the just society,” flipping
the discourse over. Instead of arguing from ideal principles, he notes the seeming innateness of certain
judgments of ours that particular actions are unjust. That is, even as children we agree on the injustice of
particular injustices more than we agree on any ideal theory—so we should start with those particular
consensus injustices and move toward a more just society one step at a time.
Ultimately, Sen (2009) dispenses with the idea of a maximally just society. I do not. I do believe
that the ideally just society is unattainable, but the practice of characterizing the ideally just society
illustrates what has gone wrong in any given society, and it provides us with a target to aspire toward
See Sen, Idea of Justice and also note 206 above.
223
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somatic realizations (whether caused directly or structurally) may be permitted to persist as long
as they are not the result of some wrong. (Deficits of mental and somatic realizations that result
from some wrong will be necessarily addressed by a justly structured society in that society’s
addressing of the wrong.) And as established earlier, standards of avoidable and unavoidable
deficits of somatic and mental realizations are relative to moral, historical, and technological
context. In conjunction with a consideration of rights-holders’ morally legitimate claims, these
notions of avoidable and unavoidable deficits of mental and somatic realizations determine the
grounds of morally legitimate State intervention.
In a justly structured society, the State fulfills the morally legitimate claims of rightsholders against the State, there are institutions and laws in place for the State (or other prosocial institutions) to address the violations of the rights of members of that State by agents
other than the State, and the State enforces the claims of rights-holders to corrective and
compensatory justice as wrongs arise. So, in the justly structured society, there will be wrongs,
but the State will not be the agent committing those wrongs and will be dutybound to redressing
the wrongs that are committed. But even with those conditions met, in the justly structured
society we should expect that commission of wrongs (and potentially very many wrongs) to
persist, and that there will be resulting deficits of mental and somatic realizations (at least in
some cases). Even if the State itself is not rampantly violating peoples’ rights, and even if the
State has a robust justice system empowered to correct wrongs, in the justly structured society
rights will be violated and deficits of realizations will obtain.
And it is in that non-ideal world that difficult questions arise: Given that there will be
wrongs and suffering even in the justly structured society, what do we mean by calling it justlystructured, and at what point must the State insert itself into the private affairs of citizens in
order to alleviate deficits? It is in the pursuit of providing an answer to that question that I take
Galtung’s talk of avoidable and unavoidable “deficits” to be helpful.
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And in each socio-moral context, the lines between acceptable and unacceptable
violence will need to be determined. Mill’s harm principle is worth mentioning here.224 I take it
that rights-holders have rights to not be harmed by other rights-holders—that each instance of
such a case is an injustice that ought to be either prevented or corrected. So I agree, generally,
with Mill’s harm principle—that the state may restrict a rights-holder’s liberty in order to prevent
their harming somebody else without warrant. But in exploring the morally legitimate bounds of
state intervention, my view also needs to be sensitive to other forms of deficits that there are:
violence that was not the result of the activity of rights-holders, for instance. The state cannot be
restricted in its intervention to only those instances of violence that arise from the action or
inaction of rights-holders; often, both avoidable and unavoidable deficits arise from natural
disaster or plague, and the justly-structured state will alleviate the avoidable varieties (as in, the
mass preventable suffering that resulted in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, or the mass
preventable suffering that resulted from the uncontained global spread of COVID-19 in 2020).
So, we can conceive of the justly structured society as being arranged in such a way that
the State has grounds for intervention in all cases of injustice; and the State (or individuals) shall
intervene when the deficit of somatic and mental realizations becomes avoidable (accept in
special cases), whether or not that deficit is associated with some wrong; and the State must
answer every legitimate claim against it to corrective and compensatory justice for past and
present wrongs (direct or structural). And, furthermore, the persistence of every avoidable deficit
of mental and somatic realizations (assuming the deficit is resolvable) itself constitutes a wrong.
From socio-moral context to socio-moral context, the magnitude of the deficits of mental and
somatic realizations that there are will be evaluated differently. In many socio-moral contexts
(like that of famine), though, at least some cases of suffering and harm will be acceptable,
because that there can be no resolution to those cases of suffering and harm makes it
impossible for a rights-holder to be morally obligated to resolve them.
224
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In a justly structured society, there will inevitably be deficits of mental and somatic
realizations, some as a product of violations of rights (as in, murder) and some not (as in,
economic collapse); and in many moral contexts the State cannot reasonably be expected or
even desired to intervene in some of these deficits (as in, a case where a child goes without
bedtime reading on Thursdays because their parent is at work). But we should expect the State
to take action to correct some wrong or some bit of suffering in cases where the deficit becomes
avoidable and the deficit is clearly associated with some wrong (as in, the childhood hunger that
results from generational poverty). This all implies that, in the justly structured society, there will
be unavoidable deficits of mental and somatic realization that are permitted to persist. I accept
that implication and grant that there will be unavoidable deficits of mental and somatic
realizations in the justly structured society. In the justly structured society there will also be
many instances of avoidable deficits of mental and somatic realizations that are permitted to
persist, so long as they constitute no violation of a human right; such deficits will be minor.
So, much as rights are highly contextualized socio-moral entities, how we characterize
deficits of mental and somatic mental realizations (in terms of their avoidability or unavoidability)
is highly contextualized. It is the case that some instances of unavoidable deficits are also
instances of a situation in which a right that normally obtains no longer obtains in the present
context; in times of famine, for instance, one’s rights to food do not obtain due to the lack of
availability of food. In that particular socio-moral context, the morally legitimate claim to food
does not obtain, though there may well be a suite of other rights: claims against rulers to their
working to alleviate the situation, for example, or claims against global powers to regulate their
carbon emissions and curb the effects of climate change. In such a case, the deficit that
starvation causes to an individual must be conceived of as unavoidable, because in times of
intense famine there is nothing that can be done by rights-holders or the State to alleviate the
mass suffering, and the inevitability of that suffering leaves that state of affairs hardly
condemnable in the terms of injustice.
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In some moral contexts, many deficits are within the bounds of a moral expectation that
they be addressed (either by moral agents or the State), but other deficits are not. And in other
cases, there is some deficit of mental and somatic realizations that is simply not evaluable in
terms of justice (as in the suffering caused by natural disaster). In the natural disaster-borne
suffering case, it might well obtain that the state and other rights-holders fail to alleviate the
suffering according to their duties to do so, in which case injustice would obtain in tandem with
avoidable mental and somatic deficits. A justly structured society, indexed to the particular moral
context it finds itself in, will surely address the most egregious examples of suffering, but may
be unable to address others (for lack of resources, or the requisite technology, etc.). In a justly
structured society there will be different undesirable things happening all at once, some of which
will be the object of moral condemnation but others of which should be conceived of as
acceptable in that context.
This picture I am offering is complicated. Here is the range of types of states of affairs
we are potentially presented with in the justly structured society:
i.

some local state of affairs could be characterizable as both just and peaceful,

ii. some right could be violated leading to some (avoidable or unavoidable) deficit of
mental and somatic realizations,
iii. some right could be violated in such a way that it leads to no deficit of mental and
somatic realizations,
iv. some deficit of mental and somatic realizations could be actualized in such a way
that its persistence constitutes a wrong and the State or individuals are dutybound to address it, and
v. some avoidable deficit of mental and somatic realizations could obtain
independent of any wrong.
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We need a decision procedure for distinguishing those cases in which the State is duty-bound to
intervene in a case of violence or injustice from those cases in which the State is not duty-bound
to intervene.
I propose this Principle of Burden (PB) for such cases in which it is unclear whether or
not the State ought to insert itself:
PB:

i.

In any case in which the State is capable of rectifying some instance of
violence (whether direct or structural), the State is duty-bound to do so
unless:
doing so violates the morally legitimate claims of some bystander rights-holder in
that context (as in, were meeting one rights-holder’s claim absolute protection
from gun violence to require the confiscation of every gun in circulation), or

ii. doing so would render the State incapable of addressing more egregious cases
of violence or some other wrong (as in, were meeting one rights-holder’s claim to
having updated textbooks in their classroom to require emptying the city’s
emergency management budget), or
iii. there is some other plausible morally legitimate way of resolving the violence that
does not require State intervention (as in, were a local church willing and able to
feed and house the homeless community), or
iv. independent of conditions i–iii, the deficit of somatic and mental realizations is
unavoidable relative to the particular socio-moral context.
Then, once it is determined that State intervention is warranted in a given case, the morally
legitimate bounds of intervention must be determined. In a liberal democracy like ours, laws and
the courts are the most obvious candidates for who gets to determine the morally legitimate
bounds of State intervention, but it should be clear to everyone that laws and the courts are
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imperfect and have frequently fallen on the side of injustice until dragged forward by moral
progress.225
According to (i), the State should not be conceived of as being morally obligated to
violate some bystander rights-holder’s right (a rights-holder who is not responsible for the
violence in question) in order to resolve some avoidable deficit, even assuming the state’s only
possible means of resolution of the avoidable deficit entails disrespecting that other rightsholder’s worth. Innocents shouldn’t be treated as moral collateral. But conceptually, there will be
some cases where the State’s duty to intervene to end avoidable deficits will cross with some
right of the bystander rights-holder and in those cases it will need to be determined if the right of
the bystander rights-holder actually stands in that socio-moral context such that the State
mustn’t so act, or if it is a socio-moral context in which there is no such contradiction of rights
because in that socio-moral context the bystander rights-holder has no such right.
In trying to carve out the bounds of morally legitimate State intervention, I envision the
State as being a moral actor of last resort. The State is hardly the only moral actor responsible
for righting some of the wrongs that there are, but in many cases it is the only moral actor with
the resources required for righting the wrong in question. So, in my view, the State is let off the
hook in those cases where a pro-social religious organization, for example, could be
conceivably responsible for righting some wrong that there is. Rights-holders would still have
claims against the State to its correcting the avoidable deficits there are in the case that some
other entity does not resolve it and in many cases the State is the only entity capable of
answering the claim. And regarding (iv), in cases of avoidable deficits, state intervention is
required, unless the only means of state intervention possible entails the violation of some
bystander rights-holder’s right, unless the state’s actions would cause some other egregious
wrong, and unless some other pro-social institution would like to resolve the avoidable deficit. If
the violence in question is unavoidable, the State is not obligated to act. I will simply emphasize
225
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here: there will be instances of preventable deficits of mental and somatic realizations that are
so minor that the State is not obligated to act to resolve them.
F. Structure and Past Wrongs
So, individuals can be wronged by other individuals and by institutions and the State,
and similarly violence can be caused by both individuals and structure. Important to note is that
social structure and society itself are historical entities; they are constituted by social
arrangements that are either just or unjust and these arrangements are the products of a long
history and a causal chain of policies, actions, and distributions of resources. At any point on the
timeline, there are states of affairs that are analyzable in terms of their being just or peaceful.
But as we attempt to answer the second core question that motivates this work—(Q2) What are
the requirements of justice with regard to Black Americans today, in light of historical wrongs?—
we must acknowledge the role that past wrongs play today and the reality that the social
relations that obtain today (many of them inequitable) are an accumulation or inheritance or
consequence of past wrongs, or otherwise have their etiology in a past state of affairs that is
characterizable as unjust. Many of the institutions and social relations that obtain today that
wrong rights-holders in the present are simply holdovers or legacies of past wrongs; 226 they are
social arrangements that instantiated unjust relations when founded, they are social
arrangements that were not changed, and as they exist currently the social arrangements
instantiate unjust relations. And the requirements of justice and the justly structured society
require that wrongs be righted, be they direct or structural.227
Here enters talk of reparations. In the final chapter, I will offer two tracks of race
reparations that I argue should be pursued concurrently as an output of my preceding rights-first
For example, Ibram X. Kendi’s Stamped from the Beginning: The Definitive History of Racist Ideas in
America is a historical account of the emergence of racist ideas as justifications for power relations that
politically and economically disadvantaged certain racial minorities. In his epilogue, he makes the case
that it is anti-racist policies (rather than other strategies that have been employed unsuccessfully) that will
make things better for victims of past and present racialized wrongs. See Kendi, Stamped, 503–511.
227
A more thorough discussion of righting past wrongs, and the various difficulties that accompany
righting past wrongs, takes place in the next chapter.
226
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theory of justice. My claim is that those individuals who are currently (and historically) wronged,
like those rights-holders who constitute Black America, have morally legitimate claim to these
two varieties of reparations as a product of their inherent worth in our present socio-moral
context. The beneficiaries of reparations will include those who are currently being wronged,
those who can be determined to be the inheritors of the debts owed to long-dead individuals
who were wronged by either another long-dead person or long-gone institutions, and living
people who were wronged in the past either by people (living or not) or some institution or
structural arrangement (still existing or reformed, or not). Navigating this space comes with a
plethora of epistemological and historiographical difficulties and we will discuss them in the next
chapter.
The first variety of reparations is the track of direct race reparations, whereby individuals
who are wronged directly or structurally (or whose ancestors were wronged directly or
structurally) are owed direct financial compensation. Direct race reparations looks backward and
laterally, handling both past and present wrongs committed by either individuals, systems,
institutions, or social arrangements; so, direct race reparations handles instances of both direct
and structural violence, and the reparations are direct in the sense that compensation is made
directly to individuals who are owed. The second variety of race reparations is the track of
structural race reparations, whereby those systems, institutions, and structures that currently
wrong Black Americans are reformed according to the morally legitimate claims of rightsholders.228 Structural reparations looks laterally and forward and addresses rights-holders’
morally legitimate claims to structural reform today, so as to discontinue and disrupt social
arrangements that reliably and predictably wrong certain rights-holders according to factors like
race or ZIP code.
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A complete theory of justice will apply these concepts to any instance of concentrated disadvantage. I
am restricting what follows to the domain of the history of American anti-Black racism.
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I have distinguished between direct race reparations and structural race reparations.
Direct race reparations handle direct financial repayment for wrongs, whether those wrongs are
inflicted by individuals or by structure. Structural race reparations address rights-holders’
various claims to the reform of the disadvantageous or violent structure around them. So, the
relevant distinction between the two varieties of reparations is not that between “violence that is
direct” and “violence that is structural”; the relevant distinction is between the kind of thing which
is owed in a given case: compensation and reform, respectively.
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Chapter 5: Morally Legitimate Claims to Race Reparations
A. A Review and a Survey of Reparations Theory
In this final chapter, I apply my rights-first theory of justice to the race reparations
discourse; but before that, here is a quick refresher of what we have done so far. In Chapter 1, I
surveyed the various theories of rights on offer from across the rights literature—from Hohfeld’s
quadripartite analysis of rights, to Wenar’s functionalist analysis of rights, and to the views of
prominent interest theorists, will theorists, and demand theorists of rights. That chapter ended
with Beitz’s praxis-first theory of rights, according to which prominent theories of human rights
are inadequate to the task of international human rights theory and according to which human
rights just are the role they play in international human rights praxis. In Chapter 2, I unpacked
Wolterstorff’s rights-first theory of justice according to which human rights are the normatively
binding socio-moral relations that are grounded in the human worth that is bestowed by the
relevant relation of God to God’s human creatures. Justice, in Wolterstorff’s view, amounts to
respect for human worth. I challenged Wolterstorff’s theistic account of rights, on grounds that it
will inevitably fail to satisfy the atheist or agnostic and that it is internally inconsistent in positing
alienable properties and capacities as those features of humanity that account for humans’
candidacy for right relation to God.
In Chapter 3, I offered multiple theistic and multiple non-theistic alternatives to
Wolterstorff’s accounting for human moral considerability while keeping the general structure of
Wolterstorff’s theory of rights and justice intact. I was sensitive to the political nature of human
rights discourse and I advocated for a Rawlsian or Beitzian maneuver according to which if one
is unhappy with the particular metaphysics of rights on offer, one should simply lean forward into
claims that enjoy far greater consensus in the philosophical community: that for some reason or
other, humans are morally considerable and have rights. In Chapter 4, I introduced Galtung and
Rubenstein so as to round out my account of justice, giving it the resources needed to talk
about structural justice and structural injustice. I evaluated structural violence in exactly the
175

same terms that I evaluated direct violence—in terms of a rights-holder’s worth being
disrespected. Now, I turn to an application of the first four chapters to a particular domain of
injustice—historical and contemporary American anti-Black racism.
And before presenting what my Wolterstorffian rights-first theory of justice contributes to
the reparations space, I present here an overview of the predominant lines of reparations
thought. In this chapter, I agree with leading reparations theorists that reparations are owed for
past and present wrongs and I focus on that scope of cases pertaining to the reparations owed
for anti-Black wrongs in the American historical context. The theoretical outputs of my
Wolterstorffian theory will, of course, apply similarly to any direct or structural instance of
disrespect for human worth—and not just the instances of disrespect for human worth that are
characterizable as anti-Black racism.
I will advocate for two tracks of race reparations: the first track being morally legitimate
claims to the direct compensation (for past or present wrongs) that is owed either to the one
who was wronged or to the one who has inherited the claim to compensation and the second
track being morally legitimate claims against the State and various other institutions to their
reform such that concentrated racial disadvantage and structural violence are interrupted.
Clearly, the two tracks differ in nature—one is straightforward compensation and the other
amounts to opportunity equalization and structural reform. But I call both tracks “reparations”
because they are both reparative. I will show that both are owed in response to the various
modes of disrespect for human worth that there are and have been and I offer that these morally
legitimate claims to race reparations obtain in just the same way that other rights obtain. They
are the normatively binding claims of one rights-holder against the other (or against the State),
supervening on human worth in just the same way and with just the same force as any other
normatively binding human right.
Central to American history is the politicization and cheapening of racial wrongs; here, I
seek to demonstrate that if anything can be thought to be a matter of justice, that which is owed
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to Black Americans in light of past and present wrongs should be thought to be a matter of
justice. My conjunction of the work of Wolterstorff, Galtung, and Rubenstein provides a space
for thinking of race reparations in terms of human worth and the morally legitimate claims that
supervene on that worth in light of past or present wrongs and racialized direct and structural
violence.
Talk of race reparations was launched back into popular discourse in recent years with
Ta-Nehisi Coates’s 2014 article in The Atlantic, “The Case for Reparations,” in which Coates
profiles decades of racist housing and property policy, red-lining, predatory mortgaging and
lending, etc., and their impact on wealth disparities between Black and non-Black families.229
Coates traces the history of reparations-concepts through Jewish Talmudic literature,
throughout the post-Civil War South, and in contemporary politics. In his article, Coates laments
the failure of lawsuits following the 2007–2008 mortgage lending crisis to fully reckon with the
debts owed to victims of predatory lenders and sub-prime mortgage lenders who preyed on
Black Americans for profits both before and after the mortgage crisis. Legal action was taken to
seek reparations from firms that used explicitly racist policies to disadvantage vulnerable Black
families who did not have access to traditional lending markets, but the suits failed.
Coates’s case for reparations is both principled and pragmatic. He profiles massive
racialized wealth gaps that are the direct consequence of human slavery, subsequent centuries
of racism, and decades of contemporary racist economic policies and he calls to the reader’s
attention that many of our society’s intractable issues are intractable precisely because we have
failed to address the matter of that which is owed to Black Americans:
Something more than moral pressure calls America to reparations. We cannot
escape our history. All of our solutions to the great problems of health care,
education, housing, and economic inequality are troubled by what must go
unspoken. “The reason black people are so far behind now is not because of
now,” Clyde Ross told me. “It’s because of then.” In the early 2000s, Charles
Ogletree went to Tulsa, Oklahoma, to meet with the survivors of the 1921 race
riot that had devastated “Black Wall Street.” The past was not the past to them.
229
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“It was amazing seeing these black women and men who were crippled, blind, in
wheelchairs,” Ogletree told me.230
With reference to case studies like post-WWII German reparations to Holocaust survivors and
the Jewish community, Coates argues that not only do reparations serve to repair some past
wrong, but they also come with positive economic benefits for both the wronged and for the
community in which the wronged spends their money. Like the works of Brophy, Brooks, and
Robinson, Coates treats reparations as a moral response to wrongful harm.231 And for those
who think race reparations are the idealist’s fiscally impractical political goal, he points to the
economic stimuli that reparations lead to in other historical contexts.
Alfred Brophy describes the pro-reparations landscape as it relates to the notions of
corrective justice and distributive justice:
Often, reparations programs look backward. That is, they focus on measuring
past harm and correcting for it. Thus, truth commissions, apologies, and
individual payments are frequently aimed at correcting for some well-defined,
identifiable past harm. Other programs are forward-looking. Community-building
programs, designed to promote the welfare of an entire community through such
actions as funding for schools, frequently make little effort to measure past harm;
recognizing that a harm occurred in the past, they are more concerned with trying
to design a program to improve the lives of victims into the future. Reparations
proponents’ discussions of backward-looking and forward-looking programs are
similar to what is called “corrective justice,” which refers to acknowledging and
repairing past harm, and to “distributive justice,” which refers to distributing
property in a fair manner. In essence, corrective justice seeks to put people back
in the position they would have been in, absent slavery or other racial crime. That
involves answering a complex question: what position would a given person be in
without slavery?232
Every reparations program is likely to look both backward and forward in certain
ways. They will be backward-looking because they are justified on the basis of
past harm and forward-looking because they are designed to enable a better
future.233
We might think of reparations, then, as programs that are justified on the basis of
past harm and that are also designed to assess and correct that harm and/or
improve the lives of victims into the future.234
Coates, “Case for Reparations.”
See Brophy, Reparations; Brooks, Atonement and Forgiveness; and Robinson, The Debt.
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It will be in the terms of that final block quote that I will think of race reparations: claims to
reparations as being justified by past (or present) wrongs, with the aim of reparations being to
improve the well-being of the recipients of those past (or present) wrongs into the future
(through both compensation and structural reform).
Brophy highlights the vastness of the kinds of reforms normally called for by the
reparationist:
That leaves open the question, once we get past studying, talking about, and
apologizing for slavery and Jim Crow: of what reparations will look like. Richard
Newman of the W. E. B. DuBois Institute at Harvard University suggested a
domestic Marshall Plan as an analogy to the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Germany
after World War II. He could not state, because indeed it is extremely difficult, the
likely cost of reparations. In talking about reparations, one is talking, as Newman
stated, “about something colossal.”235
And like Coates, Brophy highlights the numbers often cited as clear evidence of the need for
reparations in the wake of both institutionalized slavery and Jim Crow South injustices:
When reparations advocates make their case, they begin by talking about the
gross differences in wealth, income, and educational achievement between
blacks and whites in the United States today. The bare numbers are stark. The
poverty rate for African Americans in 2004 was 24.7%. The poverty rate is near
its lowest point ever, but still nearly one in four African Americans lives in
poverty. Children have it even worse: 33.6% of African American children in
2004 lived in poverty. By comparison, a significantly lower percentage of nonHispanic whites (8.6%) lived in poverty in 2004; 10.5% of non-Hispanic white
children in 2004 lived in poverty. The median income for African American
families in 2004 was $30,134; for non-Hispanic whites, it was $49,061 50%
higher than for African Americans. In 2000, the median income for African
American married couples was $50,749 and for non-Hispanic white couples it
was $62,109, closer together.236
Such evidence of inequality could easily be multiplied across an entire spectrum.
In terms of educational achievement, 88% of non-Hispanic whites have high
school diplomas and 27% have college degrees, while 77% of non-Hispanic
blacks have high school diplomas and 15% have college degrees. The story for
health care is similarly bad. The infant mortality rate for black babies, for
instance, is more than twice the infant mortality rate for white babies. Such
figures, suggesting that we inhabit two separate nations, to borrow a phrase now
common in political debate, serve as one pillar of the movement for
reparations.237 (pg. 57)
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While there is broad agreement about the need for reparations in the reparations
literature, there is of course disagreement about what constitutes reparations and about which
policy approaches would actually advance those who have been wronged. J. Angelo Corlett
offers:
Whatever else reparations require, they require the autonomy of oppressed
individuals and the sovereignty of oppressed groups. And this autonomy and
sovereignty implies freedom to not be reconciled or integrated with their
oppressors if that is in fact what is desired by the victim of heirs of oppression.
The key here is that any adequate theory of reparations for oppression must
make primary the right to oppressed persons and groups to freely choose with
whom they desire to associate. I take this to be a human right, if indeed there are
such rights. Whether or not there are human rights, it is a moral right…238
My rejection of the utilitarian-based approaches to restorative justice implies that
justice by way of reparations is mostly concerned with justice to victims of
oppression and their heirs as a matter of fairness under morally acceptable rules
of law, including compensatory criminal and tort law. Assumed here is the fact
that “victims of crime deserve to be compensated”… Should this make amends
between heirs of oppression impossible because the debts are too great to pay
or otherwise rectify in full, this hardly counts against my argument for
reparations… For if a society finds that its payment of reparations to its
oppressed groups makes extraordinary demands on its economy—even longterm ones—that is not to be taken as a fault with reparations…239
William Darity and Kirsten Mullen offer a systematized approach to reparations that includes the
alternative of atonement:
Reparations are a program of acknowledgment, redress, and closure for a
grievous injustice. Where African Americans are concerned, the grievous
injustices that make the case for reparations include slavery, legal segregation
(Jim Crow), and ongoing discrimination and stigmatization… ARC— the acronym
that stands for acknowledgment, redress, and closure—characterizes the three
essential elements of the reparations program that we are advocating.
Acknowledgment, redress, and closure are components of any effective
reparations project. Acknowledgment involves recognition and admission of the
wrong by the perpetrators or beneficiaries of the injustice. For African Americans
this means the receipt of a formal apology and a commitment for redress on the
part of the American people as a whole—a national act of declaration that a great
wrong has been committed. But beyond an apology, acknowledgment requires
those who benefited from the exercise of the atrocities to recognize the
advantages they gained and commit themselves to the cause of redress.
Redress potentially can take two forms, not necessarily mutually exclusive:
restitution or atonement. Restitution is the restoration of survivors to their
238
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condition before the injustice occurred or to a condition they might have attained
had the injustice not taken place. Of course, it is impossible to restore those who
were enslaved to a condition preceding their enslavement, not only because
those who were enslaved are now deceased but also because many thousands
were born into slavery. But it is possible to move their descendants toward a
more equitable position commensurate with the status they would have attained
in the absence of the injustice(s)… Atonement, as an alternative form of redress,
occurs when perpetrators or beneficiaries meet conditions of forgiveness that are
acceptable to the victims.240
Robert Westley published an article in which he argued that direct compensation to
individuals is insufficient (though, perhaps, is necessary) for the task of reparations:
Sufficient, in other words, to reflect not only the extent of unjust Black suffering,
but also the need for Black economic independence from societal discrimination.
No less than with the freedmen, freedom for Black people today means
economic freedom and security. A basis for that freedom and security can be
assured through group reparations in the form of monetary compensation, along
with free provision of goods and services to Black communities across the nation.
The guiding principle of reparations must be self-determination in every sphere of
life in which Blacks are currently dependent.241
Additionally, beyond any perceived or real need for Blacks to participate more
fully in the consumer market—which is the inevitable outcome of reparations to
individuals— there is a more exigent need for Blacks to exercise greater control
over their productive labor— which is the possibility created by group
reparations.242

Westley focused on the need for institutional reform and Black agency as against mere cash
repayments. Brophy, on Westley’s work:
Westley made out the moral case for reparations in the broadest terms then
available. He surveyed the horrors of slavery and the ways that even after
slavery ended the system of segregation systematically disadvantaged African
Americans in job and educational opportunities, in voting rights, and even in
obtaining financing for housing. Discrimination by the Federal Housing Authority
in funding for housing is often cited as evidence of the federal government’s
culpability in the Jim Crow system: In the years after World War II, when home
ownership by whites was dramatically expanding, due in large part to the FHA’s
underwriting of mortgages, black home ownership did not increase so drastically.
The FHA engaged in “redlining,” drawing lines in red on maps of residential real
estate that marked the less desirable areas. The FHA would not underwrite
mortgages in the areas in red. Those discriminatory practices, which were in part
a response to consumers’ wishes, illustrate some of the choices made by
240
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government that in turn left many minorities with little opportunity or ability to
acquire homes. Those who already owned homes in redlined areas saw their
property values decline while homes outside the red lines increased in value.243
Similarly, Manning Marable calls for a rejection of institutional white supremacy and the ethic of
white supremacy:
… white Americans, as a group, continue to be the direct beneficiaries of the
legal apparatuses of white supremacy, carried out by the full weight of America’s
legal, political, and economic institutions. The consequences of state-sponsored
racial inequality created a mountain of historically constructed, accumulated
disadvantage for African Americans as a group.244
Marable and Westley argue that cash payments to affected individuals are insufficient to the
task of correcting for past wrongs and that necessary for fuller compensation (i.e., reparations)
are more equitable power relations.
Robinson emphasizes that affirmative action policies, though perhaps part of the
solution, are insufficient for very many victims of past and present wrongs. He charges
emphases on affirmative action policies of being sensitive to the situations of more advantaged
Black Americans, but of being hardly adequate for the very poor. Robinson argues that
improving the well-being of those in the most disadvantaged positions requires direct and robust
distributive justice:245
They are palliatives that help people like me, who are poised to succeed when
given half a chance. They do little for the millions of African Americans bottommired in urban hells by the savage time-release social debilitations of American
slavery. They do little for those Americans, disproportionately black, who inherit
grinding poverty, poor nutrition, bad schools, unsafe neighborhoods, low
expectation, and overburdened mothers.246
The historical documentation of the wrongs committed against Black Americans (even those
committed in the last century) and the data which indicate massive economic, education, and
243
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health disparities along racial lines make a compelling case for the claim that sufficient
corrective and distributive justice have yet to be carried out. In my view, each of the elements
discussed above—redistributions of wealth, affirmative action policies,247 structural reforms that
result in more equitable power relations—is a necessary condition of a complete reparation for
past wrongs.
In the next section, I offer my own argument for two different sets of claims to
reparations. In the section following that, I use my argument for race reparations to respond in
detail to prominent arguments against race reparations. I will save the bulk of those arguments
against reparations for that section, so as to set them up and knock them down in the same
place. But here is a very quick review of those sorts of accounts. Clifford Angel Bates, Jr.,
(2021)248 argues against reparations on grounds that, since racial harms have ceased, minority
communities should forgive and move on. John McWhorter (2018) 249 argues against reparative
policies like affirmative action on grounds that they do not help the most disadvantaged. David
Horowitz (2001)250 argues against reparations for several different reasons—that responsible
parties are hard to identify, that only a small proportion of white Americans owned slaves, that it
is unclear that all African Americans today suffer from the consequences of slavery, that
reparations have already been paid, and several others. George Sher (1981)251 argues against
reparations on grounds that there is no way for us to know that there really is a direct causal
chain from some past wrong to some present day disadvantage, and thus on grounds that there
I endorse Harris and Narayan’s work on affirmative action, in which they argue that affirmative action
ought not be conceived of as either a form of compensation or as a means merely to the end of promoting
diversity. They argue these things, in part because these frames mischaracterize affirmative action
policies as providing “justifiable preferences” to the beneficiaries of the policies. In their words: “We
argue that affirmative action policies should be understood as attempts to equalize opportunity for groups
of people who confront ongoing forms of institutional discrimination and a lack of equal opportunity,”
“Affirmative Action,” 247. Affirmative action, that is, not as a form of compensation, but rather as an
equalizer of opportunity. In my work, I have called affirmative action a form of reparations, not because I
think it is a form of compensation, but rather because I think it is one necessary response to past and
present wrongs (among them, unequal distributions of wealth and opportunity).
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is no way to attribute moral responsibility for a particular wrong or debt with certainty. I address
these anti-reparations accounts in detail in Section C of this chapter.
B. Two Different Morally Legitimate Claims to Race Reparations
In a previous chapter, I offered the following argument from my foundational claims
about human worth and the rights that supervene on it to the claim that reparative justice and
compensation are owed to Black Americans:
1. Black humans have immense, ineradicable human worth, in virtue of their
humanity.
2. Beings of thus and such a worth command respect. That is, any morally
legitimate claim of theirs is normatively forceful.
3. Morally legitimate claims are normatively binding, so to violate one makes
one blameworthy; to violate intentionally is a wrong, and definitionally, an
instance of injustice.
4. On human worth, claims supervene against other individuals—and against
the systems and institutions in which Black humans have always found
themselves—to certain treatment and life-goods. The particular goods and
treatment to which humans have claim vary from context to context but are
determined by objective facts of the matter regarding that which is good for
things like us, humans.
5. These claims preclude the permissibility of many of the historical wrongs
committed against Black humans: institutions like human chattel slavery,
police brutality, hate crimes and racial slurs, racist economic or housing
policies that impoverish or disadvantage Black humans, etc.
6. Violations of such claims result in real psychological, bodily, or economic
damages, the latter of which can compound over generations of injustice.
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7. So, Black humans have historically been wronged, and to the extent that
these race-related wrongs continue, at least some Black humans are
currently wronged by them.
8. Those individuals, institutions, or organizations that committed (or commit)
the wrongs are blameworthy and ought to be held accountable.
9. Corrective justice and redistributive justice need to be applied to instances of
such wrongs.
10. Those who violate the rights of Black rights-holders, then, ought to be
punished in accordance with the law, and reparations ought to be rendered
such that the well-being of the wronged is as if the wrong were never
committed, or such that the well-being of the wronged is improved to that
point to whatever extent possible.
11. These wrongs, then, generate for Black rights-holders new claims against the
State to its execution of justice; and they generate for Black rights-holders
new claims against those who wronged them to repayment for damages.
12. Therefore, in virtue of past and present wrongs, at least some Black
Americans have morally legitimate claims to corrective and compensatory
justice; that is, race reparations.
Thus, it follows from my rights-first account of justice, in which justice is ultimately reducible to
talk of whether or not a rights-holder has been rendered those life-goods to which she has
morally legitimate claim, that Black Americans (whose status is historically and currently that of
wronged) are owed race reparations, quite aside from any of the epistemological, political, or
pragmatic difficulties cited by opponents of race reparations.252
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When it comes to race relations in the American social context, some of the most glaring instances of
racial injustice have been inflicted on the Black community. But similar injustices have been inflicted on
other groups throughout our history—the Native American nations, various immigrant and refugee
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Moreover, it follows from my broadly Wolterstorffian take on justice and structural justice
that Black Americans have two different kinds of morally legitimate claims to race reparations,
as a product of the two different modes of injustice Black Americans have been individually and
collectively subjected to—instances of direct violence, and instances of concentrated and
structural disadvantage. To demonstrate that, I’ll add four statements to the end of that
argument:
13. Black rights-holders have (historically and currently) been made victims of
both direct violence and concentrated structural violence.253
14. Whether the violence committed is direct or structural, in at least some cases
compensation is due.
15. Whether the violence committed is direct or structural, the victim has a
legitimate claim to the cessation of the violence; in the case of structural
violence, this entails claims to structural reform, more equitable power
relations, and the dismantling of social relations that perpetuate structural
violence.
16. Therefore, in virtue of their ineradicable human worth, facts of the matter
about that which should be considered their life-goods, and facts of the
matter about their historical treatment, at least some Black rights-holders
have morally legitimate claims to compensation for past and present racial
injustices, and at least some Black rights-holders have morally legitimate
claims to structural reforms that ensure more equitable power relations, fairer
distributions of resources, cessations of racial inequities in education and in
the criminal justice system, etc.

communities, nations we have bombed, etc. Injustice and concentrated disadvantage, no matter the
group or individuals who are disadvantaged, will result in morally legitimate claims to reparations.
253
Note that I am using “violence” here in the expanded sense à la Galtung.
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I call both sets of claims—the set addressing compensation, and the set addressing structural
reform—“reparations,” because they are both reparative. Structural anti-Black racism precludes
compensation for past and present wrongs and any comprehensive clearing of debts because
structural anti-Black racism perpetuates violence and is itself violent (causes deficits of mental
and somatic realizations). The first kind of morally legitimate claim to reparations is a claim (or
set of claims) to direct compensation for direct or structural wrongs; the second kind of morally
legitimate claim to reparations amounts to a morally legitimate claim (or set of claims) to
structural reforms that would disrupt concentrated racial disadvantage, structural violence, and
those social arrangements that unfairly situate Black America.
I endorse Nozick’s characterization of compensation:
Something fully compensates a person for a loss if and only if it makes him no
worse off than he would otherwise have been; it compensates person X for
person’s Y’s action A if X is no worse off receiving it, if Y had not done A.254
Rights to reparations are generated by some wrong, and corrective justice in these cases will be
one-part punitive (when possible) and another part compensatory. When we speak of
reparations for wrongs in the distant past, like those wrongs associated with the transatlantic
slave trade, or the Jim Crow South,255 we should grant that present-day rights-holders cannot
accept or be rendered the punitive component of justice—the original wrongdoer is gone, and
the rights-holder who was originally wronged is gone. That is, no one today should go to jail for
some wrong that was committed by someone else in the past.
However, compensation can still be rendered and the compensation, if never paid to the
originally wronged, is owed. So there is a critical distinction here between responsibility for a
wrong and responsibility for a debt incurred. The payment of compensation is not punishment—
that debt is inherited, as is the legitimate claim to that debt; whoever owes the debt today
(assuming we are talking of an individual’s wrong, and not a nation’s or corporation’s wrong) is
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not guilty or blameworthy in any sense associated with the original wrong. We can treat
compensation owed to someone who has been wronged like property that can be inherited.256
And of course, when a rights-holder is wronged today, whether or not that wrong has to do with
race, similar legitimate claims to corrective justice obtain. 257 This is not to say that I am
committed to a view in which individual rights-holders must be the payees of legitimate moral
debts; we could just as easily imagine a federalized approach to compensation.
Bittker and Fullinwider both argue that much of the structural disadvantage that persists
today in the African American community, more than being a direct result of the original injustice
of slavery, is largely attributable to the failure of our national government to protect the liberties
of the formerly enslaved in the aftermath of the Civil War.258 Bittker goes so far as to claim that
Black communities would face no concentrated disadvantage today had the government acted
swiftly to countermand the racist policies of the post-War South and the racist policies of the Jim
Crow South. That is, had liberties been secured immediately, the playing field would have been
levelled. But secured liberties in the aftermath of grave injustices like chattel slavery is not
sufficient for compensation and after centuries of slavery the only thing that would have leveled
the playing field is direct compensation for centuries of stolen labor. I agree that more proactive
actions would have gone a long way toward allowing the African American community to begin
to build wealth and achieve economic and legal equity relative to their white peers, but
undoubtedly egregious wrongs like those of slavery itself or the Jim Crow South have to be
addressed, too.

Cf. Boxill, “Morality of Reparation” and Kershnar, “Descendants of Slaves.”
Worth exploring, although I will not do so here, is a consideration of the wrong that obtains in our
failure to make compensation for past wrongs—this wrong, too, is evaluable in the terms of justice, as it
constitutes a failure to meet our duties to resolve instances of avoidable deficits that have in their etiology
some wrong in the past (distant or recent). Not only do past wrongs need to be addressed, but the
persisting failure to address a past wrong is itself a wrong, and we can perhaps conceive of such
persisting failures in terms of compounding moral interest.
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It is not enough that the liberties of marginalized groups are secured after some
egregious wrong; the nature of the crimes committed against the Black American community
are such that massive debts are owed and compensation is due for the wrong itself, regardless
of the actions of the State to secure Black Americans’ liberties following the Civil War. Whether
or not Black Americans’ civil and bodily liberties were secured after the Civil War, centuries of
bondage had already amounted to real and inheritable damages. The debts incurred by
generations of human trafficking and abuse did not just evaporate with emancipation, and it is
not plausible to claim that emancipation and the civil liberties established after emancipation
amount to compensation. Had action been taken after the Civil War to fully compensate the
victims of slavery, such actions would have fulfilled Nozick’s notion of compensation and
reparations for those wrongs would not be needed. The problem with holding the view that
securing Black liberties after the war would have been sufficient for compensation is that it is not
at all clear that simply guaranteeing a former slave would be treated as fully and wholly a citizen
(after the slave was freed) would compensate that former slave for (potentially) decades of
forced bondage, torture, suffering, and stolen wages. Securing the former slave’s liberties would
have been a necessary condition of compensation, but it would not have been sufficient.
There will be two modes of the direct variety of race reparations for past wrongs: the first
mode pertains to cases of a wrong that was committed in the distant past and in which case
compensation was never paid and there is an outstanding debt, and the second mode pertains
to cases of a wrong that was committed in the distant past and in which both compensation was
never paid and it can be plausibly argued that the past wrong continues to directly harm present
day rights-holders. In the first case, we are painting a simple picture: cases in which there are
debts that were never repaid, and claims to those debts were simply inherited by subsequent
generations. In the second case, we are describing a more complicated picture, in which there
is a past wrong that was never corrected and a rights-holder who was never compensated, and
the past wrong either caused subsequent states of affairs in which new harms are dealt to
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present day rights-holders or the past wrong and the lack of compensation has accrued in the
form of persisting present day structural violence (like racialized generational poverty). In either
sort of case, the past wrong is remedied by compensation, and that compensation should be
considered a life-good to which some present-day rights-holder has a morally legitimate claim
(either because the claim and debt were simply inherited, or because the claim is generated by
present-day consequences of past wrongs, these consequences themselves being instances of
injustice).
The morally legitimate claim to structural reparations or structural reform is a product of
the preceding work on structural injustice and concentrated disadvantage. Sometimes, debts
are clearly owed by individual rights-holders in virtue of the wrongs they have committed. But
other times, wrongs are the product not of individual rights-holders but rather of social structure
and patterned social arrangements and institutions. In these cases, it will be the case that a
government, institution, or society of individuals owes some wronged individual compensation; it
will also be the case that the rights-holders who exist within social structures and social
arrangements have morally legitimate claims to existing in social structures in which they are
not systemically wronged or disadvantaged as a product of factors like race, geography, or
income level. Rights-holders who do exist in those inequitable or exploitative social relations
have legitimate claims to structural reform, to a resolution to their exploitation and lack of access
to social, political, cultural, or financial capital. This legitimate claim to reform might include
direct compensation for some structural injustice committed by a government or other entity, but
the focus here will be the structural reforms owed to rights-holders in light of past wrongs and
the unjust states of affairs that may persist today as a product of those past wrongs. Needed will
be just and equitable access to the various kinds of capital there are to be had in a society, just
and equitable distributions of resources and public goods, and just and equitable means of
political participation.
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When a rights-holder exists in a web of social relations that disadvantages them unjustly,
or when they are related to institutions and government in ways that withhold from them those
life-goods to which they have morally legitimate claim—in addition to any relevant compensation
the rights-holder is owed, they are owed a reformation of the unjust and exploitative social
relations that will perpetuate wrongs if not addressed. Rights-holders have legitimate claim to
existing in a web of normatively binding social relations that does not exploit them or withhold
from them their right merely as a product of the structure of that web and the way it
disadvantages individuals and communities according to factors like race or geography or
income; and that legitimate claim is constituted by various sets of claims to particular reforms,
according to their socio-moral context.
Elizabeth Anderson presents injustice in structural terms similar to Rubenstein’s, and
Rubenstein’s work and Anderson’s work run helpfully parallel. Anderson discusses what we
have been calling structural injustice in terms of concentrated disadvantage—the various
disadvantages that accrue to certain individuals or groups as a result of social situation, either
by design or as a product of some past wrong or some present neglect (willful or not).259
Anderson’s work focuses on a particular structural injustice: racial group inequity in America.
Anderson hones in on the structural causes of racial group inequity and she argues for a fuller
integration of racial groups, a sometimes-literal spatial rearrangement of our social relations to
one another and to social institutions. Anderson makes the case that racial segregation is the
underlying cause of racial group inequity due to the effect segregation has of establishing and
entrenching asymmetric power relationships in a society:
Segregation of social groups is a principal cause of group inequality. It isolates
disadvantaged groups from access to public and private resources, from sources
of human and cultural capital, and from the social networks that govern access to
jobs, business connections, and political influence. It depresses their ability to
accumulate wealth and gain access to credit. It reinforces stigmatizing
stereotypes about the disadvantaged and thus causes
discrimination…Segregation also undermines democracy. The democratic ideal
259
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seeks a culture and political institutions that realize society as a system of equal
citizens. Democratic political institutions should be equally responsive to the
interests and concerns of, and equally accountable to, all citizens. Segregation
impedes the realization of this ideal and these principles. It impedes the
formation of intergroup political coalitions, facilitates divisive political appeals,
and enables officeholders to make decisions that disadvantage segregated
communities without being accountable to them. It undermines the competence
of officeholders by limiting their knowledge of and responsiveness to the impacts
of their decisions on the interests of all.260
… the problem I propose to investigate is the persistence of large, systematic,
and seemingly intractable disadvantages that track lines of group identity, along
with troubling patterns of intergroup interaction that call into question our claim to
be a fully democratic society of equal citizens.261
Anderson argues that one of the primary causes of concentrated racial disadvantage is racial
segregation, as in many segregated environments the lines to cultural, social, political, and
financial capital are cut off to groups that are arbitrarily (but at least initially, intentionally)
relegated to disadvantageous social positions.262
Anderson’s relational theory of inequality is an account of the causes of group inequality.
It explores inequities across racial groups, and rather than locating the cause of the inequities in
some intrinsic feature of members of disadvantaged groups, it locates the cause of race-based
inequities in social relation. Anderson’s is a structural approach, though of course Anderson’s
account is not blind to the individuals who make up the social relations that are her priority:
This book concerns group inequality: modes of social organization whereby
bounded social groups are subject to systemic disadvantages in relation to
dominant groups. Large, stable, systematic social inequalities across the world
are tied to many kinds of group identities, as of race, gender, ethnicity,
religion…Charles Tilly has called these “durable inequalities.” I prefer to call them
“group” or “categorical” inequalities to stress their ties to paired social
categories…Max Weber argued that categorical inequality arises from social
closure. If a group has attained dominant control over an important good, such as
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This does not necessarily apply to those instances of segregation that are entered into willingly, such
as when members of cultures cloister together in certain parts of town. But we should note that even in at
least some of those cases, the willingly entered into segregation will have the negative deleterious effects
associated with other forms of segregation, in addition to whatever positive benefit the willing segregation
has conferred on the members of that community (cultural preservation, a sense of safety, or belonging,
for instance).
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land, military technology, education, or purported access to the holy or divine, it
often secures this advantage by closing its ranks to outsiders.263
The relational theory of inequality locates the causes of economic, political, and
symbolic group inequalities in the relations (processes of interaction) between
the groups, rather than in the internal characteristics of their members or in
cultural differences that exist independently of group interaction. It provides a
useful perspective for normative purposes because unequal relations among
people (that is, modes of social hierarchy), as manifested in their interactions, are
proper objects of direct normative assessment in a theory of justice. This
relational approach contrasts with views that take de facto inequalities in goods
as objects of direct normative assessment independent of the relations through
which they are produced or their effects on social relations.264
Anderson contends that it is relations—that is, patterns of interactions within the bounds of
systems, institutions, and social structure—which ought to be conceived of as either just or
unjust, rather than taking unequal distributions of goods (independent from social relation) to be
the object of evaluation.
Anderson claims that when a power relation between two groups becomes so
asymmetrical that one group can deprive another of certain goods, the concentrated
disadvantage (the poverty that accrues as a result of the structure of the social relation) can
amount to violations of rights:
Group inequalities arise when a group has acquired a dominant position with
respect to a critical good such as land or education and practices social closure
to prevent other groups from getting access to these goods, except on
subordinating terms. Social closure, or segregation, thus has two sides:
suppression of intergroup contact when such contact would cede equal access to
the good to outsiders, and promotion of intergroup contact when the advantaged
group can relate to outsiders as authorities to subordinates and thereby
manipulate the terms of intergroup cooperation to its advantage. A group’s
dominance over one good then extends to others by emulation, adaptation,
leverage, violence, and political control. Group inequality thus arises from the
relations or systematic interactions between social groups… Oppressive social
relations are unjust because they deprive members of the disadvantaged group
of their basic human rights.265
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Anderson argues for racial group integration, on grounds that the only way to create access to
social, cultural, political, and financial capital for disadvantaged groups is to create proximity for
those groups to those various forms of capital.266
Anderson’s work highlights how social relations can result in some individuals or
communities (but not others) having their right deprived them, their claims and worth
disrespected. Her account explains the ways social arrangements can yield violence. I have
argued that it is our normatively binding social relations, our socio-moral relations to others and
the normatively binding aspect of those relations that are evaluable in the terms of justice or
injustice. These social relations obtain between two individuals and they obtain between an
individual and broader social structures or institutions. Whether we speak of an individual
withholding from another individual that to which they have legitimate moral claim, or whether
we speak of an individual (or group) being socially situated in such a way that they are
systemically deprived power or life-goods, we should think of disadvantages and wrongs as
being violations of normatively binding social relations.
Concentrated disadvantage and structural injustice are instances of injustice, in my view,
for no other reason than that they are instances of human worth being disrespected and the
rights to certain life-goods (which supervene on that worth in tandem with objective facts of the
matter about that which is good for things like us) being violated. And it is important for my view
to have the resources needed to speak of injustice in such structural terms, because while much
of the disrespect for the worth of Black Americans that needs to be addressed is interpersonal,
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Probably, racial group integration is not the only way to create access to the various forms of capital
within these disadvantaged groups. But I agree with Anderson that integration is a very good way to do
so—and probably the best way. Other alternatives: external investments in racially homogenous
communities, massive public works in racially homogenous communities, sizable grants or even microloans to racially homogenous communities. It is probably false that racial group integration is the only way
to create access to capital; however, Anderson is probably right in the sense that that racial group
integration is the only way to eventually create equitable access to the various forms of capital that there
are. The challenge to Anderson, here, would be the observation: What good is mere integration if it does
not also come with a redistribution of resources, or a mechanism for giving previously disadvantaged
groups the means to determine resource allocation? Justice cannot be mere togetherness, after all; there
is also the matter of power.
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the rest of it is a systemic and institutionalized disrespect for the worth of Black Americans; and
just as interpersonal injustices demand procedural correction and reparations for damages, so,
too, do institutional and systemic injustices. I have tried to make it clear that direct injustices and
structural injustices are both instances of disrespect for human worth, that they are both
violations of the claims of rights-holders to proper treatment and certain life-goods, and that both
warrant (at least sometimes, and for the very same reasons) both procedural justice and
compensation for damages.
Anderson’s work here on the causes of group inequality provides us with one further way
of thinking structurally about the reparations that are owed to Black America. Given her work, I
offer that we should incorporate into our reparations model a set of morally legitimate claims to
racial group integration, claims to a resolution of the root cause of concentrated disadvantage
(targeted segregation). These claims to integration and the disruption of concentrated
disadvantage should be considered reparations in the broadest of senses—that of their being a
response to past and present wrongs. Anderson’s work is qualitatively different than some of the
others we have discussed, but with it we can hone in on at least one structural reform relevant
to our socio-moral context—that of integrating racial groups so as to create equity with regard to
access to capital. For very many, this integration should be considered a life-good to which they
have morally legitimate claim in light of past and present wrongs; and to the extent that
integration is a morally legitimate response to past and present racial wrongs, it should be
considered reparative.
Further structural reforms will be necessary, including policing reforms, education
reforms, and finance reforms; in as much as our present day institutions and policies
disadvantage some individuals and groups according to factors like race, the rights-holders
wronged by those social arrangements have legitimate claim to a cessation of those structural
wrongs (and to compensation). To withhold from those who are owed either variety of
reparations is to fail to respect them, to fail to show proper respect for their worth, and to violate
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the morally legitimate claims they have. Earlier, we saw Brophy’s characterization of reparations
as one-part backward looking and another-part forward looking. Failure to make these reforms
will only lead to further structural disadvantage and the need for further compensation down the
road. Structural anti-Black violence not only precludes compensation, it perpetuates
disadvantage and many of its manifestations are either themselves the result of past wrongs or
instances of new unacceptable violence.
We asked, “What are the requirements of justice with regard to Black Americans today,
in light of historical wrongs?” Direct compensation for particular (past and present) wrongs is
owed, and the reformation of those social arrangements which perpetuate concentrated and
structural disadvantage is owed. Until those requirements of justice are met, the status of Black
America will continue to be that of “wronged” and structural injustice will obtain. Until those
claims are met, our society will be characterizable neither as just nor as justly structured, both
because the violence caused by the persistence of these injustices is in its own right an
injustice, and because the deficits of mental and somatic realizations caused by the persistence
of these injustices are unacceptable in our 21st-century socio-moral context.
Policies like affirmative action, massive investments in public goods (like New Deal era
programs that brought electricity to the Mississippi River Delta), the Great Society initiatives that
reduced poverty rates, and universal basic income serve multiple purposes, but they are each
potentially structural attempts to address past wrongs or generate group equity. As cited above,
the data are clear that these policies have not yet amounted to full compensation and structural
justice, but I take it that in at least some socio-moral contexts rights-holders whose status is
historically and currently that of wronged have morally legitimate claim to such policies. Indeed,
such policies are necessary components of the kinds of structural reforms to which wronged
rights-holders have legitimate claim in light of the structural injustices committed against them.
But the problem with proceeding as if affirmative action, public goods investments, and
universal basic income can replace direct compensation for historical or present wrongs is that
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many of the wrongs visited upon the African American community incurred debts of massive
scale, often in the form of multiple generations of lost wealth. Just as these debts did not
evaporate with the emancipation of slaves, they do not evaporate with even aggressive
affirmative action policies, gratuitous investments in public goods, or universal basic income
(unless, of course, such things can be shown to have fully compensated individuals and
communities for the debt owed to them).
Affirmative action in the marketplace is a structural approach designed to make
historically marginalized groups better represented and more competitive in the marketplace,
but that a given board room is demographically more representative of the general population
than it was a century ago is no guarantee that a particular rights-holder whose ancestor was
egregiously wronged in the past, or who is currently structurally disadvantaged, has received
any measure of advantage or compensation today. Similarly, that a particular city benefits from
some massive investment in public education or parks services is no guarantee that the unjustly
incarcerated or the descendant of the unjustly incarcerated, for instance, will benefit or be paid
in full for that which was unjustly taken or withheld from them.
So, while I am supportive of public policies like affirmative action and investments in
public goods as ways to raise tides and ships, such policies are no guarantee that particular
wrongs will be addressed or that particular rights-holders will be compensated for egregious
wrongs in virtue of which they have legitimate claim to compensation or structural reform. And I
grant that, given the epistemic issues with specifying to whom what is owed, even my approach
of direct repayment for past wrongs will leave out some—as a product of our inability to locate
and quantify every wrong committed and the debt it incurred. But, we can address a great
number of them and should do so. Similarly, though they fail to address the wrongs committed
against very many individual rights-holders, we can exercise affirmative action policies and
investments in public goods as a way of equalizing access to future opportunity and hedging
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against racialized economic inequity. In an attempt to make things more structurally just, we
should do so.
Members of historically wronged communities may well have morally legitimate claims
against their State to these sorts of public policy approaches; but following the wrongs
committed against them or their ancestors, they also have morally legitimate claim to
compensation. And for all we should champion these public policy measures, if morally
legitimate claims to race reparations in the form of compensation are ignored to the extent that
the condition of compensation is not met, then we ignore the demands of justice. As such, we
are left with the view that in addition to structural reforms, a necessary component of making
race reparations will be robust redistributions of wealth that compensate individuals, families,
and communities for past and present-day wrongs. The practical implementation of such
compensation will come with political and epistemological difficulty, but that there are political
and epistemological difficulties is no argument against the claim that: What is owed to at least
some Black Americans in virtue of their ineradicable worth and the various ways they have been
disrespected throughout history is compensation and structural reform.
C. The Case Against Reparations
As I said at the end of Section A, there is a case against reparations, too. In that section,
I offered a very quick survey of prominent anti-reparations lines of thought, and here I will
address them in more detail. It should be noted that rather than being a principled refutation of
either the historical record or various principles of justice and fairness, the case against
reparations tends to be a political argument that appeals to the various difficulties associated
with making reparations.
The issue of reparations raises interesting philosophical puzzles regarding moral
indebtedness, the inheritability of claims and harm, and collective moral responsibility. It raises
further puzzles about the indebtedness of wrongdoers to the wronged and the transfer of moral
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accountability for those wrongs across time. Brophy summarizes the various arguments of the
opponent of race reparations into these broad categories:
1. That there have already been adequate reparations paid through the Civil War
and social welfare programs, like the Great Society,
2. That taxpayers should not have to pay, because they are innocent; that is, they
have no culpability for the actions of past legislators and private individuals, and
they have no benefit from the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow,
3. That compensation is impracticable or politically unworkable,
4. That reparations are divisive and focus attention of the Black community in the
wrong places,
5. That slavery is, on balance, a benefit to the descendants of the enslaved.267
We could well add to Brophy’s points the following three:
6. That some relevant statute of limitations has run out, or that over time some
claims may simply fade away; over long periods of time our epistemic footing
becomes less sure, and the diffusion of the descendants of wrong-doers and
victims across nations, religious groups, and ethnic groups makes the answering
of claims less reasonable
7. That it is impossible to identify an appropriate recipient for reparations268
8. That victims of racialized wrongs should just forgive wrongdoers and move on 269
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Brophy, Reparations, xvi.
In very many cases, it is possible to identify the appropriate recipients of reparations. We should
simply spend our political energy on those clear cases. But I grant that in some cases, it may well be
impossible to identify the appropriate recipient. Later on, I offer that we should err on the side of being
reasonably over-permissive with regard to who gets reparations—it is better, I take it, for some people
who are not strictly speaking owed to receive compensation than it is to allow some more exacting
standard or process to withhold life-goods from those who are legitimately owed. Against the overly
permissive model in general, and against racial affirmative action policies in college admissions in
particular, John McWhorter (McWhorter, “Affirming Disadvantage”) writes: “But only a small fraction of
today’s black and Latino students at selective universities grew up in anything like poverty, as we know
from endless reports of how grievously few poor people of any kind gain admission to selective schools.”
But this, in my view, is not so much an argument against such policies, so much as it is an argument for a
more aggressive application of such policies.
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I will not interact with Brophy’s (4) and (5), on grounds that the former is beside the point and
that the latter is absurd.270 But the foundation of a case against reparations for past wrongs is
two-fold: first, a rejection of the attributability of moral responsibility for some past or present
wrong to someone in the present who did not personally commit that wrong on grounds that
they are not possibly blameworthy, and second, a rejection of the inheritability of a claim to
reparations for some past wrong on grounds that present day rights-holders did not themselves
experience that particular injustice.
I reject (6) in principle, on grounds that in my Wolterstorffian view, there is no statute of
limitations on human worth or the morally legitimate claims to life-goods and compensation that
supervene on human worth; further, there are potentially very many instances of reparations
owed from the recent past, and talk of expired statutes of limitations in these cases would not be
sensible. Too, there is no principled reason to believe a morally significant debt incurred in the
relatively recent past has simply evaporated with time; after all, the operative “compensation”
concept involves the correction of some past wrong. I am certainly willing to accommodate
statutes of limitations with regard to the punitive component of justice in cases of past racial
wrongs, on grounds that in very many cases the wrong-doer is long-dead and cannot be
punished—but when it comes to compensation, punishment is beside the point.
There is an important sense, however, in which the passage of time does make the
meting out of reparations difficult, if not impossible; in some such extreme cases, the
expectation that reparations be paid would strain plausibility. Take some wrong that was
committed in the very distant past—say, thousands of years ago. And let’s say that this wrong
Clifford Angel Bates, Jr., (Bates, “Grievance and Forgiveness”) argues that forgiveness is appropriate
because racial harm in America has ceased. In this paper, I have illustrated clearly why we should think
that racial harm has not ceased. And even if it had ceased, debts would persist for past wrongs.
270
That reparations talk is politically divisive is certain, but that does not say anything about what Black
Americans may be objectively owed. That descendants of the enslaved are better off for the institution of
slavery is absurd, because many Black Americans are in verifiably unjust situations and because racial
disparities that have their roots in racist policies and institutions are well-documented. Not to say anything
of how the “slavery was, on balance, a good” analysis ignores the grave injustices of slavery itself and the
grave injustices that followed in the Jim Crow era.
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was just discovered in an archaeological excavation last week, the wrong-doer and victim
clearly and unambiguously identified. At this point, the wrong-doer has potentially hundreds of
thousands of descendants and the victim has potentially hundreds of thousands of
descendants. So, one might ask: are reparations really owed in this case? I say: probably not.
For one, the familial and DNA relations to the original wrong-doer and victim exist, but only in
nearly negligible (genetic or biological) terms and most of the descendants probably will never
know about their relation to either the wrong-doer or the victim, much less feel some affinity for
them or intimacy with regard to them. Too, with the passage of time the descendants of victims
and wrong-doers are scattered across various nations, religious sects, and ethnic groups. It
would simply be impossible to identify everybody who is owed and everybody who owes a debt
of compensation. So in a case like this, it is not as if the international community could pressure,
say, one well-defined nation or religious community to pay a debt of compensation to some
other well-defined nation or religious community; the passage of time blurs these simple
categories and makes the payment of reparations by one group to another implausible.
The long passage of time can also erase (or simply lose track of) the negative effects of
past wrongs, while compounding negative effects that have nothing to do with the wrong in
question; alternatively, the long passage of time could potentially serve as an opportunity and
well-being equalizer, perhaps negating particular claims. Statutes of limitations are in place in
contemporary law, largely due to the epistemic difficulties that come with the passage of time—
witnesses die, memories fade, and documents are lost, and procedural justice relies on good
testimony and accurate records for its integrity. These problems would only be multiplied in the
case of arbitrating a wrong from thousands of years ago. But we should note here that American
history and American anti-Black racism are not subject to these historical difficulties—in very
many cases, it is relatively clear who was wronged, who did the wronging, who is presently
disadvantaged because of the wronging, and who is owed (and who owes) the debt of
compensation or reform. That we cannot reasonably expect some wrongs in the very distant
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past to be compensated for is no reason to think that more recent wrongs should not be. Put
simply, the wrongs associated with American racism are hardly the distant past. American antiBlack racism populates the recent past, and the present.
I reject (7) on grounds that in at least very many cases, the proper recipient of
reparations can be identified and if we are presented with cases in which the recipient of
reparations is underdetermined or unknowable, we should simply want to focus on those cases
in which the recipient of reparations is knowable.
And I reject (8) on grounds that, although forgiveness is a necessary feature of the
reconciliation process and of healthy political community in general, it is a torturing of our
“forgiveness” concepts to use the expectation of forgiveness to justify the canceling of every
debt owed for identifiable racialized wrongs and to perpetuate both tangible disadvantage and
the need for compensation. We should want for there to be forgiveness, and to some extent
forgiveness for moral guilt should be expected, but forgiveness need not preclude either
compensation or structural reforms. Indeed, forgiveness may only serve to perpetuate racial
wrongs, if by “forgiveness” we mean the relinquishing of responsibility for the correction of laws,
systems, and institutions that reliably and predictably wrong members of some racial groups but
not others. Certainly, someone who was wronged may forgive the inheritor of the debt that is
owed of that debt; in such a case, the debt would be absolved. Alternatively, someone who was
wronged may forgive someone in the sense that they wish to absolve the wrongdoer of feelings
of moral guilt or shame, yet still expect the compensation to be repaid. But the wronged do not
owe forgiveness of either sort to the wrongdoer (though they may owe it to themselves or to
God to forgive the wrongdoer in either of the two above ways) and if compensation is owed for
some past wrong then that debt should be paid. Forgiveness is a virtue of sorts, but it should not
be used as a blunt weapon against the wronged, negating their claims to reparations. Doing so
would only serve to perpetuate a variety of injustices.
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Brophy hints that opposition to reparations talk may be rooted in political, racial, or
national identity, or at least in how one identifies culturally:
As reparations talk has grown, so has opposition to reparations. Arguments for
reparations for slavery and its claims for an accounting of past injustice, for
apologies and truth commissions, for reconciliation of decades-old debts and
forward-looking relief, and for group-based relief represent yet another front on
what has been called the “culture wars” of the 1990s and 2000s. The case for
reparations rests on how the past is viewed and what one believes should be
done about it.271
Writer David Horowitz is a fitting example of Brophy’s point. Horowitz does not argue against
reparations so much as he presents his own list of “reasons” why reparations for slavery “are a
bad idea and racist, too”:
1. There is no single group clearly responsible for the crime of slavery
2. There is no one group that benefited exclusively from its fruits
3. Only a tiny minority of white Americans ever owned slaves, and others gave their
lives to free them
4. America today Is a multi-ethnic nation and most Americans have no connection
(direct or indirect) to slavery
5. The historical precedents used to justify the reparations claim do not apply, and
the claim itself is based on race not injury
6. The reparations argument is based on the unfounded claim that all AfricanAmerican descendants of slaves suffer from the economic consequences of slavery
and discrimination
7. The reparations claim is one more attempt to turn African-Americans into victims.
It sends a damaging message to the African-American community.
8. Reparations to African-Americans have already been paid
9. What about the debt Blacks owe to America?
10. The reparations claim is a separatist idea that sets African-Americans against the
nation that gave them freedom272
Not all of these “reasons” warrant serious interaction. Horowitz’s (1) and (2) are beside the
point—that there are difficulties with identifying wrongdoers is no reason to think Black
Americans are not owed reparations, and that multiple groups benefitted from human slavery is
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no reason to think Black Americans are not owed reparations. Item (3) is similarly beside the
point—that many white Americans were innocent in terms of whether or not they owned slaves
is not reason to think Black Americans are not owed reparations by some person or entity.
Number (5) is clearly false—today’s arguments for reparations to the descendants of
either human slavery or Jim Crow injustices are based on past and present injury. Point (6) is
beside the point—that some Black Americans are affluent is no reason to think that other Black
Americans (or these affluent Black Americans themselves) are not owed reparations. Items (7),
(9), and (10) are baseless, border on gas-lighting, and are not reasons to believe that those who
were or are wronged are not currently owed reparations.
That leaves Horowitz’s (4) and (8) as requiring some answer. Regarding (4), we can ask:
is there reason to believe that an American who can plausibly deny culpability in the evils of
human slavery or Jim Crow injustices is, then, released from the burden to pay reparations to
those to whom reparations are owed; and if there is, is there, then, no debt? And regarding (8),
we can ask: is there reason to believe that reparations to Black Americans have already been
paid in full? I’ll start with the latter question: a quick look at the racialized economic, health, and
education disparities indicates that compensation for past and present racial injustices has not
yet been meted out. If the claim is that compensation has been made, and that Black Americans
are disadvantaged regardless, we should ask the person who argues against reparations: are
Black Americans, then, somehow inadequate to the task of succeeding in America?273 The
answer to that question is “no”: there are real barriers in place that have never been sufficiently
torn down. Horowitz provides some elaboration to his point (4):

Brophy mentions “arguments” that Black fatherlessness and drug usage are responsible for these vast
racial disparities; see Brophy, Reparations. Kendi (2016) and Anderson address these sorts of
arguments, and I agree with Kendi and Anderson; see Kendi, Stamped, and Anderson, Imperative of
Integration. It is vastly more plausible that these vast racial disparities are the consequence of racist
institutions that systematically disadvantage some groups and advantage others, than that they are the
consequence of some defect in Black Americans or Black American culture. Kendi characterizes the
arguments from Black fatherlessness and drug use as being racist, and I agree with Kendi on that, too.
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The two great waves of American immigration occurred after 1880 and then after
1960. What rationale would require Vietnamese boat people, Russian refuseniks,
Iranian refugees, and Armenian victims of the Turkish persecution, Jews,
Mexicans, Greeks, or Polish, Hungarian, Cambodian and Korean victims of
Communism, to pay reparations to American blacks?274
And Brophy provides the reparationist’s response to the idea that some American individual,
entity, corporation, or government may be absolved of moral responsibility in that way:
But American law has worked out the general principle that taxpayers are liable
for the acts of government officials acting under color of law. And corporations—
which are really a collection of individual shareholders—are liable for the acts of
their employees. In cases of environmental pollution, companies (meaning their
shareholders) are frequently held liable for decades following the pollution…. So,
it is reasonable—in fact, corporate liability is premised on the idea—that
shareholders, even those who had no direct influence on the decisions, have to
pay. In the United States, culpability attaches even without fault in many
instances. It is natural to expect that corporations—or government bodies—will
have liability for the decisions they made, sometimes decades ago.275
Reparationists have two responses. First, governmental bodies, like
corporations, have a continuing existence. Governments are liable for the
judgments issued against them—and, unfortunately, they have to satisfy those
judgments with taxpayer money. New immigrants take their new government
subject to the liability existing at the time. We all take America with the good and
the bad at the same time. There are a lot of opportunities here; so there are
some disadvantages. Reparationists’ second response is more general. It
denies that the people who are claiming innocence actually are innocent. As
Professor Ogletree has recently phrased it, “while black folks were sitting at the
back of the bus, generations of white immigrants go straight to the front.”276
Against reparations, George Sher has argued that there is no way for us to know that
there really is a direct causal chain from a past wrong (like slavery) to the present injustices
experienced by marginalized groups.277 Sher rejects, then, that particular present wrongs can be
justifiably thought to have their etiology in some particular distant past wrong (that is, in a
particular past wrong committed by a particular individual), and Sher rejects the attributability of
present-day responsibility for reparations for that past wrong on those grounds. The line of
thinking is that the causal connections between past wrongs and present states of affairs are
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unknowable, at worst, and underdetermined, at best. Here, Sher is arguing from our
epistemological standpoint to the position that we cannot be justified in believing that a
particular present-day injustice or racial disparity was ultimately caused by a particular past
wrong, and finally to the position that we cannot, then, reliably attribute present-day
responsibility for making reparations for those past wrongs. I think Sher is right about many
cases—in very many cases, we cannot trace those causal chains all the way back to the original
injustice, because we are so epistemologically limited. But in other cases, Sher is wrong.
Certainly, we can trace moral responsibility and economic disadvantage across history—in very
many cases it can be known, indeed, who the descendants are of which former slaves and
which slavers. Too, it can be known which nation or state or corporation sponsored the slave
trade, or implemented red-lining policies, or withheld access to the ballot box, and that
knowledge is sufficient for conceiving of particular debts being owed to particular rights-holders
by particular nations, states, or corporations.
Note that an inability to trace an unbroken causal chain from some past wrong to some
unjust present state of affairs does not preclude reparations, writ large; if it precludes anything
at all, it precludes our inability to determine that a particular individual today is accountable for
paying another particular individual a direct compensatory payment. But there are very many
other forms that reparations could take, and our epistemological limitations do not change the
fact that the victim of injustice is owed. Were Sher right and were it the case that we cannot
reliably attribute moral responsibility to somebody in the present for past wrongs and
reparations for those wrongs, it would not follow from that that reparations are not owed. I have
not argued, and the reparationist does not argue, that individuals exclusively are the agents of
race reparations; indeed, in the literature surrounding affirmative action policies, legal reforms,
and direct compensation to those who have legitimate claim to direct compensation, the State or
the corporation are also agents in the rendering of reparations. And we certainly know which
State committed American race crimes and benefitted from them, which State legally sanctioned
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slavery, and which State legally kept Black Americans from the vote, from home ownership,
from access to credit and capital, and so on.
The epistemological worries associated with the matter of reparations make the meting
out of reparations difficult—it is a matter of fact that we are epistemologically limited and ought
to approach the matter with a measure of intellectual humility. It is to be noted that, surely, there
are very many wrongs that we can never know about, and that fact will render us incapable of
making reparations for at least some wrongs that there were or are. And it is noted that the
project of pricing out debts that are owed for past wrongs (and present wrongs) that we do know
about will be difficult, as will be the projects of determining who exactly is owed what amount
and for which particular wrongs. It may well also be the case that once the historians,
economists, ethicists, sociologists, and mathematicians have run the numbers on what is owed
and to whom, the project of making reparations will be characterizable as unaffordable. Be that
as it may, that a particular past or present wrong may well be unknowable, that making race
reparations is politically and practically difficult, or that direct compensation for past and present
wrongs may not fit into the federal government’s budget or into the budget of individuals who
have inherited another’s debt, is no good reason to reject that Black America is owed for past
wrongs. Even if the amount owed is astronomical, rather than throwing up our hands and
imagining ourselves to be in a socio-moral context in which Black Americans are not actually
owed because the American government or taxpayers cannot cover the check, we could
conceive of some model of reparations according to which the bill is paid in installments over
very many years. After all, the debt as it stands was accumulated in installments over very many
years. The moral burden of compensation and reparation is not necessarily that the debt be
paid in full all at once; but the debt needs to be paid.
These epistemological and practical difficulties can be resolved the same way we
resolve any problem that comes with epistemological and practical difficulty: rigorous research
and historical scholarship and meticulous accounting. Indeed, this is Coates’s ultimate call to
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action: an appeal to dedicated research and investigation.278 In his case for reparations, Coates
observes that in every Congressional session since 1989, the late Representative Conyers
introduced legislation to create a commission on the study of reparations for slavery and
segregation. Such a commission could potentially bring these epistemological, pragmatic, and
political worries to resolution, and at the very least it would elevate the scholarship that has
been done regarding the historical problem. In his article, Coates takes this to be a reasonable
starting place. Coates does not call for the debt to be paid in full all at once—he only asks for
this meaningful starting point.
For the sake of clarity, I will give further attention to the important practical matter of
determining who, exactly, should be considered to be owed reparations. As I have said,
answering this question comes with epistemological barriers. I should say this, first: the
pragmatics of meting out reparations will be characterized by, and will constitute, a necessarily
political process. We should, of course, want this process to be informed by principle; but the
process will be a matter of laws, legal procedures, and imperfect humans judging particular
cases and making decisions with limited resources. So, let us begin answering the question
Who exactly is owed? by offering simple principles that should be widely acceptable:
i.

the reparations process, and judgments about who is owed what, should be fair
and impartial,

ii. claimants to particular reparations (reparations that are made in addition to
broader policy approaches aimed at compensating large numbers of people at
once) can be fairly expected to provide some reasonable justification for their
claim, and
iii. states and corporations that know or are presented with their historical liability
should engage in the reparations process in good faith and should not wait on

278

Coates, “Case for Reparations.”

208

individual claimants to make their claims before initiating compensation for past
and present wrongs and any subsequent disadvantage.
I appeal to the reader’s fundamental intuitions about fairness and reasonability: that any legal
process should be fair and that for there to be a fair outcome in any dispute reasonability is
required from both parties to the dispute. And I acknowledge that those words come with
problems, too—What constitutes a reasonably justified claim?, for instance, and What
constitutes a fair process? Since this will be a necessarily political process, I offer that those
questions ought to be decided in detail by lawmakers, the commissions of historians and legal
experts they form, and impartial monitors of any actualized reparations process.
In my view there will be three varieties of claimants to reparations:
i.

those who were recently directly or structurally wronged

ii. those who can be determined to be the inheritors of claims to particular
compensatory debts owed to long-dead individuals (who were wronged by either
some other long-dead person or some long-gone institution)
iii. living people who were wronged in the distant past either by people (living, or
not) or some institution or structural arrangement (still existing or reformed, or
not)
So we have as potential claimants to reparations individuals who are wronged today (either
directly or as a product of concentrated disadvantage), the descendants of those wronged in the
past, and those still living who were wronged at some point in the past. Each has morally
legitimate claim to reparations, and would make those claims, corresponding to the sort of
wrong associated with their disadvantage—one claim might be in response to some direct hate
crime, for instance, and another claim might be in response to a rights-holder’s lack of access to
credit, and still another claim might include a historical case to compensation for land or
opportunity (as in, slavery) that was stolen from the rights-holder’s ancestor. To the extent that a
rights-holder has been wronged, and to the extent that a debt of compensation is owed or to the
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extent that access to opportunity can be equalized, claims to such compensation or equal future
opportunities can hardly be termed unreasonable. States and nations should be conceived of as
responsible for implementing policies and reforming laws, such that contemporary structural
racial disadvantages (for instance, racist red-lining in mortgage lending) are corrected and
compensated for. And it will be up to lawmakers or other impartial officials to work out the legal
mechanisms by which reparations can be made to individuals or communities who bring their
claims to racial reparations; remedy and compensation for damages is already a feature of the
American justice system, and it does not strain plausibility at all to imagine that such a process
could be initiated and applied to the race reparations context.
So, who is the proper recipient of reparations? My Wolterstorffian answer: any person
who is owed reparations, in the form of either direct compensation or structural reform. By that, I
do not mean to offer a tautology—rather, I mean just that teasing out the details of Who is
owed? is a matter of determining whose worth was disrespected tantamount to the generation
of new morally legitimate claims to the life-goods of compensation or reform. This answer
purposefully creates a very large set of individuals who are owed race reparations, and surely
some of the members of the very large set would surprise those who have argued in the
aforementioned ways against reparations. This set would include those who were recently
wronged, those who descend from someone who was wronged in the distant past, and those
who are still living but were wronged in the distant past. Teasing out the details of particular
cases and claims will be inherently political—a matter of process, law, and procedure. In the
case of American anti-Black racism and reparations for injustices like the trans-Atlantic slave
trade and domestic human chattel slavery, systems would need to be established for the
processing of claims to compensation for those debts owed. It would be a set of human
processes, including expert deliberation over historical documents, genealogies, and claims to
compensation for either particular past wrongs or generalized structural violence.
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There are roughly three different sorts of race reparations programs that are relevant in
the context of addressing American anti-Black racism:
i.

Compensation for the loss of wages, land, freedom, and life associated with the
international slave trade and domestic human slavery. This compensation should
be paid either directly to victims or descendants of victims, or to proxy institutions
or organizations in cases where the proper recipient cannot be known.

ii. Reparations owed for the institutionalized and systemic mistreatment of Black
Americans and more recently immigrated Black community members, as in Jim
Crow laws, voter suppression, redlining, police brutality, and so on. These
reparations are paid either in the form of structural reforms or resource
reallocations to proxy entities, to be conceived of as owed both to the Black
community as a whole and to the individuals who comprise that community.
iii. “Atonement” models of reparations. Atonement is paid to proxy entities in cases
where epistemic, genealogical, or historiographical difficulties make it impossible
to determine who, exactly, is owed what, but it is clear there remains a debt
owed. This also serves the function of providing a space for reconciliation, and it
provides the ability for an agent today to unencumber themselves of the sins of
their ancestors.

So, the story is not simple. The various types of wrongs that there are warrant conceiving of the
reparations project as being a multifaceted, cross-cutting project. There is no simple way of
making amends that can handle all the various types of debts that there are and the various
epistemic or historical complexities that come with some of those debts.
To show why the various sorts of reparations programs are needed, let’s carefully
restrict answering Who is owed? to the domain of American anti-Black racism and the particular
evil of slavery. The skeptic may ask of the reparationist in this restricted domain: Will race
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reparations include every Black person in America, or just the descendants of the enslaved?
What about the descendants of the enslaved who are now white or identify as white, and what
of the inheritors of debts who are quite affluent even despite the wrongs committed against their
ancestors (or against them in the near-past)? Again, my Wolterstorffian answer: the proper
recipient of reparations is any person who is actually owed a debt of compensation or structural
reform in light of the past wrong of human chattel slavery, the disrespect for human worth
associated with human chattel slavery. So, yes, the descendants of the formerly enslaved are
owed compensation for stolen life and stolen labor; and to the extent that someone who is
affluent today is owed a debt for the wrongs committed against their enslaved ancestor, then
they, too, are owed reparations even despite their affluence. And to the extent that someone
today who identifies as white is owed a debt for some wrong committed against their enslaved
ancestor, then they, too, are owed reparations even despite their lack of identity with the Black
community or despite their not being victim to contemporary anti-Black racism. The debts of
compensation associated with human slavery and Jim Crow-style institutional racism should be
conceived of as fixed things, indexed to some particular wrong or theft in the past. Some
individual’s affluence today, or their identity as white, erases neither the original theft nor the
debt of compensation owed because of it. And neither does one’s conviction that the
compensation is unfair (in the case of the white descendent) or unnecessary (in the case of the
affluent descendent) undo the past injustice or the claims to compensation that result from it.
For centuries in the American context, intermarriage between races was very rare, and
altogether illegal in some states at some times. One consequence of this is that the Black
community persisted with a relatively cohesive social identity. This has changed relatively
recently, with far greater rates of marriage between members of different ethnic groups and
rising rates of multi-racial identification. But still, the isolation of ethnic groups in the American
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social context has made identifying who is owed compensation or reform for anti-Black racism a
relatively easy task.279
We have three options when it comes to acknowledging the epistemic difficulties that
come with making judgments about which individuals and which communities are owed for past
and present racial wrongs: we can be purists with regard to only rendering reparations to those
individuals whose claims can be explicitly verified, we can throw up our hands and not mete out
reparations at all in the cases where the set of people who are owed is underdetermined, or we
can be reasonably over-permissive with our approach to reparations. I recommend this last
option; we should make good-faith efforts at rendering reparations with the understanding in
place that it is likely that at least one person will receive a measure of compensation that was
not, strictly speaking, owed to them. Just as with any endeavor undertaken by our political
community, the reparations process will necessarily be an imperfect political process.
Clearly, talking in particular of What is owed to whom? in the context of American human
slavery and its legacies will require a careful combing of American history and a case-by-case
deliberation of claims to compensation for past racialized direct and structural violence. Just
above, I mentioned that a contemporary rights-holder’s identifying as white or their affluence
should not be taken to cancel debts owed for labor and life that were stolen in the past. But
there are further questions: Is every Black person in America today owed for the wrongs
associated with human slavery? What of those who only recently immigrated? Or what of an
African American who did not recently immigrate, but who cannot verify a claim to some
particular past wrong associated with human slavery? The answer to those questions is surely
“no.” But note that answering those questions with “no” does not preclude that these individuals

Professor Jacob Adler, in a discussion of this paper, observed that racists operated with a “one drop”
rule, according to which you were Black and therefore to be subject to horrific treatment if you had just
one drop of “Black” blood. This is a potentially useful standard in determining who is owed for past and
present racial wrongs—if the political systems and institutions that disadvantaged Black Americans
operated by the “one drop” rule, then the political systems and institutions that render reparations for
those past wrongs can just as easily use that standard.
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may well be owed compensation or reform for some instance of direct or structural racism that
obtains today or that obtained in the recent past. Are all Black people in America owed
reparations for the wrongs associated with human slavery? and Are all Black people in America
owed reparations? are two different questions with appropriately different answers. There are
matters of fact, historical facts, that justify claims to compensation for the evils associated with
slavery and, similarly, there are matters of fact from more recent history that surely justify other
claims to compensation or reform.
To illustrate the need for proxy group reparations and atonement reparations, we should
consider what it means to be the inheritor of a claim to compensation. Take the example of
someone who was enslaved for the duration of their life, but who did not have children. What of
the stolen life and labor in that case—is anyone legitimately owed compensation for it? The
compensation cannot be paid to the individual who was wronged or to a particular individual
who inherited their claim to compensation—so can it be anyone’s duty to pay it? In my view, this
case illustrates well an argument for a form of group reparations. Had the individual who was
wronged not been so grievously wronged, potentially they would have had a family, a career,
participated in civic life, and so forth. Although the compensation cannot be thought to be due to
any particular individual, it can still be conceived of as being due. And I offer here that this
variety of debt of compensation could be paid in the form of investment in entities like Blackowned businesses, investment in predominantly Black institutions like historically Black colleges
and universities, or investment in educational and career opportunities for young Black people.
These are just examples—ways of conceiving of the massive debts owed to the Black
community, in general, in lieu of the possibility of attributing to a particular Black person or
family a morally legitimate claim to a particular repayment. In the case of paying compensation
for slavery to individuals, we are talking of literal back-pay for stolen labor and life; in the case of
paying compensation for slavery to community organizations like schools or businesses, we are
talking of what is potentially a form of group back-pay.
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We can conceive of at least some debts of compensation—in particular, those that do
not fall to a present-day descendant of someone who was wronged in the past—as being
legitimately paid out in ways that help to mitigate the sorts of group inequities and structural
racial injustices that obtain today. This group back-pay approach is also potentially helpful in our
consideration of cases where genealogies and lineages might be impossible to discern—what
do we do, for instance, in a case where a perpetrator’s and a victim’s lineages cross, or when it
is simply impossible to determine who is the inheritor of a past debt or claim (even when we
have exhaustive genealogical information)?
One way to make compensation in cases such as these in the context of American
slavery and anti-Black racism includes making payments to entities like HBCUs, communitybuilding organizations in predominantly Black neighborhoods, and so on. Whether the difficulty
in identifying an individual as the proper payee or recipient is epistemic or genealogical or
historiographical, we can know that there were grave wrongs committed intentionally against
Black people, that these wrongs left a legacy of racialized disadvantage, and that paying
compensation to certain schools, businesses, or non-profits would help to alleviate the inequity
that obtains today. Payment of compensation to these entities in furtherance of making
compensation at all is more than symbolic—we can conceive of it as a sort of surrogate
reparations or proxy reparations.280
Such a model of making compensation also accommodates for atonement. Especially
where there is epistemic or historiographical difficulty in identifying which person should be
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Indeed, in the wake of the Holocaust, the German government makes regular reparations to the state
of Israel, given the identification of many of the world’s Jews with the state of Israel. This does not replace
compensation to individual victims or to their descendants, but it does help to correct for many of the
cases of compensation owed that are unknowable. Nearly 20% of Israelis are non-Jewish. And most
Israeli Jews are from nations not directly affected by the Holocaust. Still, most of us would say that such
payments to Israel continue to be warranted. This is a product of aforementioned difficulties: both the
passage of time and the diaspora of individuals across nations and different cultural groups make a
precise payment of reparations impossible. But, surely, such difficulties should not preclude the payment
of reparations at all. Rendering reparations in this type of way may be imprecise, but rendering
reparations imprecisely is certainly more just than failing to render reparations at all. See Rising,
“Holocaust survivors” and Timsit, “Blueprint.”
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compensated for which wrong, the prolonged desire to make amends can go on without closure.
Providing the ability to make amends even given the epistemic difficulties that arise provides
both some measure of compensation and some degree of reconciliation between the wrongdoer and the victim and their descendants. Of course, none of these approaches to American
race relations should be thought to replace the simple form of reparations that takes into
consideration the enslavement of a particular Black person and the debt of compensation that is
owed to their descendants.
So, independent of whatever legal process can be established for answering claims to
compensation for the particular past wrong of slavery, we can conceive of approaches to
reparations that cast a wider net than just the arbitration of particular claims that arise from
particular past injustices—reparations that are owed to the community as a whole, or to every
individual in the community, in light of disadvantages that obtain as a product of the wrongs or
policies that were implemented with the intention to disadvantage the entire community. Earlier
in this paper, we discussed policy approaches like affirmative action, which are aimed at forging
more representative distributions of power in the market, in classrooms, and in access to
opportunity. Anderson argues that integration is the most appropriate response to contemporary
racial inequity—the disruption of concentrated disadvantage and the creation of greater access
to all forms of capital for those who are currently cut out.281 I have just mentioned a “group backpay” approach, in which debts for past wrongs could be paid via investment in Black community
organizations, Black enterprise, and education and work opportunities for young Black people.
History provides the example of Germany’s reparations payments to the nation of Israel and
various charitable organizations, as a sort of proxy compensation.282
And I suggest one final mode of reparations: that of a universal basic income for
members of economically disadvantaged communities. As covered, poverty in our socio-moral
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is racialized, and concentrated disadvantage falls along racial lines. In the case of American
human slavery and its various legacies, one simple and precedented (albeit politically
hazardous) way to create greater group equity (or pay out compensation for past wrongs) is to
simply send money regularly to individuals, neighborhoods, or racial group members whose
disadvantage can reasonably be thought to be the product of those particular injustices. The
goal for such payments should be opportunity equalization and the creation of equity with regard
to the distribution of financial capital across different racial groups.
I provide the above list by way of expressing further that the American race reparations
(broadly speaking) project is a manifold project, and in my view necessarily so. It is a project
that takes into account the full variety of debts of compensation owed to individuals by other
individuals, by institutions, and by the state, and it is a project that takes into account the variety
of group inequities that have as their etiology some form of structural anti-Black racism. The
different sorts of wrongs that there are and the variety of debts owed justify different modes of
compensation and reform. The reader simply should not expect for there to be a silver bullet,
and the skeptic of reparations should not demand some single approach to this vast array of
past wrongs that can sufficiently address every debt owed or every structural injustice that
obtains today. Mere compensation does not answer the morally legitimate claims to police
reform that arise from instances of police brutality, for instance; and similarly, affirmative action
policies do not answer the morally legitimate claim to compensation for decades of stolen life or
labor.
D. Human Worth & Explanatory Fit
An account of justice that begins with human worth was initially attractive to me for
several reasons. First, it offered a simple way to account for the moral considerability of every
human being—after all, it is relatively uncontroversial that human beings are morally
considerable (though, the various rationales behind that claim are far from being
uncontroversial). And as the reader has seen, the task then becomes that of accounting for the
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moral considerability of each human, either in a property or capacity an individual has or in
some moral entity that supervenes on or is grounded in some property of that individual (like the
supervenience of worth on humanity, or on other properties). As we have seen, other authors
point to human capacities in accounting for human worth, but I agree with Wolterstorff’s
conclusions that no capacities-account of human worth is immune to counterexamples;
inevitably, some rights-holder could be found who lacks the capacity on offer. Wolterstorff and
other theists point to the special relation of God to God’s human creatures. In my work, I have
taken the position that human worth supervenes on humanity—so every human has human
worth ineradicably, and no non-human has human worth at all, though they may well have some
other variety of value.
An account of justice that begins with human worth also does a good job of explaining
what has gone wrong in any given instance of racism, direct or structural. It explains the
intuitions we have of wrongness upon hearing that some individual has been mistreated
because of some morally insignificant fact about them, like their skin color. Racism is wrong or
immoral, because it is an instance of a thing of a certain kind being treated in ways that are
inappropriate as determined by the kind of thing it is and the respect it is owed. Things and
beings that are valuable are due certain kinds of treatment, and it is jarring when morally
considerable objects or persons are treated as common, even when there are no explicit rules
regarding the treatment of those valuable things. The question Why is racism objectively wrong
and why is it an injustice?, even in societies in which racism is legal or normalized, can be
answered by appeal to the human worth of the victim of racism and the duties that worth
generates regarding their treatment.
I have offered that worth supervenes on humanity and I have gone a step further to offer
that human rights then supervene on human worth together with facts about our interests (in
individuated socio-moral contexts). Starting with human worth allows us to talk sensibly about
the normative force of human rights. There is a normative shortfall when one appeals to strictly
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physical facts about humans in order to explain human moral significance, and including worth
as a moral property of ours helps to close that normative gap. That an individual is a human or
has that property or set of properties constitutive of humanity may be conceivable as being a
reason for treating an individual in some ways but not others, but only after we have already
decided those ways humans ought and ought not to be treated. Needed is an appropriate moral
starting point—some moral property like human worth, or else some moral law or binding set of
principles—and I have chosen worth as that explaining entity. 283
Once it is granted that human rights obtain and that they are relevantly connected to our
human worth, and once it is granted that worth lends to the things that have it a normative
dimension, we can talk sensibly about those rights dictating the actually normatively forceful
rules regarding how we ought to treat other rights-holders and how we ourselves ought to be
treated. One might ask, “You have just claimed that deriving normative forcefulness from strictly
physical facts is ultimately unsuccessful, so how is positing a supervenience relation of worth on
strictly physical facts like humanity in order to account for normative forcefulness not also
ultimately unsuccessful?” The difference is in my introducing non-natural human worth to
account for the normative force of rights—instead of accounting for the moral significance of
humans and their rights by appeal to strictly physical facts or capacities, I have accounted for
the normative force of rights by appeal to a non-natural moral property, human worth. The moral
worth that belongs to humanity gets us a normative starting point; and I take it to be relatively
uncontroversial that humans are, in fact, relevantly valuable. Human worth gives human rightsholders their normative aspect; human worth makes human rights-holders morally significant,
and it makes certain goods and treatment not just good for them, but also due to them. Things
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Or one could reject normativity altogether. But my project is a realist take on worth, rights, and
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regard to moral facts.
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that lack moral significance, and things of which it cannot be said that certain goods and
treatment are due to them, are things that lack the requisite worth.
Appealing to objective human worth also provides my account with a way to account for
the objective rightness and wrongness, and the objective justice and injustice, of acting in
particular ways regarding rights-holders in those contexts in which there are not laws or
contracts in place explicitly defining the rights of rights-holders or the just and unjust treatment
of rights-holders. Human worth and inherent human rights precede human contract, social
contract, divine proclamation, or law; so instances of racism are unjust even in contexts in which
racism is sanctioned, because instances of racism are instantiations of disrespect for the
objective worth of a rights-holder. (In such a case, the laws or contracts that permit racism are
unjust in the structural sense.) Granting that human worth is conceivable as a moral property of
humans, worth can provide us with an ontologically real and fixed starting point in our cognizing
about the moral and just treatment of people.
So, an appeal to human worth reifies the moral significance of humans (but does not
necessarily arbitrarily locate us at some apex of moral considerability), and it provides normative
force to the claims we make against others in socio-moral contexts. It explains why racism is
wrong, even in those socio-moral contexts in which racism is entrenched or sanctioned—justice
as ultimately appealing to the treatment that is due to individuals vis-à-vis their human worth
counts racism as an injustice, because it recognizes instances of racism as being instances of
rights-holders being treated in some way other than their objective human worth demands in
that context. Starting with the worth every human has ultimately gives us an account that is
sensitive to egalitarian intuitions and our intuitions about fairness, and it gives us a way to justify
the conviction that every human is an object of serious moral consideration, regardless of nonmorally relevant factors like race, gender, disability, religion, sexuality, or economic status.
Reparations are a matter of justice, under my view, because justice is ultimately respect for
worth, and victims of racial injustice (both contemporary and historical) have legitimate claims
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both to compensation for what was taken from them and to existence in a web of social relations
in which their wronged status will not be perpetuated. And these claims obtain forcefully
because the wronged rights-holders have the requisite human worth.
E. Conclusion
I have presented a theory of justice that is fundamentally an appeal to human worth and
to the normatively binding social relations (rights and their correlative duties) that supervene on
that worth together with facts of the matter about those goods and treatment that are life-goods
for us. In particular socio-moral contexts humans, in virtue of their tremendous worth, make
morally legitimate claims against others to these life-goods. These claim-rights are intrinsically
social, because the contexts in which claims are made are necessarily social, and because
humans are intrinsically socially situated. That is, a human never finds himself or herself outside
of a social situation; human individuals are ever socially situated to other rights-holders and to
the relational webs, systems, institutions, and State in which they find themselves.
Individuals can treat rights-holders with the appropriate respect for their worth, or they
can disrespect their worth. When an individual treats a rights-holder with proper respect for their
worth, she treats him in ways that are consistent with the demands of justice; when an individual
treats a rights-holder in a way that disrespects his worth, in violation of the rights that supervene
on that worth, she treats him in ways that are inconsistent with the demands of justice. When
the rights-holder’s claims are not met, she is wronged; when the rights-holder’s claims are met,
she is treated according to the legitimate grounds for respect she possesses (her worth). The
rights-holder’s inherent human worth supervenes on certain inalienable properties about that
rights-holder, namely the fact of the rights-holder’s humanity. One has other rights, too, that are
alienable or conferred, in virtue of one’s social situation, context, or contingent properties about
that individual on which certain worth supervenes. But one’s inherent human worth is special, in
that one has it inalienably, and it is in virtue of every human’s inherent human worth that every
human has morally legitimate claims to certain goods and treatment in every social context.
221

With such an account, we have seen how to evaluate the actions of individuals who
harm or withhold some good from rights-holders—that is, in terms of their disrespecting the
worth of the rights-holder, thus flouting some right of theirs and the normatively binding social
relation they find themselves in to the other. With the work of Rubenstein and Anderson, we
gain a way to conceive of justice and injustice in structural terms. We gain an understanding of
the wrongs and injustices that accumulate in a society not in virtue of the actions of individual
moral actors, but rather in virtue of the social structure in which individuals find themselves.
Some wrongs are a reliable and predictable output of social structure and asymmetrical power
relation. The injustices that are most persistent in our world tend to have these structural forms.
Whether or not there is an individual moral actor who is directly responsible for a given instance
of disrespect for some rights-holder’s worth, that disrespect obtains, and the state of affairs
must be considered unjust. Rubenstein and Anderson have provided a language for just such
cases—such a state of affairs should be considered structurally unjust. Victims of structural
injustice in such states of affairs suffer from concentrated disadvantage or structural violence.
I have tried to establish that, as a matter of fact, the just society is unattainable, when
the just society is conceived of in terms of that state of affairs in which no rights-holder is
wronged and everybody gets that to which they have morally legitimate claim. However, I have
insisted that the justly structured society can be actualized—that society in which the State
meets its duties to rights-holders, in which the institutions and laws of society serve as no
impediment to rights-holders getting that to which they have morally legitimate claim from other
rights-holders, and in which the State inserts itself legitimately to right injustices and
unacceptable violence. But what of the structural violence that obtains in a given society? In the
justly structured society, the disadvantageous social relations that are permitted to persist
(whether direct or structural) manifest only acceptable deficits of somatic and mental
realizations, so the persistence of any unacceptable deficit ought to be regarded a wrong. In the
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previous chapter, I offered my Principle of Burden as a decision procedure for determining in
which cases the State is duty-bound to correct some wrong or alleviate some bit of suffering.
In the justly structured society, there will be ranges of acceptable deficits of somatic and
mental realizations. But what of a society like ours—what of the injustices and deficits in
contemporary America? So that it is immediately before the reader, here is the Principle of
Burden I offered earlier:
PB:

i.

In any case in which the State is capable of rectifying some instance of
violence (whether direct or structural), the State is duty-bound to do so
unless:
doing so violates the morally legitimate claims of some bystander rights-holder in
that context, or

ii. doing so would render the State incapable of addressing more egregious cases
of violence or some other wrong, or
iii. there is some other plausible morally legitimate way of resolving the violence that
does not require State intervention, or
iv. independent of conditions i–iii, the deficit of somatic and mental realizations is
unavoidable relative to the particular socio-moral context.
When conditions (i) or (ii) are met, I conceive of that State as being obligated not to intervene;
when (iii) or (iv) are met, the State is simply not obligated to take action, although its action
would be good. Add this to the elements of the justly structured society I introduced earlier,
where such a society is structured:
i.

in such a way that persons can be rendered all of that to which they have morally
legitimate claim by other members in the moral community,

ii. in such a way that persons are rendered all that which they are owed by the
State and other public institutions, and
iii. in such a way that persons are protected by enforceable laws from actions of
others who would demean them or withhold from them their right.
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Recall that (i) is a necessary condition of the justly structured society because it is necessary
that the systems, institutions, founding documents, etc., of a society are not such that they
actively preclude the fulfillment of the morally legitimate claims that obtain between rightsholders. Element (ii) is a necessary condition of the justly structured society because a society
in which the State itself does not fulfill its morally legitimate duties to the rights-holders over
which it is sovereign (as in, its duties to provide clean water to everyone, or a basic mode of
health care) could hardly be conceived of as justly structured. And (iii) is a necessary condition
of the justly structured society because there are very many cases of a rights-holder’s rights
being violated in which the State should step in to right the wrong, alleviate the suffering
caused, and bring any wrongdoer to justice. A combination of these necessary conditions and
my Principle of Burden helps to flesh out the necessary conditions of the justly structured
society.
Under the criteria that I have laid out for the just society and the justly structured society,
I take it to be uncontroversially clear that our liberal democracy in the United States is not only
unjust (which can be said of every society that exists), but also structurally unjust. That is not to
say that our society is unique with regard to my characterization of it as being structurally
unjust—probably, all societies on our planet are structurally unjust, and in fact the United States
is better off than most. But in our society clear and glaring deficits of somatic and mental
realizations obtain, even in just the one domain of structured race relations.
Take the experience of Black America, for example, a community whose status is
traditionally and currently that of wronged. From police violence against the African American
community,284 to education performance gaps between the students of racially segregated
schools and neighborhoods,285 to the relative lack of access to good credit,286 and healthy

See Tate, Jenkins, and Rich, “Fatal Force.”
See Rothstein, Racial Achievement Gap.
286
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food287—it is clear that the community members of Black America are victim to concentrated
disadvantage, and Elizabeth Anderson’s work alongside others makes the case powerfully for
anyone who is in doubt.288 The social arrangements in which Black Americans find themselves
are unjust and structurally unjust; that is, Black Americans are frequently wronged
interpersonally, as a product of the way our social systems and institutions are arranged
(racialized disparities in access to clean drinking water or racialized disparities in criminal
conviction and sentencing in our criminal justice system),289 or in some combination of the two
(as in instances of police brutality). As a product of the way our social relations have long been
structured and are currently structured, rights-holders in the Black community are routinely
withheld that to which they have morally legitimate claim and these instances of disrespect for
Black rights-holders’ inherent worth do real harm and generate new claims to corrective justice
and compensation.
It is clear why this is a form of structural injustice. Many of these wrongs are a product of
social structures and relations, and of the way certain systems and institutions have the effect of
disadvantaging some communities relative to others. Individuals who belong to groups that are
routinely disadvantaged suffer from deficits of somatic and mental realizations and in many
cases (as when a Black child is denied the kind of quality of education that the White child who
lives just across town benefits from) these social relations should be conceived of as wronging
the rights-holder.
Do American social arrangements in the particular domain of American race relations
meet my original three criteria for the justly structured society? No. It does not obtain for every
citizen in America that (i) our society is structured in such a way that persons can be rendered
all of that to which they have morally legitimate claim by other members in the moral community.
Brones, “Food Apartheid.”
In addition to Anderson, Imperative of Integration, see Anderson, White Rage; Kendi, Stamped; and
Coates, Between the World and Me.
289
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That is, it is false that there are no institutional barriers to every Black American (for example)
receiving all of that to which they have morally legitimate claim from other rights-holders and
from the State and various other public systems and institutions; Anderson’s work on the effects
of segregation and concentrated disadvantage, for example, reveals how institutionalized racial
segregation keeps rights-holders of different races apart spatially, cutting off access to the
political, social, cultural, and financial capital held by more affluent rights-holders.290 This spatial
separation restricts opportunity for Black Americans and it cuts Black Americans off from the
social spaces in which the systemically advantaged find access to capital and opportunity.
And it does not obtain for every citizen in America that (ii) our society is structured in
such a way that persons are rendered all that which they are owed by the State and other public
institutions. The United States government, state governments, and local municipalities have
been historically numb to the interests of Black America and other ethnic minority groups. The
State is duty-bound, by the ineradicable worth of Black Americans, to provide Black Americans
with the same kind of clean water that more affluent communities have access to, with the same
kind of police protection that affluent communities have had access to, with the same kind of
health care and nutrition opportunities that more affluent neighborhoods have access to, and
with the same quality education that white kids across town have access to. In as much as the
State owes these things to every member of its society, these things are due Black Americans
by the State, in virtue of the ineradicable worth of Black Americans—but inequalities in access
to each of these public goods obtains nationally and locally. In those inequalities, and in the
deficits that result, we see wrongs.
And, finally, it does not obtain for every citizen in America that (iii) our society is
structured in such a way that persons are protected by enforceable laws from actions of others
who would demean them or withhold from them their right. In the United States, there are laws
in place that protect rights-holders from discrimination and being unjustly wronged by other
290
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rights-holders, and there is a justice system that to some degree sets such wrongs right, but the
justice system is enforced without racial equity and entire institutions within the American justice
system were designed and are perpetuated in such a way that disadvantage is meted out to the
people of color under their jurisdiction. None of this is to say that some people in the United
States do not know justice; indeed, if you are racially and economically privileged in our society,
one could hardly blame you for thinking that you live in a structurally just society. The structure,
after all, works well for you, though certainly you know of the injustices that befall others. But
that there are entire swathes of rights-holders who are either directly wronged by the State or
who are indirectly disadvantaged by standing social and institutional relations indicates that not
everyone in our society experiences structural justice. So, our society is best conceived of as
structurally unjust.
Further, our society is far from meeting the dictates of the Principle of Burden I offered.
The hands of our liberal democracy are hardly tied, when it comes to the State intervening to set
right certain wrongs. Many of the egregious wrongs in our society are such that the State could
intervene and do justice—and ought to. The State is duty-bound, for instance, to intervene in
cases of racial inequity in education funding, but in many cases it does not. The disparity in
education funding by race is striking.291 And, presumably, the State could right the vast array of
wrongs associated with these disparities without (i) violating anybody’s morally legitimate
claims, without (ii) making the State incapable of preventing some other wrong, and without (iii)
doing so unnecessarily or wastefully on grounds that some other agent or institution could or
should intervene. And, presumably, it is false that (iv) the deficit of somatic and mental
realizations caused by school water that has toxic chemicals in it is an acceptable deficit.
Surely, for example, given our social context and massive national wealth it is a reasonable
moral expectation that the State make provision for ensuring that every public school child be
able to drink nonhazardous water at his or her school and have access to updated textbooks.
291
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So, it is not as if the structural injustices that persist in our society are such that the State is
unable or morally obligated not to address them. Many of the structural injustices that obtain are
such that the State is obligated to address them, but simply does not.
In a liberal democracy like ours, the problem of the persistence of structural injustice is
fundamentally a collective action problem. The resolution of the structural injustice and
structural violence over which public policy has some say is a matter of political will. In a
representative democracy, rights-holders vote for leaders to represent their values, priorities,
and interests in government, and these leaders write policy and are held accountable for their
work in the next election. So, in a liberal democracy, the conversation about the State’s duties to
rights-holders is a conversation about the complex moral weave constituted both by the duties
of office of those in elected office and in the public service sector to those who have been
wronged, and by the duties of individual rights-holders to those who have been wronged to vote
in particular ways and to pressure law-makers to address systemic wrongs.
Our normatively binding social relations are constituted by claims against our moral
interlocutors—I have legitimate claim to being treated in certain ways but not others, and those
claims tug at the rights-holders around me. I have morally legitimate claims to not being unjustly
physically assaulted by officers of the State—those claims pull at individual officers of the State,
they pull at those who determine law enforcement policy implementation, they pull at those with
the power to rewrite law enforcement policy, and they pull at those with the power to vote or
work politically and socially to install new leaders. When an injustice like police brutality
happens and then persists, individual officers have wronged the victim, leaders of the
institutions in our justice system have wronged the victim, policy makers with the ability to
rewrite the laws that govern our justice system have wronged the victim, and those who are able
to (but who do not) exercise their political agency in service of reforming the justice system so
that police brutality no longer persists have wronged the victim. We have failed, individually and
collectively, to act with proper respect for the worth of the individual who has been wronged.
228

When an officer of the State brutalizes someone unjustly, that is clearly an injustice, and
it is easy to locate the point of violation of the victim’s set of morally legitimate claims against the
officer. When law enforcement policy is such that it systemically disadvantages some
communities and not others, members of a society have obligations to those wronged
individuals and to disadvantaged groups to work politically and socially to correct the structural
injustice. In such a case, the injustice is structural, in that it is a reliable and predictable outcome
of the way our society’s institutions and systems have been arranged to the detriment of those
who typically fall victim to police brutality or mass incarceration or over-policing, but the
individuals whose worth is being disrespected make their claims against us to our participating
as individuals in society in such a way that their worth will no longer be disrespected by
policymakers, institutions, and officers of the State.
Our moral relations are the web of social relations in which we find ourselves; legitimate
claims obtain between the victim of injustice and each of the moral actors to whom or to which
the victim of injustice is socially situated. In a liberal democracy, rights-holders have agency in
determining social structure and relations; intrinsically socially situated as we are, our political
decision-making within these webs of social relations ought to be informed by the legitimate
claims others make upon us, both to our immediate treatment of them and to our activity as
intrinsically social political agents who (collectively) can determine the extent to which the worth
of the rights-holders around us is either respected or disrespected by system, institution, and
State. When I vote for the candidate with the policy ideas that will wrong African Americans, for
example, it is not as if I directly wrong African Americans in the same way the racist political
leader wrongs African Americans; but I do wrong African Americans in voting so, the wrong
being indexed to the morally legitimate claims of African Americans against me to act politically
in ways that further their betterment or preclude their abuse, all other things being equal.
There are some goods that only the State and its collective resources can be reasonably
expected to provide—for example, public safety services. That some neighborhoods are not
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provided with adequate fire safety services, for instance, is nothing I can directly correct (unless
I have incredible wealth). That is, I have no duty to provide that neighborhood with fire safety
services; and, certainly, if you live in a state or city far away from that wronged neighborhood
and your political decisions could not possibly affect them, then you have no duty whatsoever to
them regarding their lack of access to fire services. But imagine that you live in the same
legislative district or town as this wronged community—you have duties, if not to becoming a
volunteer firefighter, then perhaps to contacting your representative or mayor to have them
address the wrong, to raising awareness to this public safety hazard, etc. So, that the residents
of this neighborhood are wronged by some structural injustice does not entail that you are guilty
in the same sense that, say, the people who have directly mismanaged that city’s resources are
guilty, but the residents of that neighborhood do have morally legitimate claim on you to your
advocacy. In a liberal democracy like ours, the resolution of structural injustice lies in the
direction of collective political action, the aim being to reform unjust social structures,
institutions, and systems.
We are intrinsically socially situated and individually and collectively we ought to respond
to the morally legitimate claims of those who take up the socio-moral space around us. Past
wrongs, when not addressed, accumulate today in standing inequitable power relations and (for
some Americans but not others) closed lines to different varieties of capital. The only way to
address an accumulation of past wrongs that disadvantages some and advantages others is by
answering the morally legitimate claims generated by those wrongs: direct compensatory
reparations, and structural reparations in the form of policy and structural reform. In as much as
we can quantify the debts that are owed to those rights-holders around us in virtue of past
wrongs, we should answer those rights-holder’s claims and pay those debts; and in as much as
we can arrange our social relations and institutions so as to eliminate the structural violence that
is foisted on some Americans but not others according to factors like race, we have duties to act
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collectively to do so. Justice is respect for human worth, and answering these claims is what
respect for human worth demands.
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